ISSN 0022-5231

JOURNAL OF THOUGHT

An Interdisciplinary Quarterly

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& Henry F. Harty
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PUBLISHED BY
THE COLLEGE OF EDUCATION
THE UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA

WINTER 1981

VOLUME 16 NUMBER 4

Journal of Thought

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The *Journal of Thought* is a quarterly publication devoted to encouraging scholars of diverse disciplines, nationalities, languages and cultures to examine the significant educational issues and problems from the perspective of their various disciplines. The Editors solicit material that treats the more comprehensive issues and problems confronting education throughout the world. Interdisciplinary dialogue among scholars is encouraged.

All correspondence and prospective articles should be sent to the Editor, *Journal of Thought*, College of Education, the University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma 73019. Manuscripts must be submitted in triplicate, be typed and double-spaced, and be accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope for their return. We suggest that the authors use *A Manual of Style* (University of Chicago). Notes must be numbered consecutively at the end of the article.

Books and book reviews should be sent to Carlton H. Bowyer, Book Review Editor, College of Education 404, Memphis State University, Memphis, Tennessee 38152.

Subscription rates per year are $12.00 domestic and $15.00 outside the U.S. Back issues are $4.00 per copy and may be obtained from the editor. *Special Topic* editions will vary in price.

The opinions and views expressed in the *Journal of Thought* are those of the individual authors and are not to be construed as the opinions of the Editors, their Colleges or Universities, or the University of Oklahoma.

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The Scribe

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Alternative Faculty Activity: The Federal Agency Experience

It is common knowledge today that many academic disciplines have an oversupply of faculty and that no relief is in sight. The demand for these people shows no sign of increasing, but the supply is not diminishing. As a consequence of this excess, many with terminal degrees suffer frustrated academic careers and others live in fear of joining them. In private moments one must suspect that these academic fields are themselves utterly without discipline—that they function only by absorbing large numbers of students into a process which at its conclusion yields individuals prepared only to participate in repeating the process in perpetuity.

Several solutions come to mind. One is to construct ways for educational institutions to increase their use of these people. It is not difficult to devise proposals. Certainly there are many possibilities for curricular enrichment. Typically, though, these suggestions run into the brick wall of finances. Resources are simply not available to fund what are otherwise intriguing and intellectually challenging ideas. And one traditional route out of the faculty, movement into academic administration, is already well used. Additional help from this quarter cannot be expected.

A second possibility is simply to reduce the supply. Indeed, in some disciplines it is way past time to take action. Right now, for instance, current wisdom suggests that only about 10% of those presently enrolled in humanities PhD programs will be able to find sustained or tenurable faculty positions. Yet, humanities graduates are notoriously those for whom positions other than teaching are

located only with the greatest difficulty. Surely some of these programs must be helped to shut down. For some time now applicants have not been encouraged, but they keep coming and being admitted so stronger medicine seems required. Of course, opportunity must be provided for those interested in pursuing at the graduate level all manner of studies. But the provision of such opportunity must be balanced by much more thoughtful consideration as to the future for such students.

Doubtless, market mechanisms will indeed eventually prevail, but in the interim the problem remains. Accordingly, I want now to consider a third possibility—alternative uses of presently employed faculty. A number of advantages present themselves in this connection. Enabling current faculty to pursue other endeavors for a period permits the reinvigoration and rejuvenation which their current immobility as faculty both prevents and requires. Additionally, many of these faculty will in the process be exposed for the first time to the conditions which define the experiences of their non-traditional students. This exposure is of no small importance in their own personal and professional growth and in their ability to counsel and instruct the non-traditional student. And, of course, with the absence from campus of these "regular" faculty, opportunities are thereby created for some of the younger PhDs searching for teaching positions. Naturally the institution benefits in a number of ways from these new individuals.

There are various ways in which such alternatives for faculty can be identified. My experience has been with the "mobility" program whereby agencies of the federal government hire on a temporary basis selected faculty members for negotiated assignments which range from pure research to program management. Officially known as the IPA or Intergovernmental Personnel Act program, this resource has received increasing use in recent years.

The IPA opportunity was designed to secure several objectives. Basically it allows agencies to move quickly in enlisting the assistance of individuals with desired areas of expertise. Agencies can move quickly because they bypass the cumbersome civil service competitive process. The condition for doing so is that the individual employed is only a temporary employee. At the very most he or she can stay four years. Assignments of such length are extremely unusual, for most are about a year long. An additional inducement for

an agency to participate is that under the "detail" provision an individual on an IPA assignment is not counted against the personnel ceiling of the host agency. The agency must have the budgetary resources necessary to support the financial arrangements negotiated with the individual, but usually the expense is less than the cost of a formal consultant for the work in question.

Agencies vary in the use which they make of the IPA opportunity. Some, such as the former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the Department of Agriculture, make fairly extensive use. Others, such as the Department of Energy, have internal policies which work against any significant involvement, especially of university or college personnel. Technically, the IPA legislation also permits agencies to send individuals to academic institutions although this practice is infrequent. Additionally, the legislation authorizes exchanges of personnel between state and local governments, Indian tribal governments, and the federal government.

While agency practices do vary, the financial arrangements in a typical IPA assignment of a faculty member are quite favorable both to the individual and to his or her academic institution. Technically the salary level is pegged to the job description. But the assignment is constructed for a particular individual with distinctive skills and credentials, so the salary is commensurate with the market for him or her. In the federal pay scale, the market is always at least equivalent to the academic salary and frequently is considerably higher.

In the vast number of cases the agency picks up the full salary, leaving the academic institution with responsibility only for the fringe benefit package. Not infrequently the agency will assume that expense as well. Financially, then, the arrangement is certainly attractive to higher education, enabling faculty renewal and reinvigoration at little sacrifice. And the host agency also profits, for it is able to command resources it might not have were the alternatives only a full-time regular appointment or a consultancy.

A properly planned and well executed IPA assignment brings more than financial benefit to all parties. Agencies to which an individual on IPA comes benefit from the fresh perspectives and special competencies which he or she brings. At the very least, the individual has the advantage of learning how decisions are made in a new environment and can return to his or her original institution with this broadened awareness. Typically, though, much more is possible. By way of illustration, consider three types of faculty members.

The one type includes the individual whose research program has been completed and who had not been able to identify a new one. Inadequate equipment may be the problem; insufficient computer access would be an example. Perhaps support staff is too small or there is simply not enough available time or colleague stimulation. Challenging IPA opportunities can revitalize anyone in this situation. Of course, once can also pursue to advantage established research interests in an IPA assignment. The point is that a new organizational environment can provide enormous assistance.

The second type of faculty member for whom an IPA assignment can offer considerable promise is the middle-aged and demoralized. Left over from earlier days when student interests or curricular requirements were different, the individual now finds that crowds which once thronged to his or her class are elsewhere. Hurt by this betrayal, he or she has difficulty identifying new ways to attract students or to serve the institution in alternative ways. It is the rare individual who remains enthusiastic in these altered circumstances. A change of pace is in order.

Even those faculty who are in areas of current demand reach points at which they wonder whether continued service presents adequate challenge and reward. With almost unbroken declines in SAT scores and other evidences of reduced college preparedness in recent years, it is the unusual faculty member who contemplates without distress an uninterrupted commitment to such effort.

It is clear that several objectives can be pursued. I have mentioned research activities, old and new. Disciplinary interests can also be advanced significantly through other kinds of activities, particularly those involving program management. In addition to sharpening old competencies, the experience can provide new ones. In fact, an IPA assignment presents a significant opportunity to develop an understanding of activities in a non-academic environment. The challenge of transferring to a different sector skills and abilities developed in academe can be quite instructive. Success in this exercise can only enhance one's sense of worth and one's confidence in education.

Such bolstering or self confidence is no small achievement. As a result, some will conclude that it is both time to make a career change and possible to do so. In these cases, the individual—by not returning to campus or if doing so by then shortly afterwards returning to government—creates new opportunities for other, younger faculty

members or aspiring faculty members to enter. Other IPA's will return to campus with old competencies rehoned and new ones acquired. In either case the institution gains.

I should point out, however, the difficulties involved. It is not always easy to sell agencies on the value they will gain through sponsoring an IPA. Academics are sometimes among the more vocal critics of government and bureaucrats can be sensitive. Sometimes, too, those in the federal service are simply suspicious of people from without—a characteristic also not unknown among those in higher education. Mutual distrust, then, must frequently be overcome. Additionally there is often a problem of supply and demand. Those with quantitative skills, for instance, are much more attractive than those without. Some disciplines which are currently most underutilized on campus are also those in which agencies have the least interest. Also, there is no central clearinghouse for such opportunities. Simply learning where there are agency offices or bureaus with interest becomes a monumental chore for the individual. There are a few associational programs that provide assistance in this regard, but they depend upon uncertain funding and can handle only fifteen or twenty individuals.

Finally, it is still unclear how the priorities of the new administration will actually affect agency use of IPA arrangements. Doubtless some agencies will reduce their use in favor of maintaining the maximum number of permanent staff. Others, though, will view the IPA mechanism as an excellent way to cope with new demands in a time of uncertainty. The challenge will be to find them.

The present tenure system guarantees that faculties will become increasingly older. It is commonly estimated that within a decade 50% of the nation's faculty members will be over 50 years of age and less than 25% will be under 40. New laws against mandatory retirement will exacerbate the difficulties. In this context, any opportunity for creative personal renewal is critical to faculty vitality. With the current limits on traditional avenues to such opportunity, resources such as the IPA become increasingly significant.

Controversy

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Back to Basics: Timeless Concepts

At a national meeting of educators, three free-lance educational writers were invited to address the group. They were asked to express their views on a variety of topics currently receiving considerable attention in educational magazines throughout the nation.

The meeting followed a symposium format, allowing each speaker time to present his views before opening the meeting to questions from the audience. This report gives you a capsulized version of each speaker's remarks.

The first speaker developed the following concepts:

1. Depiction of violence and sex should not be permitted.
2. Censorship is necessary in the education of children.
3. Youthful opinions, once formed, are difficult to eradicate.
4. Excellence in studies should be encouraged.
5. A mastery of mathematics is absolutely essential.
6. The structure of subject matter should be emphasized.
7. A balance of work and play should be encouraged.
8. Moral training is an important facet of any educational program.

The second speaker stressed the importance of the following concepts:

1. Formal education should begin at age seven; earlier, only if a burden is not placed on the youthful mind.
2. Youthful adaptability should be recognized in the development of school programs.
3. Individual differences among students should be recognized.

4. The individuality of the pupil should be acknowledged.
5. Incentives should be offered to the student to arouse his competitive spirit and interest in school subjects.
6. Physical education has its place in the school setting.
7. Mastery of a second language should be required.
8. Reading instruction should be a slow process.
9. Several subjects may be taught at one time.
10. The poetry and prose of the masters should be studied.
11. The teacher is the parent of the student's mind.

The third speaker directed his attention to the following topics:

1. Regular attendance should be required.
2. Equal educational opportunities should be provided for boys and girls.
3. Schools should be pleasant in appearance and conduct.
4. Subjects should be geared to students' needs.
5. Students learn by doing.
6. Knowledge is not innate, but is derived from sense experience.
7. Higher education should be offered only to those who can derive benefit from it.

At the conclusion of the presentation segment of the symposium, the three speakers—Plato, Quintilian, and Comenius—entertained questions from the audience of educators. The questions indicated a lack of agreement on the part of the audience on many of these basic principles. How far have we advanced in this great endeavor called education?

Humor

Get To Know Your Dean, Dr. Forbisher

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Every year, freshly minted assistant professors join college faculties and assume duties befitting their exalted positions: heavy teaching schedules, surplus comatose advisees, permanent recordership on standing committees, and extramural tasks for which no financial compensation is provided.

Bemused clerks load up these untenured novices with policy manuals, parking regulations, tables of organization, campus maps, and assorted guidelines. Thus encumbered the newcomers limp away to their windowless scriptoria and wade through their acquisitions. Finally they realize what the Provost meant when he spoke of "rights and privileges thereunto appertaining" during the doctoral investiture ceremony.

It will shock the fledgling academician (known hereinafter as Dr. Forbisher) to discover that nowhere in his silo of mimeo-graffiti is reference made to his Dean, as a person. Proof of a decanal presence may be found, certainly. His undecipherable signature legitimizes numerous documents, and even Dr. Forbisher knows that every reputable college has at least one Dean on the books. Beyond that, however, Forbisher will learn next to nothing about his boss. The fleeting glimpse he caught of the Dean during the hiring process ("Hey, Bish . . . there he is. That's *him!*") dissolved rapidly, leaving more shadow than substance (an impression shared by the senior faculty).

I am deeply troubled by this syndrome. To allow Forbisher to drift blithely into his first semester devoid of appreciation for his chief executive is to handicap him profoundly. After all, Forbisher may bump into the Dean on a stairwell, or in an elevator—or just before

the year's one and only faculty meeting. Destinies are shaped by such close encounters. It behooves Forbisher to study the man to whom he will relate so intimately, the solon whose keen insights into the human psyche will be capstones to assessments of Forbisher's worthiness as a faculty member. Actually, veteran professors should bear the major responsibility in such instances. They owe it to Forbisher to orient him to the Dean's attributes early on. For some inexplicable reason they usually keep silent.

How then, is Forbisher to learn? Who will tell him what he needs to know? Deans are too self-effacing to reveal much about themselves, so Forbisher must not expect strong signals from the primary source. Of course, there are provocative works he could extract from the vast body of writings on the subject. Two notable examples that Forbisher might consult come to mind immediately: Dean Henry Kramp's *I Never Went to Lunch* (Popinjay Press, 1971), a soul-searing autobiography by a self-confessed failure often touted by critics as a literary antecedent to Erica Jong's *Fear of Flying*; and Lupe Guevera's *Decano Loco* (Central American Library, 1980), a terrifying account of life in a Dean's suite during a period of merit raise allocations. Realistically, Dr. Forbisher will not have time to read anything but memos for at least one year. By then, it may be too late.

In the interest of preserving Forbisher's prospects I feel compelled to cast in his direction a few pearls of unalloyed wisdom regarding Deans. My thoughts are rooted in twenty years as (to quote Charles A. Beard) an "old worker in the vineyard," and, in particular, upon my long service under Dean T. S. "Toots" Pertwell, the highly revered father of modern college administration. (Mature readers will recall Dean Pertwell's authorship in 1950 of the seminal study of administrative strategies, *Always Go to Lunch*). The Pertwell Theory, from which I have drawn liberally, is a bottomless intellectual wellspring that retains an astonishing currency. It has withstood the ravages of time and survived savage attacks from the nation's foremost pedagogues. Even in mercifully abridged form it will present much to Dr. Forbisher that he will find (as the Dean was so fond of saying, over and over) "Pert-i-Nent" to his tenuous circumstances. From my Pertwell file I proffer a palmful of nuggets for Dr. Forbisher's edification:

Axiom VII: Watch Your Mouth. Pertwell points out that Deans are frequently targets of vicious bias, not unlike other minority groups.

As a rule, the prejudice manifests in the form of demeaning nicknames (''Ol' Diz,'' ''Birdlegs,'' ''Il Duce,'' e.g.) and totally insupportable generalizations (''If he's in his office it must be payday''). For Dr. Forbisher the dangers inherent in such reprehensible practices are several: (1) maliciousness is habit-forming; and (2) invariably, one of Forbisher's competitors will inform the Dean that, at an orgiastic cocktail party, Forbisher made cheerful reference to the Dean's uncanny resemblance to Heinrich Himmler. Pertwell reminds us that *obergruppenfuehrers* never forget, especially at reappointment time.

Axiom XIV: Sanitize Your Turpitude. The classic POMP test (Pertwell Overlay of Managerial Personalities) indicates that Deans are outraged when junior faculty violate the moral code Deans exemplify in their own behaviors. A distillation of the POMP inventory tells Dr. Forbisher that it would be to his advantage if he were: happily married to his first wife, churchy, the proud father of two children, civic-minded, kind to his aged parents, neurosis-free, abstemious, and catholic in his sartorial tastes. Pertwell notes that Deans fret about confirmed bachelors, abhor divorce, eschew profanity, live in fear of ''affairs,'' and deplore agnosticism and other spiritual aberrations. To guarantee moral homogeneity Deans are driven (often, by ''voices'') to extremes, such as invalidating search committee decisions. If Dr. Forbisher slipped through the screening process somehow he would be wise, Pertwell thinks, to sell his Hare Krishna purse, get married to a socialite, have triplets, and become an ordained deacon prior to his fifth-year review.

Axiom XX: Keep It Humble. Pertwell cautions against one's letting one's light escape from one's bushel precipitously. His ''Alma Mater Matrix'' illustrates neatly how this notion may work against Forbisher if he is too cavalier in his remarks. To be precise, Forbisher ought not express visible pride in his own schools before he researches where the Dean was educated. Now, if the Dean went to Harvard, M.I.T., Chicago, Princeton, Stanford, or Yale then Forbisher is free to say whatever he wishes about his own, lesser institutions without fear of psychic reprisal. But, if Forbisher graduated with honors from any of the aforementioned ''lamaseries of the intellect,'' and the Dean did not, then he would be prudent to soft-pedal his good fortune,

lest he appear patronizing. Deans are very touchy about condescension and Forbisher may foreshorten his career by inadvertently displaying a low regard for the Dean's diplomas. Pertwell advises that Forbisher compensate for potential differentials of this sort by making public statements such as: "Golly, I'd trade my Harvard M.A. anytime for a B.S. in Education from Herpes State," "Mom was too ill to move from New Haven to Toledo, and I didn't want to desert her," or, "California was the only state my fianceé could get a doctorate in Parapsychology—so what could I do?" and the like. Word will circulate that Forbisher is appropriately unassuming about his background. Forbisher also might carry with him everywhere a copy of Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, which the Dean will believe is a treatise on modesty, and be pleased.

Axiom XXVI: Placate Your Consumers. Surveys of his colleagues Dr. Pertwell conducted show that Deans have empathetic genes. The milk of human kindness that runs through their veins is never curdled by frustration. There is a breaking point, however. Deans cannot abide maltreatment of students, particularly when the ensuing complaints end up in their laps. Messy things like this disrupt luncheon engagements and regularly scheduled rounds of golf with the Vice-President for Finance. Pertwell urged Dr. Forbisher to steer clear of causing such problems by: (1) Announcing right off that he gives "A's" only, except to chronic absentees, who receive automatic "B's"; (2) Refusing to divulge the true location of the Dean's office; (3) Blaming graduate assistants for everything; or (4) Teaching correspondence courses exclusively. It never hurts, either, to cancel one class per week and give take-home examinations. Forbisher need not be concerned, really. If he remains flaccid and avoids alienating students his annual rating will cause him no pain. Pertwell assures us that Deans normally evaluate new faculty in terms of how many grievances have been filed against them; net losses in student credit hours occasioned by an instructor's add-drop ratio; and the quality of rumors passed on to the Dean by departmental secretaries.

One could continue mining Pertwell's theories indefinitely. Ah, what a lode! He gave us an endless supply of (as he was wont to say, over and over) "axiom bombs" to energize our imaginations and guide us through the radioactive waters of higher education. The

sampling above is sufficient, I think, to prepare Forbisher to deal intelligently with strange, new Deans.

Deans, Pertwell infers, are more to be pitied than censured. They need desperately to be understood. Forbisher will discover that they are as responsive to sympathetic stroking as are normal folk. It requires but a modicum of effort. It is an investment a junior faculty member can well afford to make. It is a humanitarian gesture, and it can bring big, big dividends.

Get to know your Dean, Dr. Forbisher. I did, and it changed my life. Once I made the commitment everything came to me: promotions, raises, consultantships, reduced workloads, awards, you name it. But best of all, it brought me the friendship of Dean T. S. Pertwell. And, even after many more years than I care to count, we remain very close. He was, and is, a model and an inspiration. And he is still going strong. As always, old "Toots" continues to hold office hours from ten to eleven each Friday morning on the porch of the Bide-a-Wee Rest Home in (would you believe) Nutley, New Jersey. I send him a card every Christmas.

Authors & Articles

Harry S Truman and the Recognition of Israel

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In 1944 Congress had considered passing a resolution in support of a Jewish commonwealth in Eretz Israel, or Palestine as the Roman and British imperialists called it, but it yielded to Roosevelt's pressures and dropped the resolution. Members of Congress yielded to F.D.R.'s viewpoint that such a congressional resolution might be used by Nazi propagandists to injure the Allied cause amongst the Arabs. As Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy said, "from a military point of view we would much prefer to let such sleeping dogs lie."[1]

Senator Harry S Truman had often expressed his understanding and sympathy for the plight of the Jewish people, but he would not override Roosevelt's Middle East policies as can be seen from his letter to the president of the Jewish National Workers Alliance dated February 16, 1944:

> With the difficulty looming up between Russian and Poland, and the Balkan States and Russia, and with Great Britain and Russia absolutely necessary to us in financing the war I don't want to throw any bricks to upset the apple cart, although when the right time comes I am willing to help make the fight for a Jewish homeland in Palestine.[2]

Truman knew the history of the Jewish people. He was personally aware of the tragedies that befell the Jews during the holocaust of World War II. It reminded him of his Missouri-Kansas people displaced by the Civil War. The self-made man from Independence who helped end World War II, who inaugurated the self-help concept in American foreign policy, and pioneered for civil rights, played an important role in the history of the Jewish people. He insisted on a

tribunal to record the crimes committed by the Nazis and their cohorts; he called on Britain to open Palestine to Jewish immigrants and he fought for a revision of American immigration laws. It was Truman who also invited 982 displaced persons encamped in Oswego, New York to enter America and not return to Europe as F.D.R. had envisioned it when he invited them in August 1944.

After he discovered that the inmates of concentration camps were still kept in those camps he ordered General Eisenhower to get them out "and into decent houses until they could be repatriated and evacuated." He felt for them and on December 22, 1945, he asked Congress to do something "at once to facilitate the entrance of some into the U.S." After much deliberation and debate Congress passed the Displaced Persons Act. It failed to meet Truman's expectations since it still discriminated against Jews and Catholics. But Truman signed it on June 25, 1948, "in order not to delay further the beginning of a resettlement program and in the expectation that the necessary remedial action will follow when the Congress reconvened." Years later the Congress put together the Walter Immigration Act which Truman vetoed on June 25, 1952, because it repudiated "our basic religious concepts" and "our belief in the brotherhood of man," but Congress overrode Truman's veto. The prejudices of the 1920's remained the prejudices of the 1950's despite the Holocaust.

Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew's memo urging Truman to be cautious and to do no more than thank Zionists for information they might provide was typical of the kind of advice he received from the State Department on the Israel question.[3] But while elements of the American establishment affiliated with various Middle Eastern industrial, oil, missionary and educational interests tried to keep the doors of Eretz Israel-Palestine closed to Jews, the Yishuv (the Jewish people of Israel), the American community, particularly American Zionists-Revisionists and various members of Congress would not let them monopolize Truman's thinking with their anti-Zionist, sometimes plain old anti-Jewish feelings. David Ben Gurion tried to make this clear when he advised State Department officials that the Jewish people would reestablish their homeland regardless of broken Balfour Declaration promises, aborted congressional resolutions and insincere presidential pronouncements.[4]

By July 3, 1945, Truman had heard from various elements of the

American people and their representatives on the question of the reestablishment of a Jewish homeland. One of the many communications was a letter sent by Senator Robert F. Wagner (D., N.Y.) and signed by 54 Senators and 250 Representatives which urged him to ask England to reestablish a Jewish commonwealth there. He could not ignore such manifestations of popular will. While he followed F.D.R.'s example and promised Arab rulers that the U.S. would take no action without consulting both Arabs and Jews he sent Dean Earl G. Harrison of the University of Pennsylvania Law School to Europe as his personal investigator to report on Europe's displaced persons.

Harrison's report was heartbreaking. The refugees were still in those camps. Few wanted to remain in Europe, most wanted Palestine.[5] After reading the report Truman urged the British to lift the 1939 White Paper restrictions "without delay." At the Postsdam conference he had urged Churchill to help establish a Jewish homeland, but Churchill preferred to see such a homeland in Tripoli. When reporters had asked Truman if any progress had been made he replied that the matter was still under consideration. And when they asked whether Stalin had been consulted, he replied that there was nothing Stalin could do about it. Truman hoped that the Russians would have nothing to 'say' or 'do' about it. But it was an unrealistic expectation.

When on August 31, 1945, he urged the newly elected Prime Minister of England, Clement Attlee, to open the land to 100,000 Jews[6] some Arabs expressed their disapproval. Iraq warned Truman not lose favor with 40 million Arabs. But now many congressmen endorsed Truman's approach. Senators Wagner, Taft, and Walsh as well as House Republican leader Joseph W. Martin introduced resolutions which called upon the U.S. to secure unrestricted immigration and colonization and to assure a "free and democratic commonwealth. . . ." At first Truman favored the resolutions, but during his November 29 press conference he had second thoughts, saying that the resolutions might make the Anglo-American Committee's work superfluous. The concurrent resolution was adopted by the Foreign Relations Committee by 17 to 1, the Senate passed it on December 17 and two days later so did the House.

President Truman could not ignore such congressional consensus. Nor could he ignore the impression Dr. Weizmann had made during their meeting of December 4, 1945. Weizmann had referred to agricultural and industrial progress Jewish settlers had made in their

homeland, and he reassured Truman that the Jewish state would be based on "sound democratic foundations with political machinery and institutions on the pattern of those in the United States . . ."[7]

Attlee rejected Truman's suggestion that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Israel-Palestine. He called for an Anglo-American committee to investigate conditions for Europe's Jews, and to recommend where they might go. Truman agreed to such an inquiry provided attention would be focused on Palestine and that it would work quickly.

The committee investigated and recommended that 100,000 should be admitted to Israel-Palestine immediately. But the British balked. When the British called for still another committee of experts to examine the "43 subjects" of the Palestine question, Truman insisted that first the 100,000 be admitted and then the experts could split hairs.[8] When he advised the British that the U.S. was prepared to assume all expenses and provide the necessary transport for the 100,000, Foreign Minister Bevin's response was to accuse Truman of wanting to dump Jews into Palestine because the U.S. did not want them.

Many in America were displeased by the British attitude, and they urged Congress to withhold all loans to England unless the 100,000 were admitted. Their words were strong, but they lacked the necessary votes to back up their sentiments.

Because he felt Bevin sought to promote "racial prejudice and friction" amongst American and British peoples Congressman Bill Barrett (D., Pa.) demanded an apology from Bevin.[9] Others like Congressman Biemiller (D., Wis.) found Bevin's remarks "insulting" and he called on British officials to cease their "Gestapo tactics."[10] But while the politicians engaged in verbal exercises, the people of Eretz Israel-Palestine were in strife and war.

On June 18, the Haganah blew up eight bridges on the Eretz Israel-Palestine frontiers. A week later Attlee retaliated. Jerusalem was placed under curfew and 2600 Jews were arrested. It was then that Truman called upon the British to admit the 100,000 Jews to Palestine "with all dispatch. . . ."

The torture and imprisonment of thousands of Jews by the British reminded Congressman Emanuel Celler of the "Spanish Inquisition" and "the Gestapo." It was all too incredible. While the British authorities accomodated former Nazi collaborator Haj Amin el Husseini in an Egyptian palace, they imprisoned Moshe Shertok, a man

who had helped recruit over 25,000 Jews for service in the British Army during World War II. But, as British tactics had not succeeded against 1776 America and 1947 India, so they would not succeed against the Jews. Celler wanted to know what Truman was doing to help save the Jews. The U.S. had done nothing to help save them during World War II and now it was sending over 4 billion dollars to help the British, who were keeping the Jews out of their homeland.[11] Former Senator Guy M. Gillette did not find the Middle East Battle to be between "the oppressed Arabs and the persecuted Jews" but between the "interests of empire and the happiness of peoples."[12] Palestine was not England, said Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah, and the British had no right to exclude the Jews from there.[13]

American and British cabinet committees met and devised a plan for a strong central government to rule over two autonomous states; 1500 out of the 45,000 square miles of West Palestine was to be under Jewish control; the central government was to keep control over Jerusalem and Bethlehem as well as the Negev; and Arab approval would be needed before the 100,000 Jews could be admitted.

Very much concerned with this development, American Zionists asked James G. McDonald to see President Truman. McDonald saw Truman on July 27, 1946, and found him to be displeased with the pressures the Israel question had created. "If we get the 100,000 at the price of this," said McDonald, "you will go down in history as anathema." Truman seemed to "explode" at that remark, but McDonald was not daunted by this President's burst of temper and he continued that even "if indirectly Truman gave assent to this thing, he would be responsible for scrapping the Jewish interests in Palestine."

"Well," said Truman, "you can't satisfy these people." Truman insisted that he would strive to get the 100,000 in but the "Jews aren't going to write the history of the United States or my history."[14] A number of congressmen likewise protested against the injustice of the new plan. The Arabs had received some 1,200,000 square miles of land since Lord Balfour's declaration of 1917, but the Jews were still excluded from the land of their forefathers.[15]

By August 12, Truman likewise rejected the cabinet committees' plan as unfeasible.[16] When on Yom Kipper, October 4, 1946, Truman wished the Jewish people a happy holiday he again asked the British to admit the 100,000 to Eretz Israel-Palestine. Four days later

he wrote Walter F. George, revealing an understanding and sympathy for the Jewish people seldom matched by any other American president. He wished that all members of Congress could have a chance to visit the displaced persons camps to see just what was happening to 500,000 human beings "through no fault of their own." These people had to be "properly located" and there was no reason "in the world why 100,000 Jews could not go to Palestine," nor was there any reason why the unused northern European quotas could not be used by the displaced persons.[17]

England and the Arabs did not care for Truman's stand and they told him so. Saudi Arabia's king wrote Truman on October 15 that the Jews were the aggressors and he found Truman's remarks astonishing. Truman responded by recalling that all parties concerned had "a common responsibility" to work for a solution that would permit those who must leave Europe to find a home and "dwell in peace and security." America, he said, supported the right of the Jews to enter Palestine, but he promised not to undertake "any action which might prove hostile to the Arab people . . ."[18]

England threw the problem into the U.N. hopper on February 18, 1947, accusing Truman of using the Eretz Israel-Palestine question to gain votes. This accusation unsettled many Americans and some even suggested that America should not assist the British in Greece and Turkey. The British request for General Assembly action was formally received by the U.N. on April 2, 1947, and on May 15, a Special Committee on Palestine was ordained to study the question.

After months of investigation UNSCOP recommended that two states be established, one Jewish and the other Arab. While the Negev was to go to the Jews, Jerusalem was to be under a U.N. trusteeship and there was to be an economic union. UNSCOP's recommendations were rejected by the Arabs, but most Jews accepted and President Truman favored it. He wanted peace and believed that it could be obtained if the leaders of the world kept their promises and agreements.

Congress supported partition. Some thirty members wrote Marshall on May 9, 1947, asking him to support partition.[19] But Washington's bureaucratic circles had different ideas. They fought to prevent the rebirth of the Jewish state. While UNSCOP recommended partition with the Negev and Elath going to a Jewish state, some of those officials like Robert A. Lovett (Under Secretary),

Dean Rusk (U.N. desk), Loy Henderson (Head of Middle East Division) allied themselves with the Arabs and the British in opposition to a viable Jewish state. Perhaps they believed that Britain could keep the Arabs friendly and thereby prevent Russia from making headway in that part of the world. Whatever the reasons, the U.S. delegation to the U.N. worked against the UNSCOP boundary recommendations, and the prospects of a ⅔ General Assembly vote in favor of UNSCOP's partition seemed dim. By November 17, 1947, the Jewish observer delegation urged Weizmann to seek Truman's assistance against the American bureaucrats.

When Dr. Weizmann saw the President he again explained the importance of the Negev and Elath. Truman seemed impressed and promised to clearly instruct his U.N. delegation on the Negev and Elath questions.[20]

Just as Truman assured Weizmann, the State Department instructed its delegate at Lake Success to advise the Jews that America would not support them on the Negev and Elath issues. At 3 P.M., November 19, Ambassador Herschel Johnson met with Moshe Shertok to transmit that news when an aide approached to tell him that there was a phone call for him. Johnson refused to be interrupted until he learned that it was a presidential message. When Johnson returned to Shertok he apologized for the inconvenience he had caused him and said that he hoped their talks "could be continued on another occasion."[21] Truman insisted that his representatives understood that Elath and the Negev were to be part of the future Jewish state.

As the vote on partition came before the U.N. General Assembly on November 29, 1947, thirty-three states favored partition, thirteen opposed and ten abstained. Great Britain abstained, and the Arab states denounced the resolution, declaring their determination to block its implementation by all means. While the U.N. debated, Palestinian Arabs, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, Iraq and Egypt collaborated on a plan to liquidate the Jews of Eretz Israel-Palestine.

An Arab strike was declared and violence erupted throughout the land. On January 9, 1948, the armed invasion of the land began by an 'Arab Army of Liberation' based in Syria. By mid-January there were hundreds of Jews and Arabs killed and wounded. On February 11, Harry S Truman had reports that the Arabs would start full-scale military operations against the Jews by March. He appealed for peace and tried to bring an end to the fighting through the Security Council, but to no avail.

Israelis had hoped that America might sell them weapons, but that hope was shattered as the Americans adhered to the U.N. arms embargo. Israel's main weapons supplier was to be Russia and Czechoslovakia. Russia did its best to reduce the Anglo-American influence in the Middle East-Mediterranean area.[22]

A variety of congressmen urged the U.S. to sell weapons to the Jews. They observed that the Arabs received supplies from England and indirectly from the U.S., but the Israelis were getting nothing. This was "illogical, indefensible, and untenable" as far as Congressman Arthur Klein was concerned. Celler reminded Truman that the U.S. had helped re-establish a Jewish state, and that it could not "wash its hands on this matter by setting up an arms embargo. . . ."[23]

But those congressmen who opposed partition were likewise opposed to sending the Jews any weapons. Congressman Rankin, Democrat from Mississippi, claimed that an "international Sanhedrin" at the U.N. was "attempting to subordinate the U.S. to its domination,"[24] and Lawrence Smith, Republican from Wisconsin, claimed that the Russians would win the Middle East if the area were partitioned. Quoting James Forrestal, he insisted that America would be forced into war and it would lose two million barrels of oil each day the war lasted.[25]

Celler attacked those Washington officials who tried to frustrate "the will not only of the Executive but of the people." He accused Loy Henderson, the "misguided chief of the Middle East State Department office, of intriguing behind the scenes to avoid decisions made on higher levels." He asked Truman to end the embargo and investigate the motives and connections of State and Defense officials.[26]

An investigation of sorts would take place into State Department motivations, but only after those officials had impeded the implementation of the President's decision. Warren Austin, U.S. Senator from Vermont and Ambassador to the U.N., announced on March 18, 1948, apparently without Truman's final approval, that the U.S. favored trusteeship rather than partition. On March 17, Truman had seen and promised Weizmann support for partition. Now he was made to look like a liar.

When Truman read the morning papers of March 19 he discovered the full impact of Austin's speech. "Isn't that hell, I am in the position of a liar and a double-crosser. I've never felt so in my life."

He felt that some State Department officials had tried to sabotage his Middle East policy and that they had tried to block his anti-Soviet expansion policy. He had hoped to "clean them out" of the government, but somehow he hadn't quite managed.[27]

After discovering Austin's speech in his morning papers Truman asked Clark Clifford to investigate how it came to pass. Clifford investigated and reported that Marshall opposed partition and directed Austin, on Lovett's recommendation, to deliver the speech at the earliest practical moment. Marshall made no provision to inform Truman as to when the speech might be delivered. While Truman had seen the substance of the speech he had not approved a "final draft of the question." Furthermore, Truman had made it clear to Marshall that "nothing should be presented to the Security Council that could be interpreted as a recession on our part from the position we took in the General Assembly." Truman had not seen the "final draft" of Austin's speech.[28] So ended Clifford's report.

On March 25, Truman issued a statement qualifying Austin's remarks: "Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate. . . ."

Austin's speech disappointed many, but as many were disappointed in Truman. Even some of Truman's best friends did not know what to make of it, and Weizmann, who had always expressed such confidence in Truman's good judgment and good intentions seemed worried about the turn of events as he wrote to Truman: "the choice of our people . . . is between Statehood and extermination. History and providence have placed this issue in your hands, and I am confident that you will yet decide it in the spirit of the moral law."[29]

Truman betrayed us to the oil billionaires, said Congressman Isacson of New York, and he asked for a congressional investigation to discover how American investors had been able to "twist the policies of this nation . . . ." James Forrestal, Defense Secretary, and William Draper, his Under Secretary, had been recruited from the Dillon Reed Company which floated ARAMCO-Standard Oil bonds. Isacson wanted to expose the administration's Arab connections.[30]

How can Truman face the people? asked Celler. This was a "shoddy underhanded turnabout." Helen G. Douglas, Democrat from California, referred to Truman's reversal as a betrayal "of people everywhere," and it showed a "lack of courageous and

intelligent leadership."[31] Vito Marcantonio (Al New York), severe critic of Truman, spared no effort to condemn the reversal as just another Wall Street trick. In 1938 "stop communism was the pretense of the cartelists to appease Hitler." That "cost the lives of six million Jews." In 1948, the "same cry is raised by our Wall Street monopolies to appease the Hitlerite Arabs . . . ."[32]

The usually circumspect New York Republican Jacob K. Javits found the American reversal repetitive of an old "bankrupt British line" which was based on a misguided and oft-disproven premise that the Arabs would be a "buffer" against Soviet expansion. Javits wanted officials like Lovett, Forrestal and Henderson to "come forward and lay their cards on the table."[33]

Appeasement was a worthless policy, said Congressman Eberhalter, Democrat of Pennsylvania. It was a "worthless effort to impose a trusteeship upon all of Palestine." The Arabs violated their U.N. obligations by refusing to accept trusteeship and by their invasion of Palestine. And the U.N. aided and abetted their aggression by imposing an arms embargo against the Israelis. The Arabs could obtain all the arms they wanted from the British. Unless Truman acted decisively "we will later regret the horrible sacrifices and bloodshed which will inevitably occur."[34]

As fighting raged in the Holy Land Samuel Rosenman, one of the President's counsels, informed Weizmann, on April 23, of the President's decision to recognize the Jewish state just as soon as it would be proclaimed.[35] But even as Truman promised to recognize the future state American officials pressured the Jews not to declare independence. Acting Secretary of State Lovett threatened to extend the existing arms embargo against the Jews. He and Dean Rusk called for secret round-table talks somewhere in a Middle Eastern desert and the postponement of independence. Rusk even accused the Jews of "armed aggression" and wanted the future Jewish state limited to a strip of land from "Tel Aviv to Haifa."[36]

Moshe Shertok advised Rusk that the Jews opposed the "somewhat spectacular proceeding" of a desert confab. Peace could be achieved through an unconditional agreement for an immediate cease-fire, but the Yishuv could not agree to another British mandate.[37]

As Clifford summed it up for Truman on May 9, partition was a reality and an accomplished fact; any further procrastination would

make the U.S. look bankrupt of reason. It was expected that Russia and its associated states would recognize Israel, and if they were first to do so American recognition would be regarded as "begrudging" and that would be "a diplomatic defeat for the U.S." Republicans would press him "before, during and after their convention" for recognition. That point could be eliminated from their platform if Truman would recognize Israel before May 16.[38]

On May 13, Weizmann wrote Truman and asked that America "the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations."[39]

Many histories of Truman's Presidency have made it appear as if his decision was a move shrouded in the utmost secrecy and mystery. It was not that much of a secret.

The possibility of U.S. recognition and the timing of Israel's proclamation of independence was known and endorsed by various men and women of the Congress. On the very day Truman was about to extend recognition Celler announced: "Independence will be declared at 6 P.M. this evening." "Take hold of yourself," said the man from Brooklyn to Truman, "push back some of your misadvisers and do what your heart prompts you to do."[40] "I always felt that the only ultimate solution of the age-old question," said John McCormack of Massachusetts, " . . . was the establishment in Palestine of a free and independent Jewish commonwealth." The sooner that Jewish state would become strong the better chance for peace in the Middle East.[41]

As Israel prepared to declare its independence, Clark Clifford asked Eliahu Elath, Jewish Agency representative in Washington, if the Yishuv was still determined to issue its proclamation. "There isn't the slightest doubt," was the answer. Clifford then asked him to draft a letter requesting U.S. recognition which he did with the help of Benjamin V. Cohen. The letter of request was rushed to the White House and President Truman recognized Israel on May 14, 1948, at 6:11 P.M. Truman's move was enthusiastically received by Israel and its supporters. The Congressional Record overflowed with expressions of support. Elbert D. Thomas of Utah applauded Truman and quoted Henry Morgenthau Jr.'s suggestion that the European Recovery Program, the Export-Import Bank and the International Bank should "consider sympathetically any applications that may be submitted by the new state."[42] Many men and women of Congress

called on Truman to lift the arms embargo since Israel faced enemies far better armed and far superior in numbers.[43] Klein, Hefferman, Javits, Celler, Blatnik, Holifield, Malter, Barkley, Vandenberg, Brewster, Ives and Magnuson, among others, applauded Truman's ability to "finally" grasp "the realities of conditions" as they were, but they felt it was time for Truman to do more than just recognize Israel.[44] He never did lift that arms embargo.

What was it that persuaded Truman to support Israel, to recognize it? Was it the overwhelming support Israel received from Congress? Perhaps they may have had an impact. He had been a member of Congress for ten years and he continued to respect its right of advice and consent.

Was it the presence of Russia in the Middle East power games that persuaded Truman to seek the friendship of Israel? Truman wanted to make sure that the Russians would not obtain Israel as an ally. The Russians were selling weapons to the Israelis, and they were more than willing to offer recognition. Truman, who had helped Turkey, Greece and Western Europe remain free of Soviet control, must have seen that U.S. recognition of Israel fell in line with his policy of self-determination.

Was the 1948 election a factor? Truman wanted to win that election and all issues concerned him, but the Republicans were as much for Israel as the Democrats. While he was concerned with votes he pursued policies with respect to Israel that alienated many voters. He sustained the arms embargo and did not make good the promise of a loan to Israel until after the American and Israeli elections.

All of the above helped influence President Truman. But there was still one more factor which is often disregarded: officialdom's attempts to make his foreign policy and to kill his policy decisions. Who was President? By what right did Lovett instruct Austin to dynamite Truman's support of partition or recognition? The study of Truman's policy towards Israel reveals the decision making process and how difficult it is to enforce policy even after goals are set. Not only does a president have to face the challenging issues and problems, but he has to beware of individuals within his own administration who want to be more than him.

In all his studies of American history and during his ten years in the Senate he had not seen such disregard. Regardless of his plighted word, regardless of Democratic platform commitments, and regard-

less of Soviet threats, middle level and sometimes upper level officials like Lovett and Rusk tried to steer their own policies. They preferred to see England as a mandate power in Palestine and to continue appeasing Arab extremists. They opposed the rebirth of a Jewish state.

Truman could not disregard the "striped pants boys," and he had to reassert the responsibility and dignity of the Presidency. He had to fight his own officials as well as the Russians, the Republicans and the pressure groups. He had to fight and win, not only for the sake of his name, but for the Presidency and whatever there was left of this thing called American democracy.

Some State and Defense officials expressed surprise with Truman's recognition of Israel, but they need not have been surprised if they had followed his policies instead of trying to redirect them.[45]

The Israelis made partition a reality and recognition by such powers as the U.S. and Russia added to that reality, but the road to peace and security for Israel was still a very long one. On November 29, 1948, Truman wrote to Weizmann: " . . . I was struck by the common experience you and I have recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts of our supposedly forlorn lost causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right—and we were both proven to be right."[46]

The man from Missouri had moments of hesitation when it came to Israel, but he did support the new state and he saw great hope for all the people of the Middle East. He envisioned Israel as a beacon of light that would help stimulate economic and industrial growth throughout that part of the world. Through the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan and Point Four he provided aid to all those states that were prepared to help themselves against the conquerors. As he put it to this writer, America had sent a team of T.V.A. engineers and experts to help advise the Iraqi government on how to develop the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Those experts came up with a plan to develop that region which could sustain some 60 million people. Iraq made no use of that plan. "The plan is in my Library. They can have it for free."[47]

Notes

[1] H. Druks, *The Failure to Rescue* (New York, 1977); *Foreign Relations of the United States*, February 22, 1944, V, 574–76.

[2] Individual's File, Zionist Archives, New York City.

[3] Harry S Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (New York, 1956), 69, 134. Hereafter cited as *Years of Trial and Hope*.
[4] *Foreign Relations of the United States*, June 27, 1948, VIII, 713–15.
[5] *Years of Trial and Hope*, 137.
[6] HST to Attlee, August 31, 1945, President's Official File 204, HST Library.
[7] Weizmann to HST, December 12, 1945, Jewish Agency Papers, Individual's Files, Zionist Archives, New York City.
[8] *Years of Trial and Hope*, 148–50; *The New York Times*, May 5, 1946; *Foreign Relations Papers*, June 21, 1946, 632–33.
[9] *Congressional Record*, June 27, 1946, A 3784.
[10] *Ibid.*, June 12, 1946, A 4139.
[11] *Ibid.*, July 2, 1946.
[12] *Ibid.*, July 3, 1946, A 3894–95.
[13] *Ibid.*
[14] James G. McDonald interview with Truman, July 27, 1946, Benjamin Akzin Files, The Zionist Emergency Council Papers, Zionist Archives, New York City.
[15] *Congressional Record*, August 2, 1946, A 4952.
[16] *Years of Trial and Hope*, 152.
[17] HST to Walter F. George, October 8, 1946, S. S. Wise Papers, Brandeis U. Archives.
[18] HST to King Saud, October 15, 1946, Official File 204, HST Library.
[19] *Congressional Record*, May 9, 1947, A 2201.
[20] Eliahu Elath, *Israel and Elath: The Political Struggle for the Inclusion of Elath in the Jewish* (London, 1966), 10–23.
[21] Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948, The First Arab-Israeli War* (New York, 1970), 14. Hereafter cited as *Genesis 1948*.
[22] Jon and David Kimche, *The Secret Roads* (London, 1954), 70.
[23] *Congressional Record*, January 2, 1948, 454–55; January 13, 1948, 121; February 19, 1948, 1418.
[24] *Ibid.*, January 15, 1948, A 204.
[25] *Ibid.*, January 22, 1948, A 434–35.
[26] *Ibid.*, January 13; February 3, 1948, 121, 1033.
[27] M. Truman, *Harry S Truman* (New York, 1973), 388–89.
[28] Clark Clifford Memo dated May 4, 1948, Clark Clifford Papers, HST Library.
[29] C. Weizmann to President Truman, April 9, 1948, Truman Papers OF 204 Misc., HST Library.
[30] *Congressional Record*, March 22, 1948, 3239–40.
[31] *Ibid.*, March 22, 1948, 3241.
[32] *Ibid.*, 3243.
[33] *Ibid.*, April 12, 1948, 4335.
[34] *Ibid.*, April 27, 1948, 4900.
[35] Kurzman, *Genesis 1948*, 84–86.
[36] *Foreign Relations Papers*, 1948, V, 2, 894–95.
[37] Shertok to Rusk, May 4, 1948, Clark Clifford Papers, HST Library.
[38] Clark Clifford Memo, May 7, 9, 1948, Clifford Papers, HST Library.
[39] Papers of HST OF 204 Misc. HST Library.
[40] *Congressional Record*, May 14, 1948, 5831.
[41] *Ibid.*, 5830–31.
[42] *Ibid.*, May 16, 1948, A 3164.
[43] *Ibid.*, May 18, 19, 20, 1948, A 3081–2, 3152, A 3157–8, A 3188.
[44] *Ibid.*, May 14, 17, 18, 1948, 5830, 5831, 5836, 5906, 5907, 5908, 5986, 5987, 5990.
[45] *Years of Trial and Hope*, 164.
[46] David Ben Gurion, *Israel: A Personal History* (New York, 1972), 474–76.
[47] Interview with Harry S Truman, August 1, 1962.

Cultural Pluralism: Implications from the Native Americans of North America

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The history of the United States of America chronicles an amazing wave of materialistic and technological accomplishments. Careful examination of this development, however, reveals a gap between the ideals of our system and the treatment of too many of our people. Similar to other nations which developed rapidly, the system has often subordinated cultural and ethnic identity. Despite its material greatness, even with its respect for human rights and personal freedom, the system has often advanced with insidious oppression, often unrecognized even to those oppressed. Our version of oppression involves the indirect suppression of individual and subcultural identity by imposition of an orientation which provides material benefits for the sacrifice of cultural identity. As historian C. Vann Woodward noted, the American people are willing to endure alien cultures so long as there is the possibility of ultimately bringing them into the mainstream of the "American Way" of living.[1] The "melting pot" metaphor characterizes this orientation.

World War II provided an opportunity for many ethnic minorities to observe other cultures and realize the oppression they unknowingly accepted in their own country. After WW II members of diverse cultural groups, especially Blacks, pushed to correct their situation; their efforts were initially toward obtaining an increased portion of the personal benefits rather than cultural identity. Indeed, their efforts led them to neglect their personal and cultural identity as they strove for the publicly defined "good things of life." As their relative

This article is a slightly edited version of a paper presented to the fifth annual convention of the Society for Intercultural Education, Training, and Research, Mexico City, Mexico, March 8, 1979.

position improved on an individual basis, awareness of cultural restrictions increased. Out of the Civil Rights Movement and increased sensitivity to human rights and ethnic identity generally, diverse social and political changes began to erode confidence in the "melting pot" and advance "cultural pluralism" instead. Throughout the country, academic institutions and some governmental and private organizations currently advocate the advantages of cultural identity and integrity. Despite the advantages, efforts to maintain a culturally pluralistic society are often ill conceived and poorly implemented. The ensuing problems for cultural minorities are perplexing. On the one hand, they want cultural identity and individuality; on the other hand, their efforts to secure these goals are producing serious problems which are sometimes so compromising as to far offset the advantages which might accrue.

The purpose of this article is to describe some of the major obstacles to viable cultural pluralism in the USA. More specifically, what are the obstacles which minorities themselves often create or perpetuate as they seek to establish their cultural identity and uniqueness? These obstacles are often the most insidious and frustrating, because they force minority individuals to address how they contribute to their own problems. Because of the diversity of cultural minorities in the USA, the article will focus primarily on select cases to portray the problems. These portrayals are not only common to other cultural minorities, but may also be generalizable to other countries who seek to maintain a viable, culturally pluralistic society. The study presumes that awareness of these problems can allow cautious, calculated movement toward cultural pluralism, thus cautioning affected minorities to avoid infatuation with idealistic goals which confuse their realistic prosperity or lack of it.

This article will focus primarily on Native American cases.[2] This focus is justifiable for several reasons. Currently Native American studies are extremely popular in the USA. Trends in this research and related programs reveal clearly the problems we wish to address. Many of these cultural minorities are also sufficiently distinct and relatively unassimilated to permit determination of early symptoms of the difficulties with cultural pluralism. Although Native American groups in North America number more than three hundred, similarities amongst them permit some generalizations which, in turn, may be analogous to other cultural minorities, especially indigenous

minorities in other countries. Admittedly, attempts to generalize from case studies of cultural minorities are fraught with danger, yet the careful linking of these cases can permit identification of salient features of the problem areas we address.

Political Discord

To understand the specific problems Native Americans encounter, salient features of the general political circumstances require attention. Despite disclaimers by those working to reinforce local tribal autonomy, federal efforts to assist tribal governance have created serious disruptions in the traditional patterns of governing. This disruption has partially resulted from undermining the traditional political safeguards by imposing an alternative system of safeguards based on the overculture's political orientation. Although responses by tribes are varied, the resulting compromises tend to be confusing and disruptive.[3] For example, the overculture presumes that power granted to a governing body or an individual will inevitably be abused. Threfore, it is necessary to establish written procedural protections that operate objectively and independently.[4] The relative success of this presumption within the broader culture itself is open to questions, but more importantly its wholesale application to its subcultures is suspect. It is difficult to anticipate the disruption caused to a cultural group whose basic philosophical orientation to power is different.

A corollary to North American suspicion of power and authority is the concern with the protection of the individual. Protection for the individual is one of the primary attributes of the elaborate American criminal justice system as well as civil recourse provided by due process and equal protection. This orientation is characterized by the saying, "Better that ten guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted unjustly." The Native American counterpart to this proposition might be, "Better that a few individuals suffer for the good of the group."[5] These antithetical approaches to governing will ultimately produce conflict between the cultures and particularly within the subordinated subculture. For this reason, many tribes of Native Americans have refused to surrender their traditional political system for those urged by the federal government.[6] Retention of their traditional system, however, does not provide a final solution, because persons within the tribe have recourse to federal courts when dissatisfied by tribal decisions.

Although examples of these problems abound, two instances merit careful attention. The notion of a democratic form of government was first uniformly imposed on Indian tribes during the 1930's under the provision of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).[7] Model tribal constitutions were drafted, and wholesale adoption of their provisions became official government policy.[8] These constitutions naturally reflected the bias and legal philosophical development of the overculture. At first the IRA was relatively successful, even though the notion of equal distribution of power among all tribal members was alien. Traditionally power was vested in certain leaders. Interestingly, the first councils elected were primarily composed of the existing traditional leadership. The early elected councils of the Southern Ute Tribe of Ignacio, Colorado, provide an example.[9] Although a tribal council had been elected, the members did not exercise their power consistent with the model constitution. Instead, the traditional headman of the tribe controlled the council. When a question was called, the council would look to the headman for an indication of a yes or no vote. All issues were unanimous. However, since that time Indian tribes have begun to function more consistently with the model constitution, despite the disruptive consequences. In resistance, many traditional leaders have withdrawn their active participation from the governing process. This results in a diminution of the tribe's collective ability to address its problems and to sustain its cultural identity. The ensuing fractionalization of tribes at this critical time renders their cultural preservation doubtful.

A more subtle example of the imposition of political philosophy is the effect of the democratic notion of reapportionment, as revealed in the idea of one man, one vote. Many tribes were traditionally organized on a clan, band or community basis. Although each unit might vary significantly in its population, they were represented equally in the government. This maldistribution of power was adjusted not on the basis of numbers but on the basis of societal functions. For instance, the religious leaders might be a small number, but their social function was highly valued. Thus, they were given equal representation in the decision making process. Many tribes patterned their voting districts according to traditional divisions without regard to population. However, federal courts have recently required tribes to reapportion their districts consistent with the one man, one vote philosophy.[10] This has shifted the balance of power to the clans,

bands, or communities that are the largest. Some of these groups traditionally provided no leadership function and had no developed leadership cadre and sophistication. Because reservations are usually economically depressed areas, new groups, previously without tribal power, have seized job opportunities and economic benefits for their own kinship or group. The consequent disruption is exemplified by the number of federal cases regarding election disputes which address voting and candidate requirements and attempted exclusion of newly elected members of tribal councils.[11]

Perhaps the most classic example of federal disregard for cultural diversity and tribal feelings was the organization of several tribes under one intertribal governing body. These intertribal groups were formed to make decisions concerning allocation of resources between the tribes. Among the many examples are the Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache (KCA) Council, of Oklahoma; the Shoshone-Banock Council of Utah; and the Cheyenne-Arapaho Council of Oklahoma. In these and other cases the tribes were traditional enemies. Combining them did not eliminate the deep-seated strife, and political struggles often centered on tribal identification.[12] If, for example, one tribe's representatives to an intertribal council meeting were in a minority, they often left and/or refused to participate actively. Whereas the BIA recognized this problem with the KCA and permitted them tribal autonomy, the sacrifice of administrative convenience came slowly, and the problem continues in many remaining intertribal councils.

The American Indian Movement (AIM) and other efforts at Pan Indianism reveal an awareness of political discord. These efforts do not, however, satisfactorily address the problems inherent to cultural diversity. Indeed they sometimes represent a substitution of one "melting pot" for another and neglect the diversity of Native American cultures. This substitution neglects tribal cohesiveness and the central notion that what it means to be Indian achieves its vitality only within a tribal context. The history of AIM reveals these problems: For example, support for AIM came primarily from urban Indians who lacked a strong tribal identity to foster a clear conception of Indianness. On the other hand, tribes such as the Pueblos who have strong tribal cohesiveness and a clearer notion of what it means to be Indian did not offer support to the movement. Another shortcoming of the AIM effort surfaced when the leaders of the movement attempted to parlay their national prominence into tribal leadership;

indeed, specific tribes typically rejected the efforts of AIM leaders to assume positions of tribal leadership.[13] Thus, the advantages of such generalized solutions to cultural problems of Native Americans have been largely offset by the problems they generated intra-tribally and intertribally.

These examples of political imposition and responses to it collectively reveal how the political philosophy of the overculture may produce serious internal disruption. Whereas the tribes may be culpable for uncritical adoption of alternative systems, whether a federal or Pan Indian alternative, they must now actively weigh the contrasts between their traditional patterns of governance and the imposed political systems, no matter how attractive or luring they might be. Unless the tribes individually address these contrasts and contradictions in realistic terms of their own political philosophy, they will perpetuate the psychological and sociological consequences which naturally follow for their people and culture.

Personal and Social Discord

Not only does the broader culture impose and encourage political constraints, it also generates psychological and sociological restrictions on minority members seeking to establish cultural identity.[14] Some tribes, like the Hopi, are aware of this dilemma and maintain two social systems: Those who inhabit the mesas of the reservation live traditionally, and those who have opted for a nontraditional lifestyle usually live in modern homes outside the village. Although members of both groups are apparently in good standing at tribal functions, their overriding concern for harmonious interpersonal relations suppresses an underriding controversy regarding the appropriate way of life.

Other examples of psychological and sociological pressures surface on our university campus. On many occasions we advise Native American students who are excited and motivated with the prospects of cultural identity. Beyond the initial level of enthusiasm we encounter a deep-seated set of frustrations. Their zealous pursuit of cultural identity often forces them to reject their less enthusiastic elders and other more self-serving contemporaries. As they further probe these intra-cultural conflicts, they often confront their own contribution to perpetuation of their problems and the shallowness of their pursuit for cultural identity. These realities, in turn, reveal the

overall shallowness of the overcultural emphasis on cultural pluralism.

Despite the open invitation to establish cultural identity, the overculture insidiously retains its emphasis and domination, indirectly compelling minorities to accept externally imposed priorities. As with Native American tribes, the minority groups' need to secure governmental financial support leads them to "chase the dollar" and establish their cultural identity only within the confines of the broader cultural "game" plan.[15] Thus, the cultural pluralism often becomes little more than a symbolic "sop," a palliative which leads groups to imagine themselves more culturally distinguished than they are and subject to frustrations and dissatisfactions they often cannot understand. As one student said in class, "What do you minorities want? You can establish your cultural identity now and still reap the benefits of the overculture!" What the young man failed to see is that the total price of the benefits is so costly that not only is the derived cultural identity anomalous, but ultimately more likely to produce serious intercultural conflicts.

Manifestations of the shallow efforts to achieve cultural pluralism are diverse. Perhaps most readily apparent is the ethnic symbolism games. These efforts reveal the shallowness, anomalies, and consequent stress for minority members. To establish cultural identity requires some means to symbolize the uniqueness. As Ralph Linton noted several years ago, groups seeking to establish their identity often reach back into their past and retrieve prominent symbols of past glory.[16] To cast these symbols in modern circumstances is often difficult, if not impossible. When a group retrieves a special ancient dance when the realistic and religious significance of such an event has long past, the performers often become entertainers for benefit of the overculture rather than sincere representatives of cultural identity. When groups retrieve archaic patterns of dress, they often call attention to the idiosyncratic rather than substantive differences. These and innumerable other examples underscore the shallow and often transparent efforts at cultural pluralism.

Perhaps most frightening is the naiveté of the young people who must vigorously pursue the shibboleths of the shallow symbols.[17] They become so engrossed in the symbols they cannot comprehend their dissatisfaction. Instead of accommodating realistic success, the symbols obscure the problems of value conflicts which originate in

more basic intercultural differences. Some of these youth suffer a regression when they realize that the trappings of cultural identity are not useful in dealing with many serious problems. Others refuse to acknowledge the disparities and create a wildly unrealistic world view. Despite cultural diversity and positive trends, which may have occurred with or without cultural pluralism, minority groups continue to encounter closed doors, disproportionate rates of failure in schools, higher suicide rates, higher prosecution and imprisonment rates, and an overall lower standard of living. No matter how comforting the symbols, these realities must be confronted.

The creation of a false sense of moral superiority and an uncritical examination of things considered Indian in general further illustrate the adoption of shallow and unrealistic identity symbols. As an important step in cultural identity people must build self-esteem and dignity. This is, however, only an initial step which must ultimately be exceeded to address broader social problems. For example, the Blacks were successful in building their self-esteem and dignity as symbolized in "Black is Beautiful." However, this symbol itself has failed to eliminate the institutionalized patterns of oppression and the behavior of some Blacks who exploit the renewed self concept for personal value alone. Analogously, Native Americans have attempted self-reconceptualization symbolized by "Everything Indian is good." Although psychologically comforting, this conceptualization does not provide an adequate basis for appraisal of Indian cultures. Thinking in terms of opposites is tempting, but relatively simplistic.

The danger of such symbolic efforts at cultural reconceptualization is the gap between the symbol and reality. For example, many young Indians have chosen to operate in a situation where they are unwilling to draw a definition of "Indian" from those around them. Thus, young Indians are caught in a dilemma. They want to be Indian, but not the kind of Indian that is poor, powerless, and helpless. The tribal elders are often viewed by youth as people who could not and did not make it. Traditional values of passivity, compromise, and patience are viewed by youth as symptoms of the deterioration and weakness of Indian culture, rather than potential strengths. They reject the teaching of these elders, and then attempt to define "Indian" as anything that is not "White." If whites work, are sober, reliable, responsible, and concerned with financial considerations, then to be Indian one must be the opposite of these "White values." This

reasoning sets in motion a dangerous self-fulfilling prophecy, as a potentially destructive, self-defeating definition of Indian begins to form: "Indian" is someone who does not work, who drinks, or who is irresponsible. These behaviors are, however, rationalized in terms of "Everything Indian is good." Needless to say, the values they reject as white are often values crucial for their own cultural development. Their efforts at self-identity create an anomalous situation abhorrent to many whites and older Indians as well.[18] This rejection, in turn, only serves to enhance the young Indian's image of his "Indianness." Older Indians are viewed as emasculated versions of what the youth romantically believe themselves to be. The net effect of these developments is intracultural disruption, intercultural conflict, and increased psychological and social frustration amongst the Indians themselves.

The absence of a clear direction for cultural identity partially explains the inability of the young Native American to create a viable cultural identity. For example, each culture has an expressed set of ideals which represents the highest aspirations of that society. However, the everyday life of a society is spent and represented at a level which only approximates the ideal. This realistic distance is common to all cultures. It is easy for an Indian to identify the disparities between the ideals of the overculture and the way its members live.[19] On the other hand, the disparity between Indian ideals and everyday life is not readily determinable, because the everyday way of life associated with Indian cultures no longer exists, even though the ideals are remembered and taught. To blame Indian shortcomings on whites who destroyed the Indian way of life is convenient and supports the viewpoint of the moral superiority of Indian people. The absence of what once was everyday Indian life thus contributes to an unrealistic skewing of many Indian values. For example, generosity in general and especially toward one's relatives is a dearly held value of Indian people. Today this value is often used by youth to exploit acquaintances and relatives. Because it no longer operates in everyday-life context of former times, it draws current sustenance from the unqualified ideal. Formerly, in everyday life there was a reciprocal expectation on the part of the extender of goodwill that the recipient assume responsibility for increasing self reliance and independence from the benevolence of the acquaintances and relatives.[20] Therefore, the ideal had a practical, functional,

social limitation. Those persons now exploited by unrestricted employment of the ideal are threatened by the appearance of seeming less Indian than those who impose. This threat is sufficient to coerce cooperation, but not without bitterness. Thus the unrealistic application of the ideal creates hostility and resentment on the part of the exploited toward Indian youth and a worthy Indian ideal. More importantly for Indian youth it stifles self-reliance and attitudes of social responsibility. Both results are seriously detrimental to the long-term development of Native American cultures.

Conclusion

The portrayal of those problems alone is no answer, but is merely a description of certain social symptoms of intercultural difficulty. Cultural pluralism which promotes substantive uniqueness will prove invaluable to the partial solution of the problems. Unless, however, the pitfalls and misdirections of cultural pluralism are anticipated, considered, and corrected, the ensuing problems will augment rather than diminish the likelihood of intercultural conflict. Obviously, no simple solution is available. But some indicators are obvious: We must distinguish between substantive and superficial cultural identity and train our students to discern the differences between the two. We must recognize the diversity of Indian cultures and avoid an overall ethnic stereotype in formulating policy. We must realize the distance between ideals and realities in all cultures and the necessity of realistic appraisal and mutual interdependence in the success of cultural pluralism. With these more realistic considerations we can place the trappings of cultural pluralism in perspective.

Notes

[1] *The Burden of Southern History* (Vintage Edition; New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 14–15.

[2] Although the focus is on Native Americans in the USA, conditions of Native Americans in Canada are similar.

[3] See Philip D. Lujan, "Communication Implications in the 'Martinez' Case for the Santa Clara Pueblo," paper presented at the Speech Communication Association Summer Conference on Intercultural Communication, Tampa, Florida, July 20, 1978.

[4] The Indian Bill of Rights, Act of April 11, 1968, 82 Stat. 78, 25 USC § 1301–1303 (1970).

[5] Interview by Phil Lujan with Delfin Lovato, Executive Director, All Indian Pueblo Council, Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 9, 1975.

[6] Of the nineteen Pueblos of New Mexico only four have followed the Federal recommendation to adopt a written constitution, viz., Isleta, Acoma, Laguna, and Santa Clara.

[7] Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 USC § 461–479.

[8] See Felix S. Cohen's *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (2nd ed.; Albuquerque: University of New Mexico, 1972), p. 83.

[9] Interview by Phil Lujan with Robert L. Bennett, former Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, March 14, 1976.

[10] Daly v. United States, 483 F.2d 700 (8th Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 658 (8th Cir. 1973); White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973); St. Marks v. Canan, No. 2928 (D. Mont., Jan. 20, 1971). In another case, the Papagos were divided into political units by the federal government based on grazing districts, which in no way reflected kin or homogeneity among the residents of the newly formed political entities.

[11] Luxon v. Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 455 F. 2d 698 (8th Cir. 1972), Salmon v. LaRose, 335 F. Supp. 715 (D. Neb. 1971), McCurdy v. Steele, 353 F. Supp. 629 (D. Utah 1973), Reversed 506 F. 2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974), Yellow Bird v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 380 F. Supp. 438 (D. S.D. 1974), Means v. Wilson, 383 F. Supp. 378 (D. S.D. 1974), Wounded Head v. Oglala Sioux Tribe Civ. No. 73–5096 (D. S.D. 1974), United States v. San Carlus Apache Tribe, Civ. No. 74–52 (D. Ariz., April 12, 1974), Groundhog v. Keeler, 442 F. 2d 674 (10th Cir. 1972), Rosebud Sioux v. Driving Hawk, 534 F. 2d 98 (8th Cir. 1976). Many other cases illustrate the problem, but those cited indicate the tendency to rely on the federal courts in situations where the stakes are high.

[12] McCurdy v. Steele, op. cit.

[13] Means v. Wilson, op. cit.

[14] See L. Brooks Hill and Philip Lujan, "Rhetoric of Self Identity: The Case of the Mississippi Choctaw," paper presented at the annual conference on Rhetoric of the Contemporary South, New Orleans, Louisiana, June 30, 1978; and "The Mississippi Choctaw: A Case Study of Tribal Identity Problems," *American Indian Culture and Research Journal*, IV, 3 (1980), 37–55.

[15] Recent legislation providing federal funding for tribally managed programs is a hopeful venture but still retains federal priorities for service and activities. Indian Self-Determination and Education Act of January 4, 1975, Public Law 93–638, 88, Stat. 2203.

[16] See Ralph Linton, "Nativistic Movements," *American Anthropologist*, XLIV (April–June, 1943), p. 230. For a further illustration of the phenomena, also see L. Brooks Hill, "Belgium: A Historical Analysis of a Linguistically Divided Nation," *Sociologia Internationalis*, XI (1973), p. 157.

[17] For expansion of this point of view, see Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Use of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967) and *Politics as Symbolic Action* (New York: Academic Press, 1971).

[18] AIM, although successful among young urban Indians, was at best only marginally acceptable to a few older people and typically rejected by most.

[19] The writing of Vine Deloria, Jr., illustrates well these disparities and tends to oversimplify the problems involved. However, the rhetorical impact of his work strongly urges us to address these concerns.

[20] Interview by Phil Lujan with Ernest Hunt (Phil's grandfather who is 81), Mountain View, Oklahoma, July 4, 1978.

Paul Goodman's Progressive Conservatism

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Most social and political analysts today agree that Americans have turned "conservative." The 1980 elections are almost universally interpreted as proof that the mood of the nation has shifted to the right. Writers, scholars, and even politicians are far from unanimous about what conservatism is, however, and there seems to be considerable disagreement even among those who wish to be identified as conservative. There exists, at this time, the danger that those who have acquired political power by calling themselves conservative will attempt to restrict the meaning of conservatism within very narrow bounds. Before this occurs, the full and broad range of conservative voices ought to be heard, in order to provide the richness and diversity necessary for the policy debates of the coming years.

One of the more penetrating and interesting thinkers on this subject is Paul Goodman, who during the 1960s and 1970s attempted to fashion a conservative analysis of contemporary American society. His "neolithic conservative" vision is not that of Ronald Reagan, though it may appeal to those whose convictions are traditionally Republican. Goodman's writings on society and education are, perhaps, best described as utopian, containing a rich mixture of criticisms of what is, along with a variety of suggestions about what ought to be. In his works he presents an analysis of the social and educational landscape which is always linked to a variety of proposals, plans, alternatives, and practical schemes for the improvement of the institutions he has criticized. It is difficult to place Goodman's brand of utopianism into any of the convenient categories. He, himself, alternately described his thinking as conservative, anarchist, progressive, and anarchosyndicalist. In truth, his philosophy contains elements of all of these, and any attempt to critize him as unfaithful to any pure ideology would be justified, but would also be a waste of time. The power of his work is actually derived from his use of a wide

range of perspectives in the creation of a new, and often refreshing, point of view.

Goodman's utopian thinking has a special appeal in the social, political, and educational present. On the one hand, our times have come to resemble those in which he did much of his writing. The problems he addresses have been curiously resistant to the efforts at liberal and radical reform which have taken place over the past two decades. Political liberals seem to have settled into a conviction that nothing can be done about existing social and educational problems aside from applying old remedies with increased energy and more funds. On the other hand, there is an obvious thirst among nearly all Americans, for new ways of thinking about enduring difficulties. This thirst for fresh ideas and solutions, more than a radical change in the nation's political philosophy, may account for the results of the recent election. The so-called turn toward conservatism may reflect nothing more (or less) than collective disillusionment with the policies and programs of those who have been calling themselves liberal. Perhaps in this context a revival of Paul Goodman's ideas and analyses may be especially welcome because they have the particular quality of being attractive to conservatives, liberals, and radicals alike.

The first section of this work deals with Goodman's conception of the larger society, including some of the efforts that have been made to reform it. The second part includes an examination of Goodman's ideas for the reconstruction of society, along with specific examples of his theories and prescriptions on work and education. For Goodman, the three areas—society, work, and education—are intimately interwined, and none can be discussed without reference to the others.

The Structure of Society

Goodman describes the broad structure of American society by dividing it into three parts. The first is what he calls the Organized System, composed of workers, managers, and organization men. The second part consists of the involuntarily poor, and the third is composed of what he calls "independents"; i.e., the voluntarily poor and those at odds with society for various reasons. He believes that each of the elements of this structure is, in its own way, trapped in an overall pattern of social organization with particular features. The

major characteristics of this pattern, in Goodman's view, are that it is highly technological, centrally controlled and administered, conformist, and lacking in any vital sense of community. These features, if permitted to consolidate unchallenged, would lead to a dark and ignoble future for mankind. "The dangers of the highly technological and automated future are obvious; we might become a brainwashed society of idle and frivolous consumers. We might continue in a rat race of highly competitive, unnecessary busy work with a meaninglessly expanding G.N.P. In either case, there might still be an out-cast group that must be suppressed."[1]

Each participant in the social system is victimized by the form of social organization. The workers have no control over the nature and character of their work; the organization men are without honor or independence in their competitive strivings; the managers are trapped with questions about the utility and worth of the technological enterprise; the poor are left out of the system which deliberately channels its abundance elsewhere; and the independents find it difficult to be decently poor and live outside the system.

Let us turn to a more careful look at the important features of society as portrayed by Goodman. What are the characteristics of an industrial, technological society with centralized institutions? Goodman approaches this question at the beginning of *People or Personnel*. "In a centralized enterprise, the function to be performed is the goal of the organization rather than of persons (except as they identify with the organization). The persons are personnel. Authority is top-down. Information is gathered from below in the field and is processed to be usable by those above; decisions are made in headquarters; and policy, schedule, and standard procedure are transmitted downward by chain of command. The enterprise as a whole is divided into departments of operation to which are assigned personnel with distinct roles, to give standard performance . . . The system was devised to discipline armies; to keep records, collect taxes, and perform bureaucratic functions; and for certain kinds of mass production. It has now become pervasive."[2]

The high technology, while potentially humane and useful, has tended to alienate the majority who are not its masters, thus adding another dimension to the rigidity of the class system. "The specialist class of wonder workers has grown more specialist . . . and the rest of the people more out of touch and inept. And inevitably, given the

actual disasters that scientific technology has produced, superstitious respect for the wizards has become combined with a lust to tear them limb from limb."[3]

Goodman is not anti-technological, but rather opposes the effects of technological development in American society; namely, that it has led to both the emergence of an elite which understands and controls technology and the creation of masses of people who do not understand it and, in fact, are rendered less self-sufficient and more dependent by it. ". . . I am persuaded that a scientific, technical way of life can be powerfully cultural and part of a noble humanism. It can be rich with meaning for all its workmen, rather than empty of meaning except for a few top managers, planners, and technicians. This was the ideal of Proudhon, Kropotkin, Karl Marx, Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey."[4]

The consequences of technology are, in part, an excess of production for profit, along with growing helplessness on the part of the consumers of that production. In an abundant society there is a plethora of means of what a person doesn't really want . . . . But furthermore, even if the end is desirable, the means often become so complicated that one is discouraged from starting out . . . . To children growing up (such complicated means) are disastrous because they make it impossible to learn by doing."[5]

Goodman, while admitting that the Industrial Revolution has produced a society of affluence (with the important exception of a near-permanent underclass), argues that the end-products of industrialism may be deceptively inefficient. "In later years there has been an increase of hidden costs borne by the public, that are especially advantageous to big systems but do not appear in the price—e.g. roads . . . , schools and colleges geared to state and corporate needs, cheap postage, and public TV channels carrying the ads. By habituation and stultification over the years, consumers are no longer able to judge worth . . . In important areas, there is no free market, but a system of semi-monopolies with inflated overhead expenses to avoid taxes, and fixed prices that do not reflect reasonable costs . . . . Finally, the pre-emption of the social means and space and the destruction of initiative and skills have radically diminished competitive re-entry of independents according to classical economic laws."[6] What this adds up to, in Goodman's view is that, despite claims to the contrary, centralized, industrial technology cannot claim to be the

most efficient pattern of social organization. This mode has, in a sense, long passed the point of diminished returns, and has begun to erode the very capacities by which efficiency might be restored. The system now feeds upon itself, producing a social climate of increasing powerlessness and meaninglessness. "Lack of meaning begins to occur when the immensely productive economy overmatures and lives by creating demand instead of meeting it; when the check of the free market gives way to monopolies, subsidies, and captive consumers . . . and when the measure of economic health is not increasing well-being but abstractions like the G.N.P. and the rate of growth."[7]

The irony of an industrial technology such as ours is that it does not produce well-being for all its citizens. Goodman points out the inequity: "We do not have, in America, an economy of scarcity, only an enormous number of poor people."[8] It is, in fact, the abundance available to the majority which prevents them from questioning the overall distribution of wealth in society and from seeking to eliminate poverty. Those who are materially comfortable do not much question the legitimacy of great wealth, nor do they identify strongly with the plight of the poor or with their wish to be included in the general affluence.

Efforts at Reform

Surely there have been efforts to change, reform, and reconstruct the American society. Goodman points often to the weaknesses and failures of such efforts. He criticizes the labor movement, liberalism, progressivism, and the more radical ideologies as well.

Of the syndicalist labor movement he says: "Industrial workers have won their unions, obtained better wages and working conditions, and affirmed the dignity of labor. But they gave up the ideal of workers' management, technical education, and concern for the utility of their labor. The result is that a vast majority couldn't care less about what they make, and the 'labor' movement is losing its force."[9]

Liberalism is criticized as well: "The liberal revolution succeeded in shaking off onerous government controls on enterprise, but it did not persist to its goal of real public wealth as the result of free enterprise and honestly informed choice on the market. The actual result is an economy dominated by monopolies, in which the earnest individual entrepreneur or inventor who could perform a public

service is discouraged; and consumer demand is increasingly synthetic."[10]

The progressive movement, too, has failed through its very successes: "(Progressive) philosophers failed to predict that precisely with the success of the managers, technicians, and organized labor, the 'achieved' values of affluent abundant production, social harmony, and one popular culture would produce even more devastatingly the things they did not want; an abstract and inhuman physical environment, a useless economy, a caste system, dangerous conformity, a trivial and sensational leisure."[11]

The Marxists also failed to come to grips with the problem: ". . . . Because of their historical theory of the 'alienation of labor' (that the worker must become less and less in control of the work of his hands) the Marxist parties never fought for the man-worthy job itself. It is not surprising now if workmen accept their alienation, and are indifferent also to Marxist politics."[12]

The problem, according to Goodman is that, except for Populism, "Class struggle, sectional struggle, struggle of interest groups have been for control of the growing centralized power rather than limitation or division of it."[13]

Having thus dismissed the major reform movements of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as having contributed to the process of centralization, Goodman is obliged to provide his solution for the ills of the centralized system of industry and technology. The essential element in Goodman's conservative, anarchist perspective is the concept of decentralism. It is not industrialization or technology that is the problem, but rather the *centralized* nature of both which makes them objectionable.

The Alternatives According to Goodman

A decentralized system, on the other hand, is "superficially conflictful but fundamentally stable." "The principle of decentralism is that people are engaged in a function and the organization is how they cooperate. Authority is delegated away from the top as much as possible and there are many accommodating centers of policy-making and decision. Information is conveyed and discussed in face-to-face contacts. . . . Each person becomes increasingly aware of the whole operation and works at it in his own way according to his

capacities. Groups arrange their own schedules. Historically, this system of voluntary association has yielded most of the values of civilization, but it is thought to be entirely unworkable under modern conditions. . . .''[14]

Goodman's decentralist prescriptions for modern society are conceived from the inside out; that is to say, he begins from the perspective of the individual as student, worker, citizen, or educator engaged in voluntary associations, and spins out a social, political or economic theory. Unlike conventional studies which presuppose or begin with the institutional framework of society and seek to place or fit the individual within them, Goodman's theories begin with persons, functions, and the demand for meaning. His ideas on work and education are illustrative of this approach.

Goodman's conception of a solution to our malaise begins with what he calls ''the philosophic truth that except in worthwhile activity there is no way to be happy.''[15] The essential question, then, concerns what constitutes worthwhile activity. For Goodman, what is needed are jobs which are intrinsically worthwhile, useful to the community, comprehensible to those who perform them, and, to some extent, under the control of the workers. The first question that ought to be asked about any kind of work is this: is it useful, is the product of one's labor of any real good? Secondly, work ought to engage the human capacities of the worker. Goodman says, ''The ideal of having a real job that you risk your soul in and make good or be damned, belongs to the heroic age of capitalist enterprise. . . . Or alternately, to want a job that exercises a man's capacities in an enterprise useful to society, is utopian anarchosyndicalism; it is labor invading the domains of management.''[16]

Goodman thinks in terms of the Calvinist conceptions of ''vocation'' and ''justification.'' ''Vocation is a solid means of finding one's opportunities, things worthwhile, useful and honorable to do and be justified by.''[17] Justification is insured by the unquestioned utility of the work done: ''Having something that you must do solves the problem of having something to do.''[18] An example of work that is unquestionably useful would be the job of providing subsistence for the population (more will be said about subsistence later).

Under the current systems of industrial production ''a person is too small a cog in the machine: he does not enough know *what* he is doing . . . . We must figure out other technical arrangements, more oppor-

tunity for the individual to work on, and train for, larger wholes. And he must have more opportunity to criticize and make inventions."[19] In order to accomplish these goals, the technological processes must be made more amenable to human uses and controls. To this end Goodman advocates that "if possible, the operation of a machine should be transparent and comprehensible to its users. . . . An important corollary is that a machine ought to be repairable by its user."[20] Machine technology must be demonstrably relevant to the task—that is, the best way to get the job done. Also, Goodman argues, technology needs to be modest; we ought to have as few machines as possible.

"These are radical ideas. The criterion of socially useful work attacks our profit system. The criterion of a job that exercises capacities and offers a field for real training and subsequent initiative is pretty close to Syndicalism, it threatens management. The need for sincere criticism and energetic performance undermines the conformity of our bureaucratic corporate system and the featherbedding of labor unions. Naturally, then, an educator to whom these are basic considerations is in conflict."[21]

Characteristically, Goodman offers "modest proposals" to stimulate thinking about alternatives to the accepted ways of doing things. One of the difficulties to be faced has to do with reconciling the principle of utility (jobs worth doing) to a capitalist economy. Goodman realized this problem: "American society has tried so hard and ably to defend the practice and theory of production for profit and not primarily for use that now it has succeeded in making its jobs and products profitable and useless."[22]

To solve this problem, Goodman advocated dividing the economic enterprise into the subsistence economy and the profit economy. The subsistence economy would fall under control of the state and would provide subsistence to all members of the society, thus eliminating the shame of poverty in an affluent society. The profit economy would be permitted to operate largely without governmental regulation. Members of the society would have to devote three or four years of their working lives to the subsistence economy, providing for food, clothing, shelter, medical services and transportation. For their efforts they would be entitled to the subsistence for their entire lives. At least in the subsistence economy the questions of utility and justification would be answered. Having subsistence provided would

produce the further advantage of freeing the worker to choose work in the profit economy on the basis of the noble principles previously discussed, rather than forcing him to work at any job under any conditions merely in order to ward off abject poverty.

Goodman also argues that, since with this plan subsistence is not derived from a tax on the general economy, it does not require the government to subsidize the profit economy in order to generate the revenues necessary to provide subsistence. This plan is viewed as an attempt to restore autonomy to workers and independence to consumers.[23]

In the realm of education, as nearly everyone knows, Goodman advocated an end to compulsory schooling. "It is impossible that long continuous years of sitting in schoolrooms is the appropriate means of educating most people to be useful to themselves and society." On the contrary, Goodman calls our attention to the fact that ". . . . in all societies, both primitive and highly civilized, until quite recently, most education of most children has occurred incidentally, not in schools set aside for the purpose."[24] "Our aim," according to Goodman, "should be to multiply the paths of growing up, instead of narrowing the one existing school path."[25]

Again, he advocates a number of schemes, ranging from apprenticeships to youth work camps as alternatives to the path of schooling. Schooling, like the other institutions of society, has a centralized structure. Furthermore, schooling itself serves to foster and reinforce the centralization of the other major institutions of society. Hence, it too, must be radically altered.

In education, "the centralizing approach is to abstract from the functions of society, whatever they happen to be, and to put the abstractions in a school-box as the curriculum. The decentralist approach would be to turn directly to the functions of society that might be educated for, and open in them opportunities for the young to take part."[26] Goodman takes the idea of learning by doing quite seriously. However, if the young are to be engaged educationally in the activities of a society, then that society must be worthy and capable of providing education. It is in this sense that Goodman's social and educational theories are more tightly interwoven than are those of most social critics or educational philosophers. For him, the society is the school. "Fundamentally," he says, "there is no right education except growing up into a worthwhile world."[27]

Goodman summarizes his view of the connection between society, work, and education in the following passage: "In the long run, the aim of the educator is to produce not merely full employment in an expanding economy, but also a productive and inventive society of workers with a noble standard of life."[28]

In conclusion, there are several reasons for suggesting that the writings of Paul Goodman be reexamined. One is that they are, quite simply, provocative and enjoyable reading. His ability to turn a pungent phrase is sometimes quite remarkable. More importantly, the troublesome characteristics of society which he identified as long as thirty years ago have only become more acute. The institutions of society have become even more centralized, the character and quality of work has continued to deteriorate, the quality of public life is no more inspiring, and millions of Americans continue to live in poverty. The conventional political maxims and programs, both liberal and conservative, seem entirely ineffective in ameliorating these ills. Novel insights and solutions, such as those offered by Paul Goodman may well deserve wider attention. His ideas have a further characteristic worth mentioning; namely, that they utilize the best elements of many political ideologies without succumbing to the temptation to be doctrinaire. As such, his criticisms and proposals may provide a common ground for a fresh analysis of our shared condition.

Notes

[1] Paul Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation* (New York: Horizon Press, 1964), p. 75.
[2] Paul Goodman, *People or Personnel* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 3, 4.
[3] Paul Goodman, *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1964), p. 41.
[4] Ibid., p. 257.
[5] Paul Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960), p. 73.
[6] Goodman, *People or Personnel*, pp. 97, 98.
[7] Paul Goodman, *Like a Conquered Province* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960), p. 267.
[8] Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, p. 128.
[9] Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*, p. 219.
[10] Ibid., p. 221.
[11] Ibid., p. 80.
[12] Ibid., p. 37.
[13] Goodman, *People or Personnel*, p. 73.
[14] Ibid., pp. 3, 4.
[15] Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*, p. 40.

[16] Ibid., pp. 36, 37.
[17] Ibid., pp. 142, 143.
[18] Ibid., p. 154.
[19] Goodman, *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals*, p. 260.
[20] Ibid., p. 32.
[21] Ibid., p. 262.
[22] Goodman, *Growing Up Absurd*, p. 19.
[23] Percival and Paul Goodman, *Communitas* (New York: Random House, Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 191–193.
[24] Paul Goodman, *New Reformation* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 68.
[25] Ibid., p. 87.
[26] Goodman, *People or Personnel*, p. 162.
[27] Goodman, *Compulsory Miseducation*, pp. 73, 74.
[28] Goodman, *Utopian Essays and Practical Proposals*, p. 256.

Jacob Burckhardt: The Historian as Socratic Humanist

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What service, if any, does a humanist owe to the community? The great nineteenth-century historian, Jacob Burckhardt, seems to offer an exemplary answer. To the sympathetic eye Burckhardt's life and work demonstrate the qualities of a humanist, that is, a person who expresses with inner conviction a concern for human liberty and creativity. According to Burckhardt, human dignity depends upon the individual's limited but real capacity to shape himself and the universe that he must live in. Burckhardt also sheds light on the civic responsibilities of a humanist. He rejects the individualism which ignores the welfare of the community as well as the collectivism which destroys individual identity. True humanists seek a harmonious relationship between individual and social responsibilities. They must cultivate themselves intellectually, morally and esthetically if they would be of much use to others. But, even their self-cultivation requires a community's support, as well as a communal forum for service and self-expression. Burckhardt's life, moreover, reveals some limits of civic humanism. The ratio of self-cultivation to community service, as well as the nature of that service, is determined not only by the talents of the humanist but also by outside forces impinging on his liberty and his creative power. He must be a realist, therefore, free from illusions.

Burckhardt is sometimes accused of having fled from harsh conflicts of civic life into an ideal world of art and history. His flight, the critics grant, enabled him to give us those incomparable books, *The Age of Constantine the Great* (1852), *Cicerone* (1853), and *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* (1860). Nonetheless, they imply, it was tainted by excessive self-interest, lack of courage or exaggerated sense of the private person. According to some critics, Burckhardt's fault was estheticism, an excessive concern for beauty, at the expense of the civic concern that he owed to society.[1] It has also

been suggested that his apparently detached attitude toward politics is a historicist legacy from his teacher, Leopold von Ranke, that survived Burckhardt's conversion in the 1850's to a classical, normative approach to history and culture.[2] Recent Marxist critics, however, discern in his indifference the mask of a patrician conservative propagandist.[3]

There is verisimilitude in each of these images of Burckhardt. His predilection for contemplation, as well as his aversion to conflict might have been rooted in natural timidity or temperamental sensitivity. Neo-humanism and other nineteenth-century cultural movements seem to have instilled in him a rather pronounced inclination to self-cultivation. In the final analysis, however, the criticisms of Burckhardt's civic spirit rest upon simplistic or distorted pictures of the man. They fail to reckon with his humanistic conception of politics, which recognized the high civic relevance of free, spontaneous creative activity of the human spirit. Burckhardt did not try to "escape" into esthetic satisfactions. Governed by a realistic appraisal of external circumstances and of his own abilities, he served the community like Socrates as a teacher.[4]

I

Among the circumstances of Burckhardt's life which strongly influenced his political viewpoint was early personal contact with modern revolution. He grew to maturity in the 1830's when liberals and nationalists challenged the post-Napoleonic restoration in France, Belgium, and many other parts of western Europe. The city-republic of Basel, his home, was torn apart by a brief civil war. The city, dominated by old, well-established families and by craft guilds, was defeated by the radicalized countryside. The final settlement deprived the city of almost all its land outside the city walls, as well as most of the university's endowment. It also turned young Burckhardt against the liberal democratic ideology that had served to support the countryside's claims.[5]

While Burckhardt was experiencing this first revelation on the role of brute force in civic life, he was still chiefly under the influence of his father, pastor of the Minster, the stately red sandstone Gothic cathedral on the Pfalz, the city's highest point overlooking the Rhine. He virtually grew up in the shadow of a striking symbol of the continuity as well as the spiritual roots of culture. A cultivated,

warmhearted and wise parent, the older Burckhardt raised his son in a Christian faith that was reasonable and humane yet firmly grounded on belief in the divine truths contained in Holy Scripture.[6]

At his father's urging, in 1837, young Burckhardt entered the theological course of studies at the University of Basel. Two years' exposure to Professor Wilhelm De Wette's rationalistic, historical critique of orthodoxy left Burckhardt bereft of faith in the Incarnation and other basic Christian dogmas. It also made him aware that organized religion throughout western Europe was being shaken to its foundations. Although his "heresy" led him out of the Church, it did not completely alienate him from Christianity. Through his father's tolerant, sympathetic acceptance of what had happened, young Burckhardt remained close to his family and profoundly Christian in the deepest recesses of his emotional and moral being. He also retained an essentially Christian realist view of human nature.[7]

At this critical point in his education, he came under the influence of neo-humanism, a powerful, early nineteenth-century intellectual movement stimulated by the revival of classical antiquity, especially Greek culture, believed to be the highest point yet attained by the human spirit.[8] The well-publicized life of Goethe served Burckhardt as a model expression of the Greek ideal of humanity: the inner harmony of human faculties, the primacy of spirit over matter, the fundamental importance of personal cultivation, and the supreme value of artistic creation. Alexander von Humboldt, also an exemplary many-sided personality, taught Burckhardt the disinterested pursuit of knowledge of nature and the universe. The world of classical antiquity was opened to his view by the writings of Barthold Niebuhr and August Boeckh and by the lectures of Wilhelm Vischer, professor at Basel.[9]

From the lives and works of these men Burckhardt gathered early impressions of the humanist's place in civic life. His task was to observe events from an Olympian standpoint and to give advice, criticism or warning. If possible, he should participate directly in the political controversy of the day. Most of all, he should enrich himself in the depths of culture, thereby fitting himself to serve others. This early, idealistic frame of mind is expressed in a letter from Berlin, 1840, to his sister, Louise, which concludes:

> Through a more profound culture our lives can come to mean so much to us, and the more that we mean to ourselves the more we are for

> others. . . . I envisage for myself an indefinite period of teaching; may I always conceive and carry it out according to the principle, let us live for others.[10]

Almost from the beginning of his adult life, therefore, Burckhardt planned a career in teaching that had a social, humanistic purpose.

At the University of Berlin, 1839–1843, Burckhardt grafted his classical idea of humanity onto a historicist conception of humanity's past.[11] Ranke, his master in European history, and Johann Gustav Droysen, rather briefly in ancient history, brought him under the influence of the quasipantheistic view that a World Spirit determines the life of empires and nations. They grow and decline mysteriously according to inner, necessary and unique laws, rather like plants and other organisms. All historical epochs are excellent in their own way, as expressions of the World Spirit; there is no universally valid criterion for judging them. In Ranke's seminar Burckhardt also adopted the scholarly, relatively objective approach to the study of history that was becoming characteristic of German universities. This contact with German historicism greatly strengthened Burckhardt's inclination to treat past epochs with detached yet sympathetic understanding, free from special pleading for any contemporary political causes.[12] And, as a corollary, it led him to view politics from a timeless perspective relativising the significance of constitutional government, national unity, social equality and other temporal objectives.

In the early 1840's, Burckhardt was yet unaware of the inner conflict that this new historical outlook might produce within his political consciousness. Historicism seemed fully in harmony with humanism; the highest aspirations of the collectivity appeared consistent with those of the individual. The World Spirit's principal manifestation in central Europe, the German people's movement toward freedom and national unity, promised the best possible circumstances for personal spiritual fulfillment. Burckhardt, therefore, could identify himself, a Swiss, with this cause.[13] On the basis of common culture, Burckhardt thought, the German states should join together in a free, loose association, like the Swiss Confederation, that would respect their individual, historical differences.[14]

But German unity, according to Burckhardt, must come about in a "natural" or "organic" manner. Even in 1841, the most "liberal" period in his life, while he was close to the Schauenburg brothers,

Gottfried Kinkel and other middle-class radicals, Burckhardt opposed the deliberate resort to revolution in order to bring forth a new social or political order.[15] A "realist," skeptical of utopian visions, he believed himself to be a better informed, more perceptive observer of contemporary German politics than his cultivated, humanitarian, democratic friends. So, moved by a sense of mission, he tried to warn them as 1848 approached. Germany would not support an idealistic revolutionary program, he argued, the masses were still politically inert. And when they awoke, they would yield themselves up to leaders who were masters of the demonic instincts of human nature. The "pure of heart," such as the Schauenburgs and Kinkel, would be overwhelmed like the moderates in 1792 during the French Revolution.[16]

He issued these warnings from Basel, where he was engaged for two and a half years in the most overtly political activity of his life, as editor of the *Basler Zeitung*, the leading conservative newspaper in German-speaking Switzerland. In a letter to Kinkel, Burckhardt placed himself in the middle of the political spectrum:

> I accepted the position mainly in order to exterminate by slow degrees the odious sympathy that exists among the ruling clique here for absolutism of every kind (e.g. the Russian) and on the other hand to come out against our raucous Swiss Radicals, which last I find precisely as repellent as the former.[17]

His experience was instructive if not personally gratifying. Observing first hand the radical agitation that brought on the Swiss civil war, the *Sonderbund Krieg*, he grew intimately familiar with the social and political forces moving Europe toward the much greater conflicts of 1848.[18]

His efforts to influence the course of events, on the other hand, were less successful. He lacked the tactical sense required of journalists as well as politicians. To please Protestant conservative readers in Basel, for example, he extravagantly insulted the Jesuits, without reflecting that his publisher, Andreas Heussler, was at that moment in Lucerne, trying to negotiate an alliance with the Catholic conservative leader, Philip Segesser. When Burckhardt was thereupon reprimanded and deprived of his chief editorial responsibilities, he concluded that he was not suited for practical politics. By 1846 he had begun to realize that he should serve his community not as a publicist

dealing with daily issues but as a teacher concerned with eternal values in history and art.[19]

Burckhardt himself called this break with politics his "flight to Italy," a romantic idiom that has misled critics ever since. On the eve of a trip to Italy he wrote to Hermann Schauenburg:

> You weather-wise fellows vie with each other in getting deeper and deeper into this wretched age—I on the other hand . . . am escaping from it to the beautiful, lazy south. . . . Yes, I want to get away from them all, the radicals, the communists, the industrialists, the State fanatics . . . the "ists" and "isms" of every kind.[20]

"Escaping to the beautiful, lazy south" is romantic rhetoric for a well-planned trip combining personal and professional objectives. He was undoubtedly inspiredby Goethe's famous "flight" to Italy, 1786–1788, related in *Italienische Reise*, first published between 1816 and 1829. Burckhardt's trip does not represent a crisis in his life as it did in Goethe's. Burckhardt used it as an opportunity to clarify, rather than radically alter his personal objectives and to study early Christian art in Rome. He did not mean that his life would thenceforth be entirely apolitical. True, he intended to devote himself to the culture of "old Europe," a higher service than political controversy. The social character of his service, however, is reflected in the role he wished to play when the crisis was past.

> When the social revolution has exhausted itself, I shall be able to take an active part in the inevitable restoration. . . . I want to help to save things as far as my humble station allows. . . . Out of the storm a new existence will arise, formed upon old and new foundations. . . . Our destiny is to help build anew when the crisis is past.[21]

Since he had forsworn strictly political activity, he must have been looking forward to an academic career with a civic purpose. If so, this civic dimension of his humanism would be quite consistent with the political philosophy that he held throughout his life. The passages quoted from the letter, for example, rest upon his conviction that loyalty and other basic political obligations are owed to society itself, rather than to the state, society's mechanism for exercising coercive power. These passages also reflect the sharp demarcation he drew between functions of the state and those of other fundamental social institutions. The state's coercive instruments are unsuited to essentially spiritual tasks, such as education, public welfare, religion and

art. Although left to private initiative, they contribute substantially to the common good. Hence, he could appropriately regard as civic or "political," presumptively reducible to education, the humanistic service which he hoped to render to the culture of "old Europe."[22]

He completed the philosophical foundations of this civic humanism in 1852 by largely abandoning Rankean historicism. In a letter to Paul Heyse, August 13, 1852, referring to the history of art, he wrote: "It is high time for me to free myself from the commonly held, pseudo-objective acceptance of everything whatsoever and to be once again thoroughly intolerant." Concerning history, the next sentence implies, he is less radically disposed; he leaves "a vent" open. It was not a sudden decision. Since leaving Berlin in 1843, he had gradually become convinced that human creativity is more or less autonomous, depending on its cultural context. Works of art in the widest sense, he believed, spring from an individual's conscious desire to express imaginative impulses from an inner source, or spirit, uniquely his own but of the same nature as the spirit in all men. The "artist" is influenced by the cultural climate of the age as well as by many external circumstances. Nonetheless he acts in the creative process as a free agent rather than as a puppet. Burckhardt, therefore, felt entitled to pass critical judgment on works of art, according to universally valid criteria of excellence, instead of searching them for expressions of the "world spirit." Although he developed this new perspective mainly through lecturing on art history, he applied it also to the past as such. He executed a major shift in historical values, from Ranke's stress on nation and state to a new emphasis on *humanitas* or self-determination; he implied that *humanitas* was an absolute value, not subject to cultural relativity.[23] He thereby inverted his teacher's thesis of the primacy of politics over culture.

II

When his long professional apprenticeship concluded in February 1858 with an appointment to the chair of history at the University of Basel, Burckhardt was beyond doubt a humanist. But, had his humanism taken on the "civic" quality that he had envisaged twelve years earlier? Or, as Paul Roth claimed, did Burckhardt live "entirely as a private person, . . . not lifting a finger in order to improve this evil world even in the slightest?"[24] Roth's extravagant accusation correctly implies that Burckhardt had not become a civic humanist in the

customary sense, holding public office or carrying out important political responsibilities. Such restricted usage, however, is not imperative. In the free civilized society of the ancient *polis*, the sovereign city-state like Athens, civic duty could include teaching rhetoric and other expressions of culture. Every free individual was expected to render active public service; personal fulfillment was otherwise impossible.[25] Burckhardt alludes to this conception of citizenship in a comparison which he draws between the ancient and the modern world:

> The complete individual in antiquity is, above all, πολιτης part of the state to a degree of which we now . . . have no idea.[26]

Burckhardt's works describe several examples of this broader civic humanism, such as Socrates, as well as the more conventional type, such as Machiavelli and Thomas More.

The life of Socrates demonstrates Burckhardt's belief that "patriotic" service can take an "apolitical" form. According to Burckhardt, Socrates is the supreme representative of the Greek philosophers, "a free and independent class of people in the midst of the despotic polis," from which they withdrew by means of self-imposed poverty and self-denial.[27] Socrates himself was a "model of piety, self-control, generosity and steadfastness but also highly individualistic in his character and activities." He took a critical stand toward the state and would have no part in its administration. Instead he sought to arouse an ethical consciousness in his fellow citizens, that is, to improve the community at its most basic level. He employed a pedagogical instrument, dialectics, rather than a lever of power. Through tireless exposure of the ignorance and prejudice of fellow citizens he hoped to make them free, civilized and worthy of public life. He stopped people in the market place to question their assumptions, refute their prejudices and clarify their confused ideas. If necessary, he tried to improve their low convictions by recourse to irony even in the presence of the young who laughed at his victims. His choice of suicide rather than exile illustrates a fundamental principle of civic humanism mentioned above by Burckhardt: outside the *polis* a citizen could not function as a person.

Burckhardt is akin to Socrates in his idealism and his ascetic way of life, in his withdrawal from politics, in his sense of mission toward students and fellow citizens, and even in his irony. Burckhardt's civic

humanism is of the Socratic type. In his introductory lecture on the study of history, presented several times at the University of Basel between 1868 and 1873, he touched on the essential purpose of education:

> An onerous duty is incumbent upon us as citizens, namely to educate ourselves to be comprehending human beings, for whom truth and kinship with things of the spirit is the supreme good. We must elicit our true duty as citizens from that knowledge.[28]

In "trained minds," he argued, true citizenship is rooted in "a need for devotion to a general goal."[29] The study of history prepares them to teach the state its duties, criticize its faults and warn it of impending disaster. Since most men are "frivolous," they cannot be expected to strive for the heights of civic virtue. Burckhardt evidently hoped that he could share his point of view not only with university students but also with the cultivated, influential representatives of business and the professions whom he reached directly through his public lectures. Through them he might contribute to strengthening spiritual convictions in a wider circle of citizens, opposed like himself to the demonic forces at work in modern civilization. Imparting this wisdom, he believed, was an obligation that he owed the community in virtue of his professional chair.[30] Basel was his Athens.

Burckhardt's civic humanism, like that of Socrates, grew out of a political outlook that focused primarily on the free individual. As a "personalist," Burckhardt holds the crucial issue is the intellectual and moral standard of citizens. Political reform, therefore, is mainly a personal rather than an institutional problem. This principle is implicit, for example, in his description of Florentine politics in the Renaissance:

> When Dante compares the city that was always mending its constitution with the sick man who continually changes his position to ease his pain, he touches a permanent feature of the political life of Florence. The great modern fallacy that a constitution can be *made*, can be manufactured by a combination of existing forces and tendencies, was constantly cropping up in stormy times.[31]

Socrates is also relatively indifferent to the constitution of the state, provided that it ensures government by law and consent. Neither he nor Burckhardt approved of despotism or believed that it could establish a genuine political community.

The good of the state is advanced through personal education of the citizens, not through revolution or civil disobedience. In the *Apology* Socrates claims that he is "a sort of gad-fly," whom God has given to the state. His civic duty is to question and examine his fellow citizens, stirring them from their apathy and intellectual complacency. He seeks to persuade them to pursue virtue and wisdom for themselves and to desire the well-being of the state rather than factional advantages. This educational mission is not only more efficacious, it is also more prudent than holding office or other public participation in politics. As Socrates pointed out at his trial, in a passage anticipating Burckhardt's sentiments at the end of his editorship of the *Basler Zeitung*,

> O men of Athens, . . . if I had engaged in politics, I should have perished long ago, and done no good either to you or to myself. . . . The truth is, that no man who goes to war with you or any other multitude, honestly struggling against the commission of unrighteousness and wrong in the state, will save his life; he who will really fight for the right, if he would live even for a little while, must have a private station and not a public one.[32]

Socrates is prepared to defy the law, should it forbid his teaching. But he is ready to accept the legal penalty for such defiance. While sharing Socrates' belief in a personalist approach to civic education, Burckhardt rejected the way he carried it out. True, citizens must be persuaded to care for moral and intellectual excellence and for the common good. But, he doubted whether examining individuals in the marketplace was productive. Moreover, he questioned the good sense of defying the state's prohibition while accepting the prescribed penalty.

This personalist conception of politics implies belief in the worth of the individual and in some significant effectiveness of individual effort. From the paramount value of individual moral integrity both Socrates and Burckhardt conclude that man must be free to realize his own good within a community ruled by law and consent. They also agree that true or personal education is of an individual by an individual. Only this kind of education promotes fundamentally the well-being of society. On personalist grounds Burckhardt opposed the inexorable spread of compulsory, uniform, mass education.[33] Even Plato's idea of state control of education by the few who are wise would not please him. True, Burckhardt would agree with Plato

that the wise are few. But, they are not suited for politics. The state belongs rather to the few who love power and have mastered the art of gaining and using it.[34] That being the case, education should not be under the control of the state. On the other hand, Burckhardt joined Plato in rejecting Socrates' conception of the supreme efficacy of individual reason in ensuring rightness of moral behavior. Burckhardt believed that demonic forces, evil in character, often successfully challenge reason, whence his principle that history is to a certain degree pathological.[35]

The pedagogical methods of civic humanism used by Socrates and Burckhardt have a great deal in common. Improving upon the Sophists, Socrates developed the negative, critical or dialectical and individual mode of instruction that bears his name. Its intention is to strip the student of indifference to higher values than self-satisfaction. His questioning enhanced by simulating ignorance and simplicity, the teacher tries to put the student in a frame of mind conducive to searching for the truth, synonymous with virtue and wisdom. Socrates presumes that, since truth is man's natural, ultimate end, the student will discover it for himself when the obstacles within him are cleared away. The teacher should act only as a midwife. In practice, unfortunately, Socrates applied this method so single-mindedly and insistently, that he made it seem an end in itself. And he often left the student baffled rather than ready to find his own way.[36]

Burckhardt's pedagogy is partly Socratic. In interpreting history he also employs a negative, critical mode of instruction, challenging prevailing contemporary prejudices, especially those derived from Protestantism, Liberalism and Humanitarianism or nourished by the nineteenth century's rapid progress in science and technology. In contrast to Socrates, however, Burckhardt's dialectics are carried out mainly in the classroom and in public lectures; he never confronts individual persons directly or threatens to expose their ignorance. He thought it would be presumptuous as well as dangerous to claim divine authority to question and examine his fellow citizens. Nor does he insist on pursuing an obstinate student, overwhelming him with logical argument. Instead, recognizing the ambivalence of good and evil in human nature, he spares the student's ego and attempts to reach him through the imagination. With great rhetorical skill he sketches grandiose, fascinating pictures of an age, such as the Italian Renaissance. Or he insinuates compelling images of persons or

events, as in his popular university lectures on the French Revolution. He thereby plants "seeds" in the student's mind with a life of their own, engendering a dialectical tension with the student's received opinions. A natural desire to resolve that tension prompts the student to further reading and reflection and ultimately to a better, more personal understanding of the topic. What makes this method specifically Socratic is that it is calculated to lead the student to wisdom. Through the vicarious experience of history, Burckhardt said, "we want to become, not clever for the next opportunity but wise forever."[37]

This objective is often overlooked in discussions of Burckhardt's most famous work, *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*. As he wrote to King Maximilian of Bavaria in 1858, he intended to portray the Renaissance "in so far as she was the mother and native source of modern man."[38] Reading the book, and pondering "The state as a work of art" and similar great themes, should induce profound understanding of one's self as well as the contemporary world. Finally, recognizing the limitations of Socratic criticism, particularly the confused alienation from learning that it might produce in many students, Burckhardt supplements criticism with positive, appreciative instruction, intended to help the student identify the good, true and beautiful, as well as to entice him to choose them. Criticism for Burckhardt is not an end in itself but a means; the student also needs positive guidance towards his goal.

The Socratic method of instruction as practiced by Burckhardt also included a simulation of simplicity and ignorance. He referred to himself as a dilettante, a rusty cultural historian, who knew better than to aspire to a prestigious academic appointment at Berlin or one of the other major cultural centers of Germany. This was a kind of aporia, a device that served to mock the conventional wisdom and the ideological or technological nostrums of modern civilization. It also freed his criticism from suspicion of self-interest or partisanship; his questioning seemed concerned only with exposing error and finding the truth. Like Socrates, Burckhardt affected his attitude, not only rhetorically with carefully calculated irony, but also with his style of life as a scholarly recluse and nonconformist. But he did not share Socrates' instinct for martyrdom, what Burckhardt called a self-deceiving absolute conviction that leads a person to an ultimately futile gesture. Burckhardt's use of irony was always prudent.

The asceticism of Burckhardt's personal life was less reminiscent of Socrates than of St. Severinus, the fifth-century Christian bishop of Noricum, to whom Burckhardt was remarkably devoted.[39] Like a secular "cleric," he practiced a reasonable poverty, living most of his professorial life in two modestly furnished rooms above a bakery. He spent most of his disposable income on professional expenses, the medical education of his nephews and the patronage of Arnold Böcklin and other needy artists. He never married. And, finally, he was obedient, complying meticulously with the spirit as well as the letter of the university's regulations. Until as an elderly man he broke a leg, he never missed a class.

The spiritual freedom gained by this asceticism supported not only Burckhardt's negative dialectics, as it had Socrates', but also Burckhardt's function as spiritual guide or mediator in the *polis*. A cicerone, a kind of priest, he sought to bring people into vital contact with the divine attributes of wisdom, goodness and especially beauty, as he had personally experienced them. He differed from Socrates in trying to arouse the aesthetic and historical, as well as the ethical side of consciousness. Art served him as a path to intimations of the Ideal or Divine Perfection, a means of transcending the frustrations inherent in the human situation. The study of history conveyed realistic understanding of man's existential self and awareness of his temporal dimension, an ambivalent gain considering the pathological nature of so much human experience. But Burckhardt's lectures convey the grandeur as well as the pity of man's passage through time. One sample must suffice:

> The greatness of an epoch or a cause depends on the proportion of those capable of sacrifice. . . . In this respect, the Middle Ages pass muster rather well. Devotion! And not a guarantee of regular pay![40]

Burckhardt often seeks to inspire, to awaken the student's innate wish to emulate past demonstrations of excellence in the higher reaches of human nature. For he wishes to attract rather than antagonize his fellow citizens. His university and public lectures were expertly designed to further his purpose. The fruit of his most productive hours, works of high rhetorical art laced with original insights, they earned for him a reputation as one of the greatest university lecturers of the nineteenth century.[41]

III

Burckhardt's "realistic" view of the ambivalent, indeed pathological nature of history put his civic humanism under important restrictions. Critics offer evidence suggesting that he was a pessimist who did not believe in human worth or significant human self-realization. His own mission as a teacher can be construed to mean something else than civic humanism. For example, he called the discharge of that duty a "metaphysical necessity,"[42] an inner, unaccountable compulsion analogous to Schopenhauer's "will to live." According to the great German pessimist, this primary, necessary and universal driving force "holds individual men firmly upon the scene, and is the *primum mobile* of their movements, while external objects, the motives, only determine [men's] direction in the particular case." "It is not life that tempts men," he claims, "but necessity that drives them forward."[43]

Burckhardt's relationship to Schopenhauer is crucial to the question of his civic humanism. For, if he shared the latter's metaphysical pessimism, he would deny in principle any worth to human striving for the good, true, and beautiful. He would also have no reason to be concerned with the common good. It is well known that, shortly before 1870, he read Schopenhauer's principal work, *The World as Will and Idea*. For a decade thereafter, on several occasions, he expressed admiration for its author and paraphrased his ideas. For example, he seems to approach Schopenhauer's sense of metaphysical necessity in the expression, "blinden Willen der Veranderung," which he chose to identify modern man's infatuation with change.[44] And, in the conclusion of the lecture, "On Fortune and Misfortune," he appears to ascribe a pantheistic unity to the collective human spirit and a correlative necessity in its movements.[45] Placed in the context of Burckhardt's world view, however, such passages reflect a rhetorical dependency, nourished by elective affinities between two men who were strikingly different in other respects. They also illustrate the lack of philosophic rigor characteristic of Burckhardt the historian.

The extent of Schopenhauer's influence is most accurately assessed against the backdrop of Burckhardt's intellectual development. His outlook on life was formed long before he could have encountered Schopenhauer's ideas.[46] Burckhardt found in Schopenhauer's book a kindred feeling for the human situation and

an appropriate vocabulary for his own views. There are two basic points at which the thought of the two men converge: the predominantly pathological nature of history and the need for asceticism. Like Schopenhauer, Burckhardt "despised the world." Moreover, he felt that his renunciation of it was compensated by the "inner satisfaction" that he received from contemplation.

As striking as it is, the affinity between the two men is less than fundamental. Burckhardt's "metaphysical necessity" is essentially a Socratic idea, clothed in Schopenhauer's phrase. It refers to a morally compelling purpose, civic service at the university, which alone makes his life meaningful. We can only conjecture whether Burckhardt felt that, like Socrates, his mission was divinely appointed. The concluding passages of *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy* on Florentine neo-Platonism reflect personal sympathy with a religious outlook offering him at least an intratemporal, transpersonal ethical foundation. *Reflections on World History*, especially the lecture "The Crises of History," suggests that some elements of his early pantheism remained residually in his psyche, for example, the mysterious idea of "Geist." It is unlikely, however, that he believed his mission to have been mandated by a special divine revelation. For, he adopts a skeptical attitude toward Socrates' divine calling, his personal "daimonion," and the Delphic message attesting to his wisdom. At any rate, in contrast to Schopenhauer, Burckhardt believed in a self-verified moral obligation rather than in a blind, impersonal force beyond his control.

Their pessimism is also substantially different. Schopenhauer's position is metaphysical, systematically denying any worth to human existence; he is basically anti-humanist. In contrast, where Burckhardt's outlook approaches Schopenhauer's, it is "existential" or "realist." In a letter to a German friend, Friedrich von Preen, September 19, 1875, Burckhardt half-humorously coined a term, "malismus," to identify his historically confirmed recognition of the prevalence of evil in the moral ambivalence of human experience. "Malismus" is distinct from Schopenhauer's "pessimismus," an abstract concept of evil in the superlative degree. Life's fractures and tragedies do not dim Burckhardt's perception of the worth of human moral, intellectual and esthetic achievement.

The realist and the humanist tendencies in Burckhardt's psyche were probably related *mutatis mutandis* as they are in Christian

ascetics. Despising the world and "fleeing" from it may be necessary in order to work in it effectively for man's salvation or improvement. Grillparzer's posthumously published works caused Burckhardt to exclaim in a letter to von Preen, December 31, 1872: "I am astonished . . . how useful and fruitful a secluded life can be for later generations." Burckhardt's own life offers abundant evidence of such coupling of asceticism with service. True, they were joined no more harmoniously in his psyche than in a Christian saint's, such as St. Paul. Cheerful by disposition, Burckhardt sometimes privately expressed personal weariness with life. And his complaints about past and present, as well as his anxieties for the future, seem to go beyond the limits of detached realism and reflect subjective uneasiness or insecurity. This trait prompted German friends to call him "the howler," while he was still a young man.[47] His civic humanism, however, should be sought in the disciplined, original and fruitful service that he rendered as a teacher for more than 35 years.

The recognition earned by Burckhardt's quasi-religious mediation obscured other civic roles more akin to those exercised by Socrates. Burckhardt was a profound critic of contemporary political and cultural trends as well as a remarkably accurate seer of their catastrophic outcome. For both reasons he has been called a prophet. Briefly, Burckhardt applies his humanist perspective to evil tendencies inherent in nationalism, socialism and other modern ideologies, as well as industrialization and the development of modern science and technology. His analysis of mass society is akin to de Tocqueville's and anticipates by a generation or more the views of Oswald Spengler and Ortega y Gasset. As a seer his more striking achievement was to predict our century's world wars and fascist dictatorships.

These themes are present in his early published work, *The Age of Constantine the Great* and *Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*; they are more evident in his lectures, especially *Reflections on World History*. They also run through his correspondence, appearing most prominently in the letters to von Preen, in the 1870's and 80's. Buoyed up by the triumphs of modern civilization, however, the educated public was not as well prepared for Burckhardt's jeremiads as it was for his pictures of fascinating epochs of history or his insights into western expressions of the Beautiful. Realistic as well as positive in temperament, Burckhardt assigned cultural critique and

prophecy a secondary place in his mission. Their impact was felt chiefly after his death in 1897, when the posthumous publication of his lectures and letters coincided with a more receptive frame of mind in the public.

Burckhardt's tack, allowing his critique to find its own way to fertile ground, is typical of an easily misunderstood personal characteristic, his essential modesty. Well-endowed with common sense, "schlau" and adept at using deflecting masks, he practiced civic humanism with uncommon discretion. This was appropriate for *vita activa* in the close, vigorously republican social relationships of nineteenth-century Basel. It also suited the strict view he took of his office at the university. Finally it took into account qualities of his personality, such as honesty, gentleness and sensitivity to abuse, which would have impaired his effectiveness in a journalistic or political arena. He learned early in life not to undertake tasks for which he was unfitted or which were destined to fail.

His critics misinterpret this discretion as cowardice or loss of nerve. The grounds for such charges, however, are unpersuasive. Some critics fail to recognize Burckhardt's use of self-protective masks to ward off importunate demands for his assistance. One such "mask" is found in Burckhardt's motto, "bene vixit qui bene latuit." The typical critic assumes that it identifies a provincial epicurean in an ivory tower absorbed in illusions. It expresses, however, Burckhardt's choice of a concealed citadel ensuring him inner freedom and a secure vantage point for his service.[48] Other critics, like the disciples of Nietzsche, fault Burckhardt for not supporting their cause. Nietzschean disappointment in Burckhardt is echoed in Edgar Salin's critical remark that Burckhardt lacked strength and courage to look "Dionysos in the eye."[49] In so many words, Burckhardt shrank from responding to Nietzsche's summons to extraordinary greatness.

That invitation, however, was inconsistent with Burckhardt's civic humanism. Long before he had contact with Nietzsche at the University of Basel about 1870, Burckhardt had chosen not to "embrace" Dionysos, or to live by his grand but ambivalent inspiration.[50] Burckhardt held the mysterious, creative power attributed to the Greek god in the highest respect. But he was keenly aware that Dionysos also stood for a demonic principle in human nature that led men to tear one another apart. Burckhardt followed Apollo instead,

the god of light and truth, beautiful and beneficent, in whom there was only a little of the primitive. His principle of *humanitas* is infused with the conviction that reason should govern the passions; its scope is defined by a clear vision of the rather constricted personal and social parameters of an individual's autonomy. Nietzsche wanted precisely to transcend that rather meager *humanitas*, to achieve an "unlimited" self-determination. His transgression of reality, however, involved a cost to self and to others that was incompatible with Burckhardt's civic humanism. His break with Nietzsche, therefore, was due to differing conceptions of *humanitas* rather than to a deficiency in Burckhardt's character. He demonstrated ample, perhaps heroic strength and courage, persevering in the hidden struggles of an undramatic academic life.

Was Burckhardt's discretion effective, or did it detract from his service to the community? The nature of Socratic pedagogy precludes a full, satisfactory estimation. Burckhardt aimed at helping persons think profoundly and for themselves. He did not seek acknowledgment of intellectual debts owed to him; he did not gather a following or establish a school, journal or any other institution embodying his views. Nonetheless, there is some scattered evidence that his civic humanism has had significant impact. Locally, he was appreciated in his lifetime as lecturer and teacher. He was commonly referred to by a nickname, Köbi, a rare sign of fraternal respect. His service to the university and to Basel earned expressions of grateful homage, in contrast to the hemlock that Socrates received from the Athenians. At his death in August 1897 the government eulogized: "Burckhardt has exercised upon the spiritual life of the community an influence of the most noble kind. Basel will always reckon among its highest honors that it possessed this citizen."[51] Within a few years, his fellow citizens brought out posthumous editions of his unpublished manuscripts and letters, as well as a continuous stream of printed comment on his life and works. It is chiefly this large body of literature that extends his civic humanism into the contemporary world.

Outside Basel, Burckhardt's civic teaching worked covertly during his lifetime, especially through his books on the Italian Renaissance. His critique of modern civilization was ardently received by Nietzsche in the 1870s but was not generally appreciated until the posthumous publications appeared. After World War II Burckhardt benefitted as civic humanist from an intellectual void caused by

Germany's disastrous experiences under National Socialism. Ranke, Treitschke and other great conservative or national liberal historians of the nineteenth century lost credibility as interpreters of history. In a famous address in 1948, therefore, Friedrich Meinecke called for reconsideration of Burckhardt, the only major historian to question seriously the direction taken by Germany under Bismarck.[52] This was followed by new editions of Burckhardt's works, many dissertations and scholarly monographs and other signs of interest.

Further indication of Burckhardt's contemporary effectiveness is the remarkable attention he has attracted from East German historians. He is at the center of a significant controversy concerning historical method and purpose. Johannes Wenzel probably expresses the predominant view, arguing that Burckhardt's civic humanism is a covert defense of established, propertied classes, especially Swiss patricians, against revolution from below.[53] Wenzel draws support from Burckhardt's well-known antipathy to nineteenth-century mass movements. Wenzel's hypothesis, however, fails to recognize that, if Burckhardt was a "patrician conservative," it was in an intellectual more than a social sense. Raised in an upper-middle class family, the great historian never manifested that pride of lineage or presumption of inherited wealth and prerogative which characterize his "patrician" colleague, Johann Bachofen. Nor did Burckhardt show any zeal for the economic, social or political interests of the "patrician" families of Basel. More important to him was the spiritual elite, the relatively few persons responsible for the creative vitality of culture. They include not only Leonardo da Vinci and other giants of artistic genius but also heroes of love and self-sacrifice, lost in the anonymity of common humanity.[54] As a Socratic humanist, Burckhardt wanted to save what is excellent in the work of past generations and to uphold those values, particularly the primacy of the spiritual, which are valid for all time and essential to human perfection.

A controversial Marxist analysis, more subtle than Wenzel's, has recently been offered by Jürgen Kuczynski, an eminent East German social scientist. Kuczynski implies that Burckhardt's approach to history is virtually protomarxist. Through an unusually penetrating artistic perception of reality he grasps fundamental relationships of the historical process; he falls unawares at least partially into a dialectical-materialistic method. This enables him to describe correctly the influence of material on spirtual culture, the conflict be-

tween classes, the contradictions of capitalism, the reactionary nature of the capitalistic state, and the primary socio-economic determinants of the deeds of "great men."

At the heart of Kuczynski's hypothesis is an implicitly radical disjunction of scientific and artistic modes of perception. Burckhardt's theory of history, as well as his outlook on life, are bourgeois or "idealistic." But they do not deflect substantially the imaginative process that dominates his historical "praxis." In his works, Kuczynski concludes, Marxists will find a legacy which they can and should appropriate critically and value highly. Kuczynski's view of Burckhardt's artistic perception of history has been challenged at several points in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, East Germany's chief historical journal.[55] The critic, however, concedes that Burckhardt reached at least fragments of truth.

This debate within East Germany reveals the real force of Burckhardt's civic humanism: its timeless and universal appeal. A reflection by William H. McNeill might apply to Burckhardt:

> It is only when others take aspects of what an author has thought and said in order to develop, twist, and reinterpret his ideas to fit their own predilections and answer their own problems that the cold type of a printed page leaps to life and . . . may become a real force in the cultural history of mankind.[56]

Burckhardt's works might be misread in East Germany, but his "pictures" of history are so allusive that they cannot be easily censored or interpreted according to strict, ideological guidelines; they exert perhaps unconsciously an independent influence on educated minds.

Burckhardt's example teaches, first, that civic humanism can flourish in a small, outlying place far from the principal centers of culture and the levers of power. Second, his achievement lies in the wisdom which he helps others acquire. His variety of Socratic humanism offers little opportunity for the greatness that men can easily recognize. He never met a crisis that might have tested his commitment as Socrates, Thomas More and other humanist martyrs were tested. Finally, Burckhardt's case illustrates the serious problem which realism raises for a civic humanist. Can a person be effective who frees himself from illusion and refrains from nourishing or exploiting the illusions of others? Burckhardt's tack exposed him to the charge of cowardice; Socrates' candor earned him a cup of

hemlock. Even Thomas More's extraordinary diplomatic finesse was baffled by this dilemma.

Notes

[1] For Burckhardt as "ardent aesthete," see J. W. Thompson, *History of Historical Writing* (New York, 1942), II, 452–453. A. W. Levi, *Humanism and Politics: Studies in the Relationship of Power and Value in the Western Tradition* (Bloomington, Indiana, 1969), pp. 192–202, claims that Burckhardt's aesthetic approach to history "overwhelmed" his moral judgment and religious awareness.

[2] For Burckhardt as historicist, see E. Grisebach, *Jacob Burckhardt als Denker* (Bonn, 1943), pp. 337–39: Burckhardt surrendered himself to "einem erinnernden Gestaltdenken." He exaggerated culture, the value of tradition, and historical greatness. According to E. M. Janssen, *Jacob Burckhardt und die Renaissance* (Assen, Netherlands, 1970), p. 67, Burckhardt was "ein verkehrter Pygmalion."

[3] Johannes Wenzel, *Jacob Burckhardt in der Krise seiner Zeit* (Berlin [DDR], 1967) pp. 71, 83, 97. Jürgen Kuczynski has published recently a more appreciative critique of Burckhardt in an essay, *Die Muse und der Historiker. Studien über Jacob Burckhardt, Hyppolite Taine, Henry Adams und eine Bibliographie* . . . (Berlin [DDR], 1974). See also Valentine Gitermann, "Jacob Burckhardt als politischer Denker," [Institut für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz, *Vorträge*, Nr. 19], (Wiesbaden, 1957) pp. 8, 16, 37.

[4] The unfinished authoritative work on Burckhardt, by Werner Kaegi, *Jacob Burckhardt. Eine Biographie* (Basel 1947–1977, 6 volumes), does not analyze fully his *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen* or his letters to von Preen, the two principal sources for his mature views on politics.

[5] Basel during Burckhardt's lifetime is described in Paul Burckhardt, *Geschichte der Stadt Basel* (Basel, 1942), pp. 146–334.

[6] See the catechism by the elder Jacob Burckhardt, *Lehrbuch des christlichen Religionsunterrichts für die Kirchen des Kantons Basel* (Basel, 1832).

[7] Burckhardt's relationship to Christianity is treated authoritatively in A. von Martin's, *Die Religion Jacob Burckhardts: eine Studie zum Thema Humanismus und Christentum* (Munich [1942], 2nd ed. 1947).

[8] Friedrich Paulsen, *Geschichte des gelehrten Unterrichts auf den deutschen Schulen und Universitäten* (Leipzig, 1921), vol. II, pp. 216–18, 308.

[9] For neo-humanism's impact on Burckhardt, see especially Kaegi, *Burckhardt*, I, 421–22. For his relationship with Boeckh, see Kaegi II, 48–53; with Wilhelm Vischer (1808–1874), see Kaegi, I, 332–37, 391–92, 495–96, and Max Burckhardt, *Burckhardt Briefe* (Basel, 1949–1974, 8 volumes), I, 270. Unless otherwise indicated, Burckhardt's letters are to be found in this collection.

[10] Burckhardt to Louise Burckhardt, Berlin, July 16, 1840.

[11] T. Tholfsen, *Historical Thinking* (New York, 1967), pp. 180–84, emphasizes the significance of Burckhardt's early historicism.

[12] This influence is clearly seen in Burckhardt's two long papers for Ranke's seminar, the first dealing with the eighth-century Frankish leader, Charles Martel, the second, with the thirteenth-century archbishop of Cologne, Conrad von Hochstaden. *Gesamtausgabe* (Basel, 1929), vol. I, hereafter [GA]. They reflect the precision of Rankean scholarship as well as the awe and enthusiasm inspired by the contemporary awakening of the German people. But they are free from an Austrian, Prussian or any other particular political viewpoint. For "Conrad," see Burckhardt to Gottfried Kinkel, December 30, 1841, and June 13, 1842; also, Burckhardt to H. Schauenburg, June 10, 1844.

[13] Burckhardt to Louise Burckhardt, April 4, 1841; to G. Kinkel, December 30, 1841.

[14] Cf. Burckhardt to Louise Burckhardt, September 25, 1841.

[15] Burckhardt to Louise Burckhardt, April 5, 1841; and especially Burckhardt to G. Kinkel, June 13, 1842.

[16] Burckhardt to H. Schauenburg, March 5, 1846. Also Burckhardt to E. Schauenburg, January 29, 1844, January 26, 1846.

[17] Burckhardt to G. Kinkel, April 21, 1844.

[18] For Burckhardt as a journalist, see Emil Dürr, *Jacob Burckhardt als politischer Publizist. Mit seinen Zeitungsberichten aus den Jahren 1844/1845* (Zürich, 1937): Burckhardt might also have been influenced in undertaking the editor's role by Ranke's example as editor of the semi-official Prussian journal, *Historisch-Politisch Zeitschrift*, 1832–1836.

[19] This conclusion was also motivated by his early success as a teacher and lecturer. Almost 100 people, including the most prominent in the city, subscribed to a series of public lectures on the history of art which he offered through two winter seasons, 1844/45 and 1845/46. For Burckhardt's critique of journalism, see his letter to W. Beyschlag, August 3, 1844.

[20] Burckhardt to Hermann Schauenburg, February 28, 1846.

[21] Ibid., May 5, 1846.

[22] For Burckhardt's distinction between state and society, see *GA*, VII, p. 27. A well-balanced study from a Christian humanist point of view is Ernst W. Zeeden, "Der Historiker als Kritiker und Prophet (die Krise des 19. Jahrhunderts im Urteil Jakob Burckhardts)," *Die Welt als Geschichte*, Heft 3 (1951), 154–73.

[23] Kaegi, II, 74–75, describes Burckhardt's conversion as "eine Abkehr vom historischen Pantheismus seiner Frühzeit zum Suchen nach einer neuen Norm. . . . Es ist die Wendung zum klassischen Burckhardt und zu seinem Humanismus." Wolfgang Hardtwig, *Geschichtschreibung zwischen Alteuropa und moderner Welt: Jacob Burckhardt in seiner Zeit* (Göttingen, 1974), is an illuminating analysis of the problem, consistent with Kaegi's. Cf. also Tholfsen, pp. 182–83. The "historicism" that Burckhardt rejects is but one of several, often conflicting varieties. See D. E. Lee and R. N. Beck, "The Meaning of Historicism," *American Historical Review*, 59 (1954), 568–77, for a brief survey.

[24] Paul Roth, "Licht und Schatten im Geschichtsbild Jacob Burckhardts," *Zeitschrift für Schweizerische Geschichte*, 27 (1947), 511 & 513.

[25] Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, pp. 66–67.

[26] Burckhardt, *Historische Fragmente*, *GA*, VII, p. 229. Also, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, p. 24, on the *Kleinstaat*.

[27] Burckhardt's views concerning the great Athenian are found in "The Free Personality," the most famous chapter of *Griechische Kulturgeschichte*, III, 352–57, *GA*, X, 1931.

[28] Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, pp. 8–9.

[29] Ibid., p. 27. Cf. Burckhardt to Albert Brenner, October 17, 1855.

[30] Burckhardt to E. Geibel, October 10, 1863. His appointment also required teaching history at the Pädagogium, Basel's senior high school.

[31] Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, *GA*, V, p. 61.

[32] Plato, *The Dialogues*, translated by B. Jowett (New York, Scribners, 1901), pp. 329–330. See Norman Gulley, *The Philosophy of Socrates* (New York, 1968), pp. 168–179, for Socrates' political views. Laszlo Versényi, *Socratic Humanism* (New Haven, 1963), offers a close, philosophical analysis of Socrates' civic mission and its related pedagogical method.

[33] Burckhardt to von Preen, July 2, 1871, April 13, 1882, and December 19, 1884.

[34] Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, pp. 21–28, on the state; also, p. 73 and pp. 188–89.

[35] Ibid., p. 3. See also Burckhardt to Albert Brenner, October 17, 1855, November 11, 1855, December 2, 1855, February 21, 1856, and March 16, 1856.

[36] See Versényi, *Socratic Humanism*, for a sympathetic, existentialist interpretation of Socrates' alienation of the people of Athens. Deficient in critical, historical perspective, Versényi absolves him of any shortcoming: through "some fatal flaw in the construction of the

world," his message failed to persuade the "great, mediocre, ignorant, general public" to seek its own good (p. 168).

[37] Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, p. 7.

[38] Burckhardt, *Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien*, *GA*, V, p. xlvi.

[39] St. Severinus upheld higher values in an age of barbarism. In this guise he had attracted Burckhardt as early as 1843; see Willibald Beyschlag's *Aus Meinem Leben* (Halle, 1896), p. 135. Burckhardt lectured publicly on St. Severinus in the winter, 1854/1855, *GA*, XIV, p. 509, and at the university ten years later. See also Burckhardt to Otto Markwart, November 15, 1893, in the latter's *Jacob Burckhardt: Persönlichkeit und Jugendjahre* (Basel, 1920), p. 44.

[40] Burckhardt, *Historische Fragmente*, *GA*, VII, pp. 254–55.

[41] For Burckhardt as teacher see the detailed, favorable description by a critical witness, Carl Spitteler, "Jacob Burckhardt und der Student," *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 1912, Nr. 184/6, 191/3. Several other students' impressions of his lecturing are in Kaegi, IV, 145–48. A. Ziegler's *Jacob Burckhardts Vorlesung über die Geschichte des Revolutionszeitalters* (Basel, 1974), contains a virtually complete text of Burckhardt's most popular university course, together with valuable analysis of his rhetoric. For his lectures to the general public, see Emil Dürr's introduction to the *Vorträge* (Basel, 1918), *GA*, XIV, vii–xiv.

[42] Burckhardt to Paul Heyse, November 12, 1875.

[43] Arthur Schopenhauer, *World as Will and Idea*, translated by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp (London, 3 vols., 1883–1886), vol. III, pp. 116–18.

[44] Burckhardt, *Historische Fragmente*, *GA*, VII, p. 453.

[45] Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, *GA*, VII, p. 208.

[46] As a young man Burckhardt expressed, occasionally with a romantic accent, his conviction that suffering is the common, unavoidable lot of man in history. See Burckhardt's letters to Heinrich Schreiber, January 2, 1838, to Johannes Riggenbach, December 12, 1838, to Gottfried Kinkel, August 20, 1843, to Herman Schauenburg, June 10, 1844, and March 5, 1846, and February 27, 1847, to Andreas Heussler, March 4, 1848. Schopenhauer's *World as Will and Idea* was first published in 1818 (2nd enlarged edition, 1844), but until the 1850's, its impact was slight. Burckhardt first refers to Schopenhauer in a letter to von Preen, July 20, 1870, in a manner which suggests that the two friends had previously discussed "the Philosopher" but not before the mid-1860's.

[47] F. Kugler to Eman. Geibel, June 22, 1848, in *Burckhardt, Briefe*, III, p. 326.

[48] Edgar Salin, *Jakob Burckhardt und Nietzsche* (Basel, 1938), pp. 21, 27, 29, 47, 79, for a discriminating contrast between Burckhardt's simplicity and his "Wille zur Maske."

[49] Ibid., pp. 46 and 201.

[50] Cf. Burckhardt to A. Brenner, March 16, 1856.

[51] Salin, *Burckhardt*, p. 234.

[52] "Ranke und Burckhardt," delivered before the German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, published in its *Vorträge und Schriften*, Heft 27 (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1948). English translation in Hans Kohn (ed.), *German History: Some New German Views* (Boston, 1954), pp. 141–156. Cf. J. L. Herkless, "Meinecke and the Ranke-Burckhardt Problem," *History and Theory*, 9 (1970), 290–321, which reduces the discrepancy between Burckhardt and other major German historians sharing common Rankean roots.

[53] Cf. note 3 for Wenzel, *Burckhardt in der Krise seiner Zeit*.

[54] Burckhardt, *Historische Fragmente*, *GA*, VII, p. 291.

[55] Hans Schleier, Review of Jürgen Kuczynski, *Die Muse und der Historiker. Studien über Jacob Burckhardt, Hyppolite Taine, Henry Adams . . .* (Berlin [DDR], 1974) in *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 23 (1975), 1324–26.

[56] William H. McNeill, *Rise of the West* (Chicago, 1963), p. vii.

Reflections on the Future of Higher Education

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It would be fascinating to look back from the 21st century to the decade of the 80's in higher education. Would the years be a growing period like the 50's and 60's with a focus on the expansion of higher education and questions about its role in society? Will the years be restrictive ones like the 70's, focussing on accountability and fragmentation of mission? Regardless of the method of forecasting, there are no cognitive roadmaps to assure predictive reliability Phenomenologists may be as accurate in predictions as the ardent advocates of the sophisticated quantitative forecasting models. Strategic planning for higher education in the 80's, whether optimistic or pessimistic, will provide a tentative focus for developing alternative coping strategies for possible futures. As Logan Wilson[1] notes, to avoid future repetition of past mistakes, academe must calculate more realistically the probable outcomes of alternative courses of action and reaction.

Pendulum Swinging: Specialization to General Education

A possible scenario for higher education in the 21st century might be a continuing debate over current issues facing the field. Perhaps there will be those educators and administrators who, then, as now, will stress basics as recommended by the Yale Report of 1828, the Harvard Report of 1945, and the Harvard Core Curriculum Plan of 1976. Strong commitment to the humanities, social, natural and physical sciences are currently found among some administrators, faculty or students in technical, business and agricultural training programs. General education is being rethought in many community colleges. Questions are being raised about the liberalizing and liberating effect of the arts and sciences. General education may continue to be the island of stability and continuity in a sea of change.

Another concern that may remain in the 21st century is the danger of reifying values, systems, beliefs that are outmoded and outdated. Rejection of education's traditional focus on great belief systems of the past to exclusion of progressive problem-solving curriculum may be found in John Dewey's "Democracy and Education," Arthur Combs' "What the Future Demands of Education,"[2] and Peter F. Drucker's "The Coming Changes in Our School Systems."[3] Advocates of this point of view note the growing number of seminars, workshops, training programs outside of higher education institutions that offer services in demand by consumers. Stress conferences, assertiveness training, holistic health programs, value clarification workshops are examples of new services operating outside regular higher education systems.

There is surely a place for both theoretical and practical education in the 21st century. Pendulum swinging between specialization and general education, and continual efforts to balance them may remain. If one were to postulate a possible scenario for strategic planning that will bridge schisms it might include at least some of the following components.

People will have the same needs for clothing, health care, shelter, employment. They will also need higher visions of the potential and possibility of an elevated human consciousness. Religion, faith, belief in something other and greater than self as a source of inspiration and strength will remain. Whatever future social and educational systems may be, provision will have to be made for fulfilling basic and aesthetic needs. Concern for all these needs is increasingly seen in emerging efforts to provide for specialization and general education.

Alfred North Whitehead[4] caught the idea of needed balance between them when he wrote:

> The early Benedictine monks rejoiced in their labours because they conceived themselves as thereby made fellow-workers with Christ. Stripped of its theological trappings, the essential idea remains, that work should be transfused with intellectual and moral vision and thereby turned into a joy, triumphing over its weariness and its pain.
>
> . . . For masters and for men a technical or technological education, which is to have any chance of satisfying the practical needs of the nation, must be conceived in a liberal spirit as a real intellectual enlightenment in regard to principles applied and services rendered. In

> such an education geometry and poetry are as essential as turning lathes.

Emerging future trends reinforce Whitehead's call for balance between specialization and general education. Tulane University has started sending every applicant to its Liberal Arts College to gain knowledge about the natural world, cultures and societies, aesthetics and values in addition to intensive study in a major field.[5] The Vice Chancellor for Academic Affairs at the University of Colorado recently proposed a minimum of three courses in each of three broad areas with more emphasis on reading and writing.[6] Thirty-six percent of all undergraduates are enrolled in community colleges and even there the balance between specialization and general education is being sought. Miami-Dade Community College, enrolling over 50,000 students, does not hesitate to penalize those who balk at new requirements. During the two and one-half years since the college adopted its general-education program, Miami-Dade has given one-term suspensions to 7,000 students not making the grade. President Robert McCabe finds it a last chance to force students to acquire a general education.[7]

There is growing awareness of the need for enlightened cherishing of art, literature, sciences and the humanities. Broudy, in *Enlightened Cherishing*, writes:

> Finally, there is the internal steadfastness, almost serenity, that comes from knowing what is really first-rate in a domain. In a life full of uncertainty, in which one must depend on the judgments of others in so many affairs, to be one's own judge is at once both an exhilarating and a steadying influence.[8]

Bridge-building between technical and liberal education has been called for by a report to the Club of Rome, entitled, *No Limits to Learning: Bridging the Human Gap*.[9] The report calls for interdisciplinary education, moving beyond specialization and disciplinary fragmentation. This call for a Global Learning Order stresses interdependence between peoples and the breaking of limitations to open channels of communication throughout the world.

During the 60's and 70's, social pressures forced higher education managers to add programs and courses to meet persistent demands. Federal funds with strings attached lessened institutional autonomy and shifted funds from academic programs to sponsored research

efforts. Affirmative action programs, management by objectives, bureaucracy and loss of identity in mission emerged from higher education's drive to compete for federal funds. Programs with little relationship to either specialization or general education were started with the express purpose of acquiring research funds. At times faculty members were rewarded primarily for skill in grant writing. Losers were students often taught by graduate assistants to relieve senior faculty to engage in funded research programs. With a period of tight funding, higher education populaces can rethink priorities and needs. Already some institutions like the University of Michigan and the University of Texas are exploring enrollment limits. The former seeks to retain teaching-research excellence while getting smaller, while the latter seeks teaching–research excellence with caps on enrollment growth. Rediscovering traditional higher education missions will be the fulcrum of the future to balance innovative risk ventures.

A Fragmented Society

The future opportunities for institutional renewal are limitless. Not only do higher education institutions have the potential for rediscovering their primary missions but also for concentrating on the development of a human and humane environment for its members. As in the international arena, so in the national, universities and colleges can serve as models for futuristic thinking based on understanding the past and integrating ideas others have differentiated.[10] The 1980's will reflect the Splintering of America[11] which, according to Harold Isaacs of M.I.T., is due to several factors, among them:

1. The impact of the technetronic revolution—with instant communication and the seductive tyranny of television.
2. Movement of industry from urban centers of the industrial age to new expanding suburbs of the space age and in techniques from labor-intensive systems to selective computer controls.
3. Political power shifts from the Northeast to the Sunbelt and Pacific Coast.
4. A lessening of the influence of Judeo-Christian values for society and for the cement of family life.
5. The breakup of the outdated coalitions Roosevelt formed in the 1930's.

6. The determination of Blacks, over 14 percent of the population, to take things in their hands to solve grievances.
7. The simultaneous determination of White ethnic groups not to be robbed of the recognition and acceptance they had won—through the Roosevelt coalition.
8. The overlooked but radical change in the pattern of immigration into the U.S. from the 1960's onward which was bound to be initially destabilizing.

The ethnic composition of the U.S. society has changed since the 1960's with most immigrants coming from Asia and Latin America. There is a jockeying for power and influence among the over 106 ethnic groups within the United States. This continual pressure and counterpressure is likely to intensify and meet resistance.[12] Since the 1960's there have been: (1) outbreaks of racial violence in urban areas throughout the U.S., shifting from whole city blocks of 15 years ago to a more selective pattern of sniping or assassination in 1981; (2) white flight to the suburbs; (3) white resistance to forced busing as a means to secure racial balance in schools; (4) inter-ethnic friction, between Hispanics and Blacks for example; (5) a swing of White ethnic voters, for example, Irish, Italian, Greek, Polish, Jewish-American away from the Democratic camp to the Republicans.[13] The Moral Majority and the Voice of Reason pressure tactics illustrate the depth of schisms in American society. The challenge for higher education faced with social fragmentation is to provide a model of renewal for faith in and understanding of democratic thought and practice. Higher education through its own community and its potential for multi-disciplinary approaches to social research can enhance workings of an open society. The potential for democracy's survival were underlined by Charles Frankel in *Democratic Prospect*:

> At bottom, the democratic attitude is simply an attitude of good faith plus a working belief in the probable rationality of others.
>
> The competition that takes place in a democracy is an instance of cooperative competition. It, democracy, rests on the assumption that there are no irreconcilable conflicts, that differences can be negotiated or compromised, if men have good will. . . . Democracy is an ethic of good faith.[14]

Living in a democracy requires active participation if its highest ideals are to be met. Models of compromise and negotiations are

required also within higher education systems. Not a lessening of academic standards, but a provision of open admissions to all on the basis of merit regardless of ethnic group or social background will be the wave of the future. Within these parameters can be found the opportunities for understanding what it means to function within an open society. As Charles Frankel[15] notes:

> That aspect of democracy which most regularly troubles its partisans—the open struggle among special interests—is precisely what marks democracy as a system resting on the consent of the governed. The politics of pressure groups is the essential feature of the politics of democracy.
>
> The basic instrument of the democratic citizen is the organized group with enough power and influence to command the attention of those who make the decisions. The basic instruments of democratic government are the bargain and the compromise.

These instruments have been the consensual mainstay of higher education's survival power.

In no small measure since the Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (305 U.S. 337, 1938); Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma (332 U.S. 631, 1948); Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629, 1950); and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents (339 U.S. 637, 1950) extensive progress has been made in higher education in expanding the concept of economic and social justice in part fulfilling the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Philip Perlmutter,[16] executive director of the Community Council of Metropolitan Boston, notes a review of the history of American intergroup relations using any criterion except that of sheer perfection would show that there has been progress—painful and even agonizing but progress nevertheless. He points to a continuing upward socioeconomic mobility of all minority groups whose members are no longer severely restrained by ethnic backgrounds. Two Quakers and a Catholic became president; a Greek, vice-president; a Jew and a Pole, secretary of state; a Black Lebanese, Italian, and Japanese, U.S. senators. As a result of the 1980 congressional elections there are a record number of Catholics (136) and Jews (35), Baptists (55), Lutherans (20), Mormons (11), and Unitarian-Universalists (9). Perlmutter also sees an expansion of the right to vote on all levels of government and the right to attend school regardless of race, religion, national origin

or sex, as well as a marked decrease, if not yet the end, to racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination in admission to social, private, fraternal and community clubs. He also notes an increase in inter-ethnic, interracial and interfaith socializations and intermarriages; and a decrease in negative attitudes toward other groups, particularly Blacks.

This increased interdependence of peoples has been an article of faith on American public and private higher education campuses for over two decades. Although, as the Carnegie Council noted, it takes some bravado to forecast future enrollments, a touch of madness is needed to believe too much in its invincibility.[17] There are those who see enrollment decreases while others, like Howard Bowen,[18] foresee large-scale efforts by the federal government to solve such pressing social problems as urban housing, health and social services. If Bowen's projections hold, regardless of the call for fewer federal services and government expenditures in 1981, there will be extensive enrollment increases in higher education. Futurists predict a dip in enrollment in higher education through the 1980's and an increase in the 1990's, but such projections are tentative at best and, if federal or state government seeks recycling and retraining programs for unemployed, projections could change rapidly.

Whatever the enrollment patterns in the future, there will be greater diversity in student bodies. Women, minorities, senior citizens and non-traditional students will comprise an ever-greater number of total enrollments in post-secondary education. There will continue to be discussion as to meritocracy or egalitarianism in higher education. The future may well provide ample room for both philosophies. Within major universities, public and private, merit will play an increasingly major role.

Unity Within Diversity

The twenty-first century may well be a period when unity within diversity will be found in American culture. In the 1980's unforeseen multiplier effects will unfold from the multitude of single interest groups each pushing their own point of view in the 1970's and 80's. Due to increased crime within American society, Attorney General William French Smith set up a task force in 1981 to recommend additional steps that can be taken by the federal government to combat crime.[19] Smith noted that thirty percent of the nation's house-

holds were touched by serious crime in 1980, including murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny or theft. He noted violent crime increased eleven percent between 1978 and 1979 and preliminary figures showed it grew ten percent in 1980. Elderly citizens in urban areas live in fear, barricading themselves in their homes; suburban and rural areas are becoming targets for the growing wave of crime in 1981.

Causes of crime are complex but vigorous legal attention to rights of the criminal to the exclusion of victims' rights have in some instances led to repetition of heinous crimes. Rights for all and justice for none suggests results of extremism in the defense of individual freedom from conformity to minimal societal restraints. Each year over half a billion dollars worth of vandalism occurs in America's public schools. By the twenty-first century, a rethinking of rights and responsibilities may well have occurred by rediscovering the role and function of discipline and control in society and education. Perhaps civics and citizenship will be rediscovered and required for all pupils in school at each grade level. Attention to how to function sanely in a democracy may well be incorporated into future curriculum. As William C. Bagley[20] noted: Democracy is on trial, under criticism and suspicion with every weakness watched for and welcomed by its enemies. The future he finds will bring competition if not clashes and conflict with now militantly anti-democratic peoples. Bagley suggested that democratic societies cannot survive either competition or conflict with totalitarian states unless there is a democratic discipline that gives strength and solidarity to the democratic purpose and ideal.

> If the theory of Democracy finds no place for discipline, then, the theory will have before long only historical significance. . . . It would be futile to deny that control and discipline may be stupid and brutal and used for unworthy ends. It would be futile to deny the need for the development of self discipline and for the relaxation of external discipline with the growth of volitional maturity. But all this does not alter the fundamental truth that freedom must go hand in hand with responsibility, and the responsible freedom is always a conquest, never a gift.[21]

Social control has been an unwanted term in intellectual circles in the decade of the 1960's and 70's but future peoples might discover the role of individual and social discipline within society for humaneness. We have the challenge to enhance our life space. As the Renaissance Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola,[22] noted in his Oration

"On the Dignity of Man," men and women are the only creatures whose lives are determined not solely by nature but largely by their own free choice. Herein lies human dignity. Men and women, Pico found, degenerate into the lower forms of life, which are brutish or through their choice and determination scale the heavens to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine. Pico's choices place a responsibility on individuals and society for control and discipline. The depth of the challenge for the future is noted in the complexities facing attempts at meeting demands of special interest groups. Arlene Patterson[23] in a *Phi Delta Kappa* article, "Professional Malpractice: Small Cloud, but Growing Bigger," notes public criticism of administrators and faculty in public schools for permitting individuals to graduate with high school diplomas when they are unable to read and write. She notes, however, a recent Federal Court decision that held graduation from high school is both a property and legal right (Debra P. V. Turlington, 474 F. Supp. 244) (M.D. Fla. 1979). Her article notes that some thirty-six states have established minimum competencies and sixteen states require students to pass a literacy test as a high school graduation requirement. Patterson underlines the complexity of meritocracy in a fragmented society by noting that when some students in Florida were notified they failed Florida competency or functional literacy test, a class action suit was filed claiming that to deny a student a diploma was to deprive a student of a property right. She noted the end result was that the court agreed the students had been deprived of their Fourteenth Amendment property rights without due process and enjoined the State from denying diplomas. Solving such dilemmas will not be an easy task. Broudy in *Paradox and Promise*[24] notes that unless all citizens are to cherish and become first-rate persons, the school system will inevitably sort out students into elites and masses. He finds the possibility of a multi-track school system.

> If we cannot give up the hard subjects and the hard discipline that elites require, and if we cannot sell them to all on the basis that every person needs them in his work, then our only recourse is to argue that every one needs them as a person, but only if one decides to be a first rate person.[25]

It will require the best efforts of all concerned with survival of democratic institutions to identify and implement strategies for augmenting unity of purpose within diversity of interests within education.

Summary

Tracing two areas of concern for strategic planning, general education and fragmentation in society with a goal of unity within diversity for the preservation and renewal of democratic institutions, will no doubt be encompassed in 21st century thinking in higher education. Consensus and compromise are essentials not easily balanced between competing claims. Higher education institutions' populations are amazingly adaptable, however, and will meet the challenges of future decades. Decisions now made in seeking balance among a variety of interest and pressure groups will determine the quality of institutional life in the 21st century. Regardless of the multitude of fragmentary pressures in the 1980's, insights gained from seeking to understand their implication for alternative scenarios will enrich and enhance coping strategies in the future. Higher education's future cannot be understood apart from the society of which it is a part and to which its products return. The final outcomes and quality of the mission of higher education depends on understanding its contribution to the heart, soul and mind of a larger societal consciousness.

Notes

[1] Logan Wilson, "Dialectic Aspects of Recent Change in Academe Annals," *AAPSS*, 448 (March, 1980), p. 15.

[2] Arthur W. Combs, "What the Future Demands of Education," *Phi Delta Kappa*, Vol. 62, No. 5 (January, 1981), pp. 369–372.

[3] Peter F. Drucker. "The Coming Changes in Our School Systems," *Wall Street Journal*, Tuesday (March 3, 1981), p. 20.

[4] Alfred North Whitehead, *The Arms of Education* (New York: The Free Press, 1929), pp. 44, 45.

[5] John Henderson, "Change on Campus: More Colleges Require a Variety of Courses to Broaden Students," *Wall Street Journal*, Vol. LXI, No. 101 (Monday, March 9, 1981), p. 1.

[6] Ibid., p. 15.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Harry S. Broudy, *Enlightenment Cherishing* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), p. 109.

[9] James W. Botkin, *et al.*, *No Limits to Learning: Bridging the Human Gap* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 135.

[10] Broudy, p. 169.

[11] Geoffrey Godsell, "The Splintering of America," *Christian Science Monitor* (Monday, January 5, 1981), pp. 12–13.

[12] Godsell, p. 13.

[13] Geoffrey Godsell, "Why Can't They Be Like the Rest of Us?" *Christian Science Monitor* (Tuesday, January 6, 1981), p. 12.

[14] Charles Frankel, *Democratic Prospect* (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), p. 14.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Philip Perlmutter, "The Decline of Bigotry in the United States," *Christian Science Monitor* (Thursday, March 5, 1981), p. 23.

[17] Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *More Than Survival* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975), p. 49.

[18] Ibid., pp. 39–41.

[19] "U.S. Task Force Is Named to Find Ways to Broaden Fight Against Violent Crime," *Wall Street Journal* (Friday, March 6, 1981).

[20] William C. Bagley, "An Essentialist's Platform for the Advancement of American Education," *Educational Administration and Supervision*, XXIV (April, 1938), pp. 241–256.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ernst Cassirer, Paul Kristeller, John Randall, *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 225. In Clarence H. Karier, "The Quest for Orderly Change: Some Reflections," *History of Education Quarterly* (Summer, 1979), p. 167.

[23] Arlene Patterson, "Professional Malpractice: Small Cloud, But Growing Bigger," *Phi Delta Kappa*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (November, 1980), pp. 183–196.

[24] Harry Broudy, *Paradox and Promise* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1961), p. 13.

[25] Ibid., p. 13.

The Hermeneutic Interplay

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Hermeneutics is relatively new in American criticism; until E. D. Hirsch's *Validity in Interpretation* (1967), most American critics thought of hermeneutics in the nineteenth-century sense of Biblical exegesis or historical and philological interpretations which are objectively valid. This is the way August Boeckh, for example, uses it in his *Encyclopedie und Methodologie der philologischen Wissenschaften* of 1877.[1]

However, Martin Heidegger, in his *Sein und Zeit* (1927), beginning with the hypotheses of Wilhelm Dilthey on the understanding of understanding itself, used the terminology of hermeneutics in his analysis of Being in order to understand and interpret what it means for a Being to understand and interpret. Heidegger's student, Hans-George Gadamer, took the discoveries of Heidegger further and in a different area than his mentor's investigations allowed. Gadamer, in his *Wahrheit und Methode* (1960), attempts nothing less than a universal theory of the general nature of understanding.[2]

Gadamerian hermeneutics is a call for radical re-examination and constant revision of critical understanding in any encounter with texts, but it takes a middle path in its opposition both to the objectivism of science and to Kantian subjectivism.

In literary criticism there often seems to be a certain amount of envy for the idea of science; we have been told by Cleanth Brooks, Elder Olson, and others that the sciences progress, that they work in a cumulative way to increase general knowledge in a field and to build on previous discoveries.[3] Olson notes that "few . . . would now contest the assertion that the sciences are at present in a condition far superior to the arts, or, at any rate, of that portion of the arts which entitles them to consideration as departments of knowledge. . . ."[4] Scientists seem to be solving their problems, moving collectively toward goals, sharing data. Critical discussions in the humanities, on the other hand, seem to be bogged down in squabbles and trivial disagreements; we cannot even agree on terminology or fundamental

assumptions, let alone a direction for cumulative efforts for perfection of knowledge in our various fields. Hermeneutics not only would deny that objectivity in textual interpretation is impossible and undesirable, but that objectivity cannot even exist in the so-called "objective sciences."

Hermeneutics, we shall see, avoids also the extremes of subjectivism and relativism of which it has been accused. In Kantian idealism, the interpreter or judge cannot know the artwork with any certainty; he can only be certain of the aesthetic pleasure on his own part in observing and judging the artwork. This subjectivism, this extreme interpretive skepticism, is anathema to hermeneutics which seeks to engage the text in "conversation," but does not seek to overpower it. Nor is it possible, according to hermeneuticists, to go instead to the subjective understanding of the artwork on the part of the work's creator, as we will see shortly. Paul Ricoeur has claimed that the theory of the text "shows that the act of subjectivity is less what starts than what completes. This conclusive act could be expressed as appropriation (*Zueignung*). It does not pretend, as does romantic hermeneutics, to rejoin the original subjectivity which carried the meaning of the text. It *responds* instead to the thing of the text. It is therefore the counterpart of distantiation which established the text in its own autonomy in relation to the author, to its situation, and to its original destination."[5]

Textual interpretation is the special problem of hermeneutics for several reasons. Texts are always interpreted when read; the reader cannot avoid being an interpreter as well. The text is part of a tradition and as a thing with a history a problem is set up since "the understanding of something written is not a reproduction of something that is past, but the sharing of a present meaning" (*TM*, 354). Secondly, texts, far more than speech (which is always accompanied by interpretive-delimiting acts or qualities such as gestures, tone of voice, accent, and the situation or circumstances known by the speaker's audience), is vulnerable to misunderstanding. Gadamer believes that the text's "meaning has undergone a kind of self-alienation through being written down" and "this transformation back is the real hermeneutical task. The meaning of what has been said is to be stated anew, simply on the basis of the words passed on by means of the written signs" (*TM*, 354–55). Meaning must be disclosed through the writing which has alienated itself from meaning. For this reason

Gadamer converts writing back to "speaking" in interpretation. "The significant and its understanding are so closely connected with the actual physical quality of language that understanding always contains an inner speaking as well," Gadamer tells us (*TM*, 142).

The "distantiation" of the text is the reason it requires an interpretive encounter, and the reason for which entering into the encounter is so difficult. There has been an estrangement, an alienation (*Verfremdung*) between the text and its interpreters, a gap has been created. This is the space for the interpretive interplay. Ricoeur has written that "to interpret is to bring close the far (temporal, geographical, cultural, spiritual)" (*PAH*, 92). Communication must take place between the text's "community" (in its historical or cultural situation) and the interpreter's community (with the interpreter's understanding of the present situation which is prior to his interpretation of the text and which directs both his questioning of the text and his own openness to interrogation by the text). Gadamer points out in "The Problem of Historical Consciousness" that the importance of time and temporal distancing in the hermeneutic situation is not, however, a distance to be bridged or overcome (it cannot be fully bridged), but instead the distance itself provides the ground for the understanding of the text.[6]

In interpretation it is necessary to proceed from the nature of the fore-project of understanding. Prior to any attempt to understand a particular work, one has a projection of meaning for that work which distracts from the interpretation as process-event. The interpreter, according to Gadamer, "projects before himself a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again the latter emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning. The working out of this fore-project, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there" (*TM*, 236). The forestructure of understanding, then, is fluid, open to the text, with expectations which do not close off, but which are actuated and changed in process with the text's unfolding (its dis-closure). The interpreter is aware of his shifting fore-structure of understanding, and of the text's unfolding "newness." But, Gadamer explains, this awareness "involves neither 'neutrality' in the matter of the object nor the extinction of one's self, but the conscious assimilation of one's own fore-meanings and prejudices. The impor-

tant thing is to be aware of one's own bias, so that the text may present itself in all its newness and thus be able to assert its own truth against one's own fore-meanings'' (*TM*, 238). ''Prejudice'' here means only ''pre-judging.'' It is without any negative or evaluative meaning and refers to the fore-structure of meaning provisionally held by the interpreter until it shifts as new meanings emerge from the text. There can be no interpretation without pre-judging.[7]

Heidegger has developed at some length the idea of truth as uncovering or ''dis-covery.'' ''To say that an assertion '*is true*' signifies that it uncovers the entity as it is in itself,'' according to Heidegger. ''Such an assertion asserts, points out, 'lets' the entity 'be seen' . . . in its uncoveredness. The *Being-true* (*truth*) of the assertion must be understood as *Being-uncovering*'' (*BT*, 261). Gadamer uses the metaphor of the conversation or dialogue to explain the way in which truth lets itself be seen.

A conversation requires certain reciprocity or give and take between those engaged in it. Central to the conversation is the object being discussed, and this necessarily means there is already some agreement and shared knowledge. Those involved in a conversation must wish to come to an understanding, share a common language, and work together in the new area between their pre-conversation stands. That is, a new ''community'' is established as a ground for the interplay presupposed by the conversation's nature (*TM*, 340–41). ''Dependence on the translation of an interpreter is an extreme case that duplicates the hermeneutic process of the conversation: there is that between the interpreter and the other as well as that between oneself and the interpreter'' (*TM*, 347).[8] John Hogan notes that

> One can never come to a dialogue with his mind made up. Openness on both sides is essential. Neither pole can control. Rather than engaging in a dialogue, Gadamer tells us, it engages us. In this manner it can be seen that the outcome of the dialogue can never be known in advance. A genuine dialogue is a process in which the give and take assists the participants in arriving at a new understanding. The hermeneutical experience is also dialogic. The reader dialogues with a text. The text responds in a give-and-take fashion until understanding is reached. The dialogue is what causes the subject matter to unconceal itself. The dialogue makes possible a new understanding.[9]

The authentic hermeneutic conversation is contrasted with recita-

tion. In recitation there is no authentic questioning for the questioner already knows the answers to his queries and he occupies a position superior to that of the questioned. Recitation has a relation to the text analogous to the situation of a student being examined by his teachers, or the words of a play being spoken by an actor. Speaking, "conversation," is nonteleological and contingent; "recitation" is teleological and determined. The student's answers to his teacher's questions must come close to the teacher's idea of the proper response to his query, and the actor is not free to substantively change the words he has been given for his role (*TM*, 497). The question-answer conversation of hermeneutics is ultimately dialectical in order to "remove the one-sidedness that it [interpretation] inevitably produces" (*TM*, 428).

Gadamer frequently emphasizes the peculiar function of questions in the hermeneutic process. Once the question itself is understood, the underlying assumptions of that question are understood, and the question is no longer a "real" question; this is the case with questions which were once asked, but no longer are (*TM*, 338). Questioning functions as the "universal mediator" in the dialectic between the prejudice prior to the encounter with the work and "the new element which denounces it, i.e., the foreign element which provokes my system or one of its elements. . . . Questioning always discloses or leaves open the new possibility that denouncing an opinion as prejudice and disclosure of the truly different in hermeneutical information transforms an implicit 'mine' into an authentic 'mine,' makes an inadmissable 'other' into a genuine 'other' and thus assimilable in its otherness" (*PHC*, 49).

This exchange between interpreter and text is characterized as a game or play (*Spiel*). In playing, one gives oneself up to the game, bounded as it is by rules and traditions (in the case of text interpretation, the rules and traditions are those of the language). In his excellent short study of the subject, Charles Stephen Byrum points out that in the hermeneutic interplay "the process . . . of understanding or thinking is the disclosure-happening play of Being. . . . Furthermore, Gadamer (in a way similar to both Heidegger and Huizinga) sees that the mode of understanding is language and that language thus becomes the most fundamental form of play."[10]

Play requires both the rules which *are* the game, and the player willing to enter into what the game requires. The player must take the

game seriously or there can be no play at all. "The mode of being of play does not allow the player to behave towards play as if it were an object," writes Gadamer. "The player knows very well what play is, and that what he is doing is 'only a game'; but he does not know what exactly he 'knows' in knowing that . . . ." (*TM*, 92). It is only in this way of belonging-to the game that the interpreter can enter into the game of the text and the text's language. Paul Ricoeur has declared that "it is the game which reveals the function of *exhibition* or *presentation* (*Darstellung*), which, doubtlessly, summons the linguistic medium, but by necessity precedes and supports discourse" (*PAH*, 98). David Halliburton, in his *Edgar Allan Poe: A Phenomenological View*, gives a concise explanation: "The literary work is essentially a game, or a playing (*Spiel*) . . . Art, for Gadamer, is not a means of securing pleasure, but a revelation of being. The work is a phenomenon through which we come to know the world. To call it a *Spiel* is not to reduce the work to a hedonistic pastime. For Gadamer as for Schiller, playing is a high and serious act. . . ."[11] Thus, play discloses itself; its Being, and not the Being of the player, is the subject. "Players do what the playing wants," Halliburton has explained elsewhere, "which is why it makes sense to speak of the rules of the game while it is nonsense to speak of the rules of the players."[12]

The analogy to play also points up interpretation as a continuous process. When we "conclude" a game, when the King is checkmated or the ninth inning is completed, we can begin again and each time the game will be played out differently; the game itself is infinitely replayable. In a similar fashion, the interpreter's "effort, or his play, is part of an endless process; it has no aim in which it terminates and continually renews itself in repetition. . . . Only when it claims a terminus by absolutizing a single repetition of the whole does it cease to be a play, a game, and take itself too seriously in false play."[13] This "play" is not illimitable license or chaos, for the game is always limited by the rules which are the game, by its playing space and nature, the boundaries between the game and what-is-not-the-game, and by the choices forced upon the player. The player "first of all expressly separates off his playing behavior from his other behaviour [*sic*] by wanting to play. But even within his readiness to play he makes a choice. He chooses this game and not that. . . . [The] movement of the game is not simply the free area in which one 'plays

oneself out,' but is one that is specifically marked out and reserved for the movement of the game" (*TM*, 96).

Reading, interpretation, entered into in accordance with these concepts of the game, leads in to the "experience" or hermeneutic "event," in which there is a reversal in the interpreter's expectations. The expectations have been set up by the interpreter's prejudices, by the forestructure of understanding (the "foremeanings"). But the event changes the prior understanding and attitudes, the structure of the interpreter's horizons. James Hans explains that "all experience leads to an openness, to a questioning of its own horizons."[14] Günther Buck informs us that "the horizonal change presents itself here as a movement from narrower and more specific to wider and more general horizons. A nullified anticipation, in being discredited, frees our view for a more embracing anticipation that arises, as it were, behind it. The process seems repeatable at will. We can think of no final horizon that experience could ever go beyond. The unsteadiness induced by negative experience is always contained within the higher-order steadiness of wider horizons."[15]

The horizon of the interpreter is made up of the prejudgments or the expectations and foremeanings with which the interpreter comes to the text. E. D. Hirsch has tried to turn the idea of Gadamer's *Horizontverschmelzung*, or fusion-of-horizons, against him to prove that the fusion of horizons necessitates first understanding the intentions of the text's author:

> How can an interpreter fuse two perspectives—his own and that of the text—unless he has somehow appropriated the original perspective and amalgamated it with his own? How can a fusion take place unless the things to be fused are made actual, which is to say, unless the original sense of the text has been understood? Indeed, the fundamental question which Gadamer has not managed to answer is simply this: how can it be affirmed that the original sense of a text is beyond our reach and, at the same time, that valid interpretation is possible? (*VI*, 254).

But Gadamer is not concerned with the author's intentions which are, in practice, irrecoverable. Understanding a text is the primary concern, the author's meaning ancillary to this (*TM*, 262). Hirsch has softened his claims for authorial intentions, although his emotional appeal has increased its scope. In his article "Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics," written four years after *Validity in Interpretation*, Hirsch pronounces that "it is more comprehensive and more human-

izing to embrace the plurality of cultures than to be imprisoned in our own. We ought therefore to respect original meaning as the best meaning, the most legitimate norm for interpretation.''[16] This is close to the position stated in *Validity*. But Hirsch goes on to admit that his ''earlier definition of meaning was too narrow and normative only in that it restricted meaning to those constructions where the interpreter is governed by the conception of the author's will. The enlarged definition now comprises constructions where authorial will is partly or totally disregarded''; meaning, he now tells us, ''is what an interpreter actualizes from a text; significance is that actual speaking as heard in a chosen and variable context of the interpreter's experiential world'' (*TDH*, 250). Elsewhere in this amazing article he tells us that the ''best meaning'' of a text changes from interpreter to interpreter, group to group, and period to period (*TDH*, 246–48). He might add, as well, that it changes from reading to reading. What happened here to the privileged stance of the author's intention in determining *valid* interpretations? As William Cain has pointed out, ''by reducing the normative power of authorial intention, Hirsch has seriously weakened the forcefulness of the term 'meaning' (whatever its other shortcomings) in his system. He still hopes to conceive of 'meaning' as (more or less) centered in the text—the interpreter finds meaning in a text because he is confident that it is truly 'there' . . . .; but of course it is 'there' only because, as Hirsch often reminds us, it has been constructed by the interpreter.''[17] The argument of *Validity in Interpretation*, the distinction Hirsch makes there between ''meaning'' and ''significance'' and the criteria he states as the only objective way to judge whether or not a given interpretation is valid, collapses when Hirsch writes that interpreters make meaning from the text and that ''all interpreted meanings are ontologically equal; they are all equally real'' (*TDH*, 246). And the interpretation of the text must precede understanding an author's intentions. Charles Altieri, no follower of Gadamer, has rightly inquired, ''how do we understand in what way the intention (or, we might add, which of a person's possible intentions) is relevant to establish meaning without first understanding the message? We can only guess what someone intends by interpreting what he has said. . . .''[18]

Hirschian ''hermeneutics'' holds that author's intentions are the prime consideration, however, because Hirsch's concern is with establishing valid interpretations; Gadamer's hermeneutics, on the

other hand, is descriptive, and tries to explain how we come to understand and interpret. Since Hirsch wishes to choose among the infinite number of interpretations of a particular text and say, "This is correct; that one is incorrect," he must establish some seemingly objective criteria for determining this correct or "best meaning." In *Validity in Interpretation* he puts forth the idea of an advocacy system (*VI*, 197) by which disputes in interpretation could be adjudicated. Either the interpretations could be synthesized or a single interpretation could be declared correct by considering the "probability" and evidence of the conflicting "subhypotheses," or, in other words, by agreeing on a guess. Hirsch's motivation for accepting the simulacrum of validity is clear; he feels it necessary to establish an "ecumenical harmony of theoretical principles" (*TDH*, 245). From such agreement "there might emerge a sense of community in the discipline of interpretation, a sense of belonging to a common enterprise" (*TDH*, 249). Eventually Hirsch foments an "ethical" argument for accepting his criteria for correct interpretations. Hirsch pronounces "a maxim that claims no privileged sanction from metaphysics or analysis, but only from general ethical tenets, generally shared: *Unless there is a powerful overriding value in disregarding an author's intention (i.e., original meaning), we who interpret as a vocation should not disregard it* . . . an interpreter . . . falls under the basic moral imperative of speech, which is to respect an author's intention. That is why, in ethical terms, original meaning is the 'best meaning' " (*TDH*, 259 and 261). Hirsch has not proven that it is necessarily more ethical or morally proper to give priority to the author's meaning, nor has he explained how the advocacy system to establish the "correct" guess is more scientific or valid; the administration of this system is also vague.

But Gadamer is not concerned with the author's intentions; instead, he speaks of the horizon of the text which includes a great deal besides the author. The author does not maintain a privileged position simply because he is the author, for once what is written is written it is already estranged from the author; it has its own otherness. The fusion of horizons is the meeting of the interpreter's fore-meanings and this otherness of the text.

The interpreter is within a tradition and his textual encounter requires him to re-examine that tradition and speak (and question) from it. The text also has a tradition of its influence and reception (the

Wirkungsgeschichte). "Our consciousness of the past, as well as that of the present," David Couzens Hoy explains, "necessarily involves an awareness of the influences and effects that past events or works have had (or failed to have) and will be colored by prior interpretations of this past and its intervening effects."[19] There is a meeting in the ground between the horizon of the text and the horizon of the interpreter, as Jan Edward Garrett makes clear.

> An historical horizon consists . . . of those prejudgments which organize an individual's expectations about the past. Some of them, if made explicit, would appear as propositions which refer to the past. For example, when I think about a Platonic text, my prejudgment that Plato valued the unchangeable more than the changeable may be at work. But my historical horizon is also partly determined by other prejudgments not so clearly identifiable with the past. For example, the prejudgments which are associated with 'unchangeable' and 'changeable' in modern English unavoidably color my thinking about Plato to the extent to which I am not completely able to bring them to the surface and contrast them with the connotations of the ancient Greek words of which they are translations.[20]

The past is something still effective (*Dagwessen*), rather than over with or completed (*Vergangenheit*). It still opens up possibilities for the interpreter in the future (see *BT*, 432). In addition, Hogan notes, "not only must the present be viewed in light of the past, but the past can only be viewed in light of the present. If Gadamer is correct, there must be a kind of influencing backwards. For example, not only does one read Heidegger in light of Aristotle but one reads Aristotle in light of Heidegger."[21] The tradition in this way creates what becomes part of itself.

Reviewers and critics of *Truth and Method* have pointed out some of the problems with Gadamer's concept of the tradition and its role in a universal hermeneutics. Gadamer posits a simple historical distancing; that is, he believes that a text by its nature becomes more incomprehensible and difficult as the distance in time between the writing of the book and its reading by interpreters increases. This would mean that more recently written texts, simply because they are temporally closer to the readers, would be more immediately comprehensible. Also, Gadamer's use of the tradition is too local for a hermeneutics which claims to be universal. Gadamer's tradition is solely that of Western Europe; he is helped in his analysis by this

localizing, for alphabetic writing is already more abstract, more estranged, than the ideogrammatic, and Germanic, Latinate, and Greek grammatical structures offer different interpretive responses than Semitic, Oriental, American Indian, or African languages do.[22]

The historical-effective interpretation of texts outlined above has been characterized by the famous hermeneutic circle, described by Heidegger (*BT*, 194–95). Gadamer has presented the hermeneutic circle in a way which more precisely concerns us. "In the beginning, without the revision of the first project, there is nothing to constitute the basis for a new meaning; but at the same time, discordant projects aspire to constitute themselves as *the* unified meaning until the 'first' interpretation is modified and replaces its initial presupposed concepts by more adequate ones. Heidegger described this perpetual oscillation of interpretive visions, i.e., understanding being the formative process of a new project. One who follows this course always risks falling under the suggestion of his own rough drafts; he runs the risk that the anticipation which he has prepared may not conform to what the thing is. Therefore, the constant risk of understanding lies in the elaboration of projects that are authentic and more proportionate to its subject" (*PHC*, 42).[23]

The hermeneutic circle, it can be seen, is closely related to the concept of the fusion of horizons related above. Gadamer speaks of literature's will-to-permanence, a continuance joining past and present or near and distant (*TM*, 353–54). The truth of tradition is transmitted, in the hermeneutic situation, to present hearing (*TM*, 420) to confront and engage the interpreter; this reflexive posture of modern consciousness towards the tradition is interpretation (*PHC*, 8–9).[24]

Notes

[1] Parts of Boeckh's book have appeared in English as *On Interpretation and Criticism*, tr. and ed. John Paul Pritchard (University of Oklahoma Press, 1968). While Hirsch's *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) popularized the term "hermeneutics," Hirsch defends the Schleiermachian concept of the term and attacks the Heideggerian-Gadamerian branch. Schleiermacher posited a "divinatory act" by which one could somehow place oneself in the mind of the creator of the text, from which point any interpretive or textual problems could be settled authoritatively and once and for all. This essay is concerned with contemporary critical thought, and so will present Hirsch's arguments only in passing. *Validity* will be cited in the text of his paper as *VI*.

[2] *Sein und Zeit* has been translated into English as *Being and Time*, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1962), hereafter abbreviated as *BT*. Gadamer's

Wahrheit und Methode has been translated as *Truth and Method*, no translator named (N.Y.: Seabury Press, 1975). This will be cited as *TM*.

[3] See, for example, Cleanth Brooks, *The Well-Wrought Urn* (N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1947), p. 208, and two essays by Elder Olson, "Art and Science" and "The Dialectical Foundations of Critical Pluralism" in *On Value Judgments in the Arts and Other Essays* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976). Martin Steinmann, Jr., provides a convincing refutation of such science-envy in his "Cumulation, Revolution, and Progress," *New Literary History*, 5 (1974), 477–90.

[4] Olson, "The Dialectical Foundations of Critical Pluralism," p. 327.

[5] Paul Ricoeur, "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics," tr. R. Bradley DeFord, *Nôus*, 9 (1975), p. 94. Hereafter abbreviated as *PAH*.

[6] "The Problem of Historical Consciousness," tr. Jeff L. Close, *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 5 (1975), p. 47. Hereafter abbreviated as *PHC*.

[7] See comments by James S. Hans, "Hans-Georg Gadamer and Hermeneutic Phenomenology," *Philosophy Today*, 22 (1978), p. 12.

[8] See also David Halliburton, "The Hermeneutics of Belief and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion," *Diacritics*, 6 (1976), pp. 6–7, and Ricoeur, *PAH*, p. 90, on the conversational model in hermeneutics.

[9] John Hogan, "Gadamer and the Hermeneutical Experience," *Philosophy Today*, 20 (1976), p. 7.

[10] Charles Stephen Byrum, "Philosophy as Play," *Man and World*, 8 (1975), p. 323. See also Johan Huizinga, *Homo Ludens* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

[11] David Halliburton, *Edgar Allan Poe: A Phenomenological View* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 32. See also Hans (note 7, above), pp. 6, 8, 9 on the game.

[12] Halliburton, "The Hermeneutics of Belief . . . ," p. 2.

[13] Byrum, p. 325.

[14] Hans, p. 13.

[15] Günther Buck, "The Structure of Hermeneutic Experience and the Problem of Tradition," *NLH*, 10 (1978), p. 38. See also Gadamer, *TM*, pp. 379, 383, 386, and 393; and Halliburton, "The Hermeneutics of Belief . . . ," p. 7.

[16] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., "Three Dimensions of Hermeneutics," *NLH*, 3 (1971/72), p. 248. Hereafter cited as *TDH*.

[17] William E. Cain, "Authority. 'Cognitive Atheism,' and the Aims of Interpretation: The Literary Theory of E. D. Hirsch," *College English*, 39 (1977), p. 339.

[18] Charles Altieri, "The Hermeneutics of Literary Indeterminacy: A Dissent from the New Orthodoxy," *NLH*, 10 (1978), p. 74. See also *TM*, p. 17 and *PAH*, p. 93.

[19] David Couzens Hoy, "Hermeneutic Circularity, Indeterminacy, and Incommensurability," *NLH*, 10 (1978), pp. 167–68.

[20] Jan Edward Garrett, "Hans-Georg Gadamer on 'Fusion of Horizons,' " *Man and World*, 11 (1978), p. 394.

[21] Hogan, p. 11.

[22] See Halliburton, "The Hermeneutics of Belief . . . ," pp. 4, 5, and 8.

[23] See also Günther Buck (note 15, above), pp. 32–33; Hirsch, *TDH*, pp. 252–54; Hoy (note 19, above), p. 171; Gadamer, *TM*, 261–67; Michael Murray, *Modern Critical Theory: A Phenomenological Introduction* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), pp. 81–83; and my article, "From Procrustean Criticism to Process Hermeneutics," in *Sub-Stance* (forthcoming).

[24] For examples of the uses of hermeneutics in "practical criticism," see *De-Structing the Novel: Essays in Applied Postmodern Hermeneutics* (Troy, N.Y.: Whitston Publishing Co., Inc. forthcoming).

In addition to the works cited, I have been assisted by Richard Palmer's indispensable *Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger and Gadamer* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969), and by William V. Spanos' graduate course

in hermeneutics and such articles as his "Heidegger, Kierkegaard, and the Hermeneutic Circle: Towards a Postmodern Theory of Interpretation," *boundary 2*, 4 (1976), 455–88. I wish to thank Sarah Orr and Professors Walter Davis and James Phelan for their comments on this essay.

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Book Review Essay

Competition and Playful Activities

James W. Keating
Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1978
iii, 169 pages. $10.50

Reviewed by:

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This little assemblage entitled *Competition and Playful Activities* by James W. Keating of DePaul University, is a welcome sight in the ever-expanding literature in the philosophy of sport—one of the newest "applied" areas in philosophy today. This press is supposed to provide low cost books, but *Competition and Playful Activities* was expensive for a paperback. However, it is well worth the price and is a useful text in sports theory courses. The first half of the book is by far the best and Keating should have probably stopped with that, for the rest is an appendage of chapters on various philosophers who have written on play, games or sport in one fashion or another (Sartre, Wittgenstein, Plato, and Weiss), and several miscellaneous chapters. I shall deal with each group of chapters in turn.

Keating's Task

Recent sport philosophers have envisioned their activity to be like that of the art curator; the preservation and restoration, in addition to the study of the cultural milieu, of their subject—*sport*. The notions of preservation and restoration are certainly ones which dominate the pages of this book. Professor Keating thinks that sport is an area of human activity of positive worth and value. Indeed a sense of urgency is felt by anyone who reads this little volume.

Preservation and restoration are ideas which suggest something in a state of *ruin*, or the threat thereof. Sports, especially in America, are in a state of ruin. Or, less dramatically, they are in a state of ruin caused by outside, destructive influences. Keating's noble task is to set sport off and protect it from these negative influences (27).

We begin this task with Keating by defining the key ideas which make up the human activity known under the term *sport*. Two things must be done to accomplish this: one, to define the notions of

competition (ch. 1), winning (ch. 2), amateurism (ch. 3), sportsmanship (ch. 4), excellence (ch. 5), athletics (passim, esp. ch. 1, 3, 5, 6), sports (passim, esp. ch. 2, 8, 11), games (passim, esp. ch. 9), play (passim, esp. ch. 10 and introduction), and gambling (ch. 13); two, to develop and to appreciate the moral dimension surrounding these notions. Let's see how this works with competition and amateurism.

Competition

Competition is defined as, following Lovejoy, an attempt between or among rivals (according to agreed-upon rules) to excel or overcome each other to get or to keep any valuable thing either to the exclusion of others or in a greater measure than others, with the provision that the activity excludes unbridled or criminal conflict or means. This proviso is the moral sphere mentioned above. Ice hockey, and later football, have entered this realm of criminal conflict. Have they ceased to be games? Keating's proviso helps explain why Underwood's book on the death of American football has appeared on the scene.[1] Football has become so violent, so full of injuries, so disrespectful to players, fans, and officials that the activity is no longer a game, but outright confrontation. We have lost sight of the distinction between competition and deceptive, destructive conflict. The conditions under which competition takes place have eroded the moral sphere in which these games, like football, take place. We have sacrificed honesty for success. For honesty we have substituted deceit, lying, hypocrisy, cheating, and malice. Instances are so numerous in the sports pages of our newspapers that they hardly need to be given in a discussion like this. But let me give one (concerning fan abuse), which occurred close to my home. Shortly after Roger Staubach's retirement was announced, we in Dallas met with the following news from Washington. "Washington Redskins' fans took the retirement of Roger Staubach with all the grace and subtlety of a crooked politician given 24 hours time out from the federal election laws. / Stars and championships were in the eyes, although few but the bravest would admit the full extent of this relief at having Staubach—'Goody Two Cleats' they call him—safely from the sidelines. / 'It's a good thing he got out now so he won't have to face the Redskins again,' a well-dressed female fan sneered."[2] Roger Staubach has become an object of abuse, disrespect, a focus of blame

for past failures and hatred. What we would expect, rather, is some reverence and respect for the man who set 11 NFL records, performed Homeric deeds—great feats which exemplify perfection. But the recognition of a great player was replaced by idle speculation over next season's games. This is all that matters. Homage to a noble athlete is an activity, a secular ceremony, lost to the American consciousness.

Keating's definition shows us that there are proper bounds or limits to activities which comprise sport but that these have been exceeded. There are several reasons why I think this is so. One is the success ethic. Americans are driven by the desire and goal to be the best. And "the best" is measured by how much money one can make. When this is coupled with the intensity of competition, we have potential situations for corruption, because the values are placed squarely on the success of winning. That means winning at all costs. Another reason is America's materialism. Instead of spiritualizing activities as people in the Orient do, Americans materialize activities. Sports are no exception. They are turned into commodities and placed in a consumer marketplace. Sports become bills of goods, bought and sold. The sports and the business sections which usually appear in the same part of the newspapers have in some ways become indistinguishable. The business transactions of players' contracts or new franchises take precedence over the games. The talk of money in sports has replaced talk of the enobling qualities of sports—what sports do for people. The humanizing aspect of these activities has been lost.

Athletics and the Money Problem

College athletics have recently been equated with money. Those who argue against Title IX and equal funding in women's sports have used this equation as the major premise in their argument. Their argument goes something like this. Athletics, in particular college athletics, cost money to run. Those who produce the revenue ought to be the ones most entitled to it, that is, the men. Since women's sports do not create the attention or generate as much revenue, then they are not entitled to the same benefits. Therefore, disproportional amounts of funds are justifiable and fair. The main assumption behind this argument is the value judgment that the worth of sports or athletics is monetary. Athletics are treated as business, big business, and some-

how we have come to tolerate or even accept this attitude. However, this treatment and its supporting argument are ones we should be skeptical of and challenge. Many of the evils and corruption in sports and athletics can be traced back to the money mentality. American sports are not autonomous; they are heteronomous. They do not exemplify play because "separateness" (Huizinga's term and one of his characteristics of play) is absent. In the communist countries sports are an expression of politics. In America sports are an extension of economics. Money dictates where the growth or popularity of sports has and will take place. In the Spring of 1980, an anonymous writer wrote on a Texas Christian University blackboard the following, which is very much to the point. "Curling isn't big in the U.S. because curling is hard to have a large audience for; it can't make $ in our capitalistic society, so [it] isn't popular." This is truly a note from the underground. Colleges and universities have forgotten the view that athletics are to be seen as a part of total university life—a life devoted to learning. Athletics make (or can make if permitted) a distinctive contribution of their own to the learning experience for both participants and spectators alike. The values associated with athletics here are those of competing, self-discovery, self-esteem and dignity, along with a whole host of others. The identity of sports and learning lies behind this perspective. We learn something profound about ourselves and others when we engage in sports and athletics which cannot be discovered elsewhere. They have an indispensible role to play in the development of human character. We need to regain the insight which this perspective affords.

It may be painful for the men, but sacrifice is necessary if we are to restore sports to their optimal setting. The first step is to reject the athletics = money equation and substitute learning for money. Then the questions become ones of what individuals are to gain from sports, and the decisions regarding which sports are to be supported or funded will depend upon understanding *who* is to engage in them. In fact, looked at this way the women should be given a priority because they have been deprived of the learning experience which athletics and sports provide. (Perhaps this consequence is what critics of Title IX and other reforms fear the most.) The appropriate questions should not concern revenue producing, available funds, etc., but rather should be questions of interest, equality, fairness, and growth. We cannot have it both ways—athletics with amateur ideals.

This conflict of perspectives is one clearly perceived by Keating in the early chapters of *Competition and Playful Activities*. (Just what "amateur ideals" consists of will be discussed in a later section.)

The growth of professionalism has substantially changed collegiate athletics. Much has been written as of late which sadly records the details of this decline.[3] Keating's own corrective policies are: (1) abolish all methods of compensation and reward, giving prizes only symbolic value;[4] (2) prohibit all expense accounts and expect each competitor to pay all of his or her own expenses; (3) make no effort of any kind to secure publicity; and (4) do not charge admission nor employ any stratagem for the purpose of profiting from the tournament or competition, allowing entrance fees and/or a sponsoring organization to cover attendant costs (35–36). These are rather drastic reforms, but Keating seems to be aware of their consequences. In detail:

> Employment of such policies would encourage greater equality in competition and the joyful, magnanimous spirit of play, but at a rather substantial price. Gone should be the drama, the widespread communal interest, the sense of importance which are inseparable from a well publicized and traditional athletic contest. Gone also would be the opportunity to cultivate and practice the virtues which are endemic to the agonistic life. You can't have it both ways. The values proper to play and those proper to athletics are usually irreconcilable within the same activity. The futile and confused attempt to fuse diverse values lies at the heart of the amateur problem. The failure to recognize the important distinction between playful activity and athletics and the values proper to each is the heart of the problem of amateur athletics. (36)

So here we have it. A rather austere program of reform. Keating is not the only one; Novak proposed a similar list,[5] and most recently Underwood has followed suit.[6] These theorists are not content to give a description of the sports world. Like Keating, they envision their enterprise as revisionary; they are telling us what the structure of that world ought to be like.[7]

Competition Again

Keating's proviso not only draws our attention clearly to the curruption of sport, but it also corrects a common misunderstanding (3). There is no such thing as competing with one's self. A better way

to describe one's activity is as his or her improvement upon past performance(s). This could best be described as self-actualization or discovery or improvement. When Wertz goes jogging and seeks to outdo his previous 9K meter runs by running 10K, he is not competing with himself. He is attempting to better an earlier established goal. While this activity shares some common features with competing, it also has some essential ones missing. As Keating says, "Only when he seeks to exceed, surpass, or go beyond the best efforts of others is he actually competing. Competition in all of its forms always presupposes an other or others" (3).

Another misconception avoided by Keating's definition is that competition consists of "parallel efforts" of the competitors (5). (George Simmel held this view.) The consequence of this idea of competition is that the "conflict in it is indirect" (4). Keating develops a convincing argument against such a view and in support of the view that in sports, as in economics, politics, etc., most often competition is of a most direct kind. "In all middle distance and distance races the competitors are keenly aware of the existence of their competitors and usually, by the employment of their strength and speed, attempt to get their oppoment to run the type of race for which he is least qualified." And, "Only in the short dashes can it be said that 'each competitor by himself aims at the goal without using his strength on the adversary . . . and that he proceeds as if there existed no adversary . . .' " (5). Throughout his book, Keating's discussion admirably reflects the sport experience as this example testifies.

So, the definition of competition has the fruitfulness to correct two misconceptions and to isolate something which should not pass as sport or a game.

Amateurism

There are many people who feel that the amateur ideal is an area of human activity which is still worth preserving and cultivating. "Through definition, they [including Keating and myself] hope to set it [the amateur ideal] off and protect it from outside and destructive influences" (27). It is statements like this which suggest the view I mentioned earlier that philosophy has a role of "policing" the concepts which underlie these activities we commonly call the sports world. Philosophers are to point to the violations of the fragile moral

sphere which encompasses the sports world and to remind those who need reminding of the notions which make up that sphere. Keating is one of the recent philosophers who fit this revisionary program. Amateurism, winning, and sportsmanship are areas of his concern, besides competition and professionalism. Regarding amateurism Keating puts it this way:

> It is of prime importance, therefore, that we know who, or what, it is that we are trying to protect and, precisely, from whom, or what, it is in need of protection. Specifically, as applied to amateur athletics, what is sorely needed is a definition that will serve as an easily applicable criterion for the inclusion or exclusion of competitors in various contests. The reason why the French-flavored term "amateur" was chosen to characterize this aspect of human life is that its root or etymological meaning is "lover" and the distinctive feature of that human activity, thought to be in need of protection, is that it is performed out of love of the activity itself and apart from all pecuniary interest. (27)

But one must be aware or be made aware of that activity which is of intrinsic value—something undertaken for its own sake and not for the sake of something else (instrumentalism). Participants themselves can be ignorant of their motives, and there may be a variety of reasons why people participate in a given game. So isolating attitudes of motives as the *differentia* of amateurism is problematic (29). Also, confused values are found in today's sports and athletics. And these too must be sorted out along with attitudes or motives if the amateur ideal is to be salvaged. We have seen Keating's proposed program of reform earlier, as to how athletics are to be restored. Speaking of restoration, let's turn to perspectives on winning.

The Final Cause of Sport

What is the final cause of sport or athletics? Is it victory as Keating says it is? (20) To really answer these two questions, we need to pause and look at Aristotle's doctrine of four causes. To know x, for Aristotle, is to know by means of causes the necessary elements of x, whether x is a natural or an artificial object. In *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, G. B. Kerferd characterizes Aristotle's doctrine in this way: ". . . the material cause deals with the substrate, such as the bronze of a statue, while the formal cause is concerned with the shape of the statue. The final cause is the end or purpose for the sake of which the process of making the statue was commenced, and the

efficient cause is that which initiates the process of change and so is its primary source.''[8] Let us look at another example, that of a *city*. Aristotle's analysis would proceed in the following manner. The matter or the stuff of a city would be the people. The form or plan would be its organization. The demographic data and various urban boundaries would be the formal cause. The final cause is living, or better yet, living well. Not just to survive, but to enhance the quality of life. Now only with the final cause in mind can we begin to give a decent description of the efficient cause. It would be, of course, the realization or acceptance of the final cause as desirable by some or all of the people. This urban example sheds light on how to analyze sports or athletics using Aristotelian categories.

The matter and form would be the same for sport as it is for city. The material cause would be the people. Pushing this category, one might want to include the equipment, the physical space or environment, and so on. The formal cause would be the organization of the people involved. This would be the making of a team from an aggregate of individuals. With the execution of plans and strategies comes the unity and harmony of individuals' movements to form teams. Or in individual sports, an ordinary person is transformed into a player. The final cause, I would submit, is playing—playing well. Thinking of a city as a place where individuals merely survive is analogous to thinking of game-playing as an activity leading only to winning. This is an impoverished view of sport. Winning is just one of the consequences of playing well. Playing well enhances the quality of life for both spectators and participants. How is this enhancement accomplished? One way to answer this question is to view sport the way Aristotle describes drama, especially tragedy, in the *Poetics*.[9]

Following Aristotle, we can suppose that sport imitates nature. Those things in nature imitated are harmony and rhythm in movement or action. The delight in seeing or in playing a game is that one is at the same time learning—gathering the meanings of things. If one cannot discern the meaning, then one cannot derive pleasure from the event. Pleasure, for Aristotle, requires both discernment or intellection and meaningfulness. So for sports or games to be pleasurable they need to possess *cultivated* players and audiences—ones who are capable of the above requirements. Cultivated players and audiences would then also be capable of efficiency, the efficient cause being the

realization or acceptance of the final cause as desirable by all or most people involved. The cultivated players and audiences are present not just to determine a winner and a loser or to witness this, but to achieve excellence. The uncultivated audience and players watch and play only to win. This is all that is determined; not excellence, mastery, perfection, or beauty. These are the sorts of things which the cultivated audiences and players hope and expect to find. The final cause includes a sense of wholeness and a catharsis on the part of the citizenry or the audience. An audience must be present in order for the final cause to be operative. The action would be incomplete unless its reality of presentation were felt in the game by those watching or playing. The games purge the audience's and the player's emotions. Thus, athletics and games worthy of their names are akin to drama. In athletics and sports, the actions are as nearly as possible one action or event, in which may be seen a sequence consisting of a beginning, middle and end. The end represents the resolution of that whole action and is transferred to the audience by catharsis.

Here it is in theory. For the resolution to be a cultivated one, the unity of the game's action must be achieved by the players and appreciated by the audience. All of this is done within proper boundaries, which constitute, of course, the moral sphere to which Keating has drawn our attention. So there is a moral paradigm which governs and guides the games, for the cultivated. For excellence and perfection to be achieved and measured, they occur within the bounds of what Keating calls sportsmanship (ch. 4), to which I will turn momentarily.

Keating tempers his position that victory in itself is not enough for the athlete by suggesting that it must be coupled with something else. That something else is excellence (21). Winning takes on whatever importance it has when opponents are equally matched and their effort is a masterful struggle of strength, endurance, and strategy.

One other point I wish to make regarding Keating's discussion of winning is that there seems to be a distinction between winning and victory which he largely ignores. He uses the terms synonymously. However, there is evidence in ordinary language to support the legitimacy of the distinction. "Victory" carries noble connotations—all those things which are brought to light by the Aristotelian perspective. In fact, the terms *victory* and *victorious* are rarely used.

When they are used, as in the sentence, "We claimed a victory over the Tigers," we are suggesting that our win was against great odds and in the presence of risk, pressure and the exercise of masterful feats on our part to overcome a seemingly superior opponent. Whereas if you asked me, "Did you win?" you are usually asking me for the results of a particular game. But the question rephrased in terms of victory such as "Were you victorious?" seems to have appropriate and inappropriate contexts. You wouldn't ask a question like that of me after my regular Sunday afternoon doubles match. The question of winning is always appropriate, so there is a difference in meaning—one, I think, worth preserving. Winning has a minimal meaning of the actual completion or end of the game; it.e., time running out and/or the final succession of moves or score. Winning is gaining the upperhand of a struggle in a competitive situation. Looked at in this light, winning is always involved in victory; it is a subset of the idea of victory. But victory includes more than just winning. In other words, my point is that the terms *winning* and *victory* stress slightly different activities which are significant enough that they should not be ignored in a discussion of this sort. If we grant such a distinction, then the answer to our initial question becomes equivocal. If victory is to carry connotations other than just winning, then we might be inclined to agree with Keating that victory is the final cause of sport. But if we equate the two terms, then there are serious reservations about this as a viable candidate for the final cause of sport.

Sportsmanship and Excellence

The title of chapter 4 is "Sportsmanship as a Moral Category." Anyone familiar with the literature in the field of philosophy of sport will be aware of the ideas in this much anthologized article, which originally appeared in the journal *Ethics* in 1964. Following the dichotomy he draws between athletics and play, Keating convincingly shows that there are corresponding notions of sportsmanship to these diverse activities. In playful activities, "generosity and magnanimity are essential ingredients in the conduct and attitude properly described as sportsmanlike. They establish and maintain the unique social bond; they guarantee that the purpose of play—the pleasure or joy of the participants—will not be sacrificed to other more selfish ends" (45). In athletics, the sportsmanlike conduct and attitude consists of a more legalistic interpretation of the rules that the player

gives (50), in addition to fairness (51), as a sense of fair play prevails over the rules and spirit of play. Keating concludes this discussion with the following remark.

> The source of confusion which vitiates most discussion of sportsmanship is the unwarranted assumption that playful activities and athletics are so similar in nature that a single code of conduct and similar participant attitudes are applicable to both. (51)

The moral quality Keating finds in playful activities is generosity, which seems to color all the other moral qualities that may be found. The moral quality pervading athletics is fairness.

Another moral quality Keating mentions, but leaves undeveloped, is self-control (45, 52, 73, 75). If there is a common link between athletics and playful activities, it may be in the idea of self-control. Self-control in both activities is requisite to bring about the desired atmosphere and aims of the participants, be it playful activities or athletics. I prefer to label this phenomenon as "moral restraint," because it seems to capture the attitude and behavior of the individual involved better, in addition to emphasizing the moral sphere. Why are Bjorn Borg's court behavior and attitude universally admired by tennis players and fans? It is because we can readily see them exhibiting the kind of moral restraint we find underlying sportsmanlike conduct. Moral restraint is the guiding thread through the seam of conduct which should govern the actions of players, coaches, officials, and spectators. When coaches draw foul penalties at basketball games because of unsportsmanlike conduct, it is due to their lack of moral restraint. When a football team is penalized because of the crowd's reactions, the crowd has not exercised its responsibilities as a cultivated audience (to use Aristotle's phrase) of a game. Many individuals have forgotten this important element of game-playing. Moral restraint affects not only the rules of play, but also the spirit of play.

We have seen the place of excellence in Keating's scheme of things, so I will briefly comment on chapter 5, "Athletics and the Pursuit of Excellence." This is a theme similar to Paul Weiss', concerning the challenges which the body offers.[10] Also, like Michael Novak,[11] Keating chooses to discuss excellence by examining the Homeric image of life as an athletic contest (55). The quest for superiority and eminence is a major goal in human life for the Greeks

and Western man (58). Athletes today are motivated by the desire to be number one, to stand apart from all the others. Keating records the personal accounts of Jack Nicklaus, Rod Laver, and Frank Beard in this regard. Speaking of the value of the pursuit of excellence, Keating makes the following comment about judging one's maximal effort:

> The athlete speaks eloquently, to this point [one's true limitations]. Great athletes never admit to their limitations; they must be painfully convinced of them. The chief value of any conscientious pursuit of excellence resides in its ability to reveal and exploit man's true potential. (61)

It is here that we can speak of transcendence. Sport provides another realm of perception and being. Hints of what our future as a species may be lie in the athletic realm.[12] The essence of man, for Spinoza, is desire, and that desire is for perfection. Where we may be able to measure such metaphysical definitions best is in competition and sport.

Keating on the Philosophers

In *Competition and Playful Activities*, there is an assortment of short chapters on Sartre (ch. 8), Wittgenstein (ch. 9), Plato (ch. 10), and Weiss (ch. 11). All of these are summations of their theories which are followed by a critique along the lines of the dichotomy Keating draws between athletics and play. This is especially true of Keating's criticism of Wittgenstein on games. Wittgenstein includes activities—playful activities—as games, which are not in fact games in his refutation of the essentialistic theory of meaning. Consequently, his refutation is not as convincing as it could be because what are offered as examples turn out to be items belonging to another kind of human activity.

One of the best chapters in this group is the one on Sartre. It is one of the best summations available in the literature today of Sartre's difficult ideas. However, that does not ease the pain which is acquired from struggling with Sartre's categories. Why do people continue to write on Sartre? It is no longer true that sport is the only sphere of human activity which is ignored by philosophers today (81). Just because Sartre was one of the first philosophers to devote a small fraction of space to sport and play doesn't mean that everyone who writes a book on the subject needs to include some discussion of

Sartre's ideas. His ideas are virtually unintelligible; and when they are penetrable, the concepts are counterintuitive or the exact opposite of what they should be. Take for instance the concept of appropriation that Sartre uses in his discussion of skiing.

"Appropriation" is explained as the manner in which human subjectivity is released (85ff.). Keating characterizes it in the following fashion:

> The environment may be a field of snow, an Alpine slope. To see it is already to possess it. Yet this first intuitive enjoyment can not suffice me. If I approach, if I want to establish an appropriative contact with the field of snow, everything is changed. Its scale of being is modified; it exists bit by bit instead of existing in vast spaces; stains, brush, and crevices come to individualize each square inch. (86)

What Sartre chooses to emphasize here is the ego, the self. It is I who change the field of snow. It is I who choose the route through the slope and the speed which I alone can diminish or increase as I like. It is my mastery over the slope; it is the self who does the appropriating. Sartre's complicated metaphysical analysis continues along the above lines, with the point of subjectivity clearly focused on an autonomous self in conscious control of its actions.

However, this is only one way to look at how play releases subjectivity or how appropriation takes place. There is at least one other way to view appropriation. What about my being being modified rather than the field of snow? A total release of subjectivity occurs when outward concern dominates and inward concern is absent.[13] Nature—in this example, the field of snow—does the appropriating rather than man. It is Nature (via unconsciousness) that does the releasing of subjectivity. Nature sports, like skiing and mountain climbing, make more sense by this analysis than Sartre's because one of the benefits they provide the human being is the feeling of union with Nature.[14] Surely the experience of freedom and the release of subjectivity are more accurately portrayed from this ontological perspective than from Sartre's. Sartre perverts the experience in nature sports by construing it along the lines of competition and domination. (This doesn't begin to fit the definition of competition given earlier.) If we follow the wisdom of the Orient, in particular that of Sekida, the ego is to be eliminated along with the illusion that it is in control. Sartre is a perfect example of Western thinking which stresses the individual, domination, and action as self centered

and directed. But, this model breaks down when one attempts to apply it to Nature. All the wrong items in the sport experience seem to be emphasized under the Sartrean model. Unconsciousness is the link to being. That link is distorted greatly when we try to conceive of it as conscious and ego centered. That sort of awareness usually brings about mishaps and miscalculations because one's attention is on the self rather than the environment—that field of snow or slope. The sort of control and mastery Sartre talks about in skiing come from Nature—not the self. Hence, his theory is counterintuitive and lacking in the essentials which make up nature sports.

Several of the criticisms Keating makes of Paul Weiss on sport had been made several years earlier by Harold VanderZwaag.[15] Weiss' book (see note 10) really deals with athletics rather than sport, individuals being less than what they might be, and women making poor teammates and mastering their bodies more easily than men. Criticisms of these four views are well-taken. Keating foresees that in general Weiss' philosophy of sport does not adequately reflect the sport experience or the concrete existential situation (126). Keating's discussion of Plato on play is uninspiring and lacks the in-depth precision that some of the more recent discussions have had.[16]

Potpourri

Out of the several miscellaneous chapters, the ones worthy of some discussion deal with the black athlete, the blood sports (hunting and fishing), and gambling. The last of these topics, gambling, is the most interesting for the philosophy of sport because so little has been written on the subject and what has been written is moralistic and associated with prostitution (139). Consequently, gambling has not been singled out for philosophical analysis. Keating's chapter on the ethics of gambling does not take us too far in that direction, but it does prompt us to begin looking for answers to some intriguing questions concerning the nature of gambling. Of those questions, the one I find of most interest is, "What is gambling and how, if at all, does it differ from betting?" (140) Following others, Keating draws the distinction in this manner: "While gambling always looks to uncertain, future events, betting is, at times, on the past—on historical fact" (143). Using time as the distinguishing trait seems to me a bit weak in that it is not one of the essential features of either activity. A better place to look for them would be in the setting in which they occur. Gambling

usually involves some sort of institutional setting which may utilize numbers and/or equipment. Roulette, dice, blackjack and other card games are obvious examples. Betting does not involve these sorts of institutional settings. We place bets in horse races, but the betting is actually gambling, because of the odds, the house and the institutions which govern its activities. Betting is an activity between two or more people, whereas gambling takes on the added dimension of one of the individuals being "the house." Betting is a wager which has an informal surrounding. The object of the wager, like the outcome of football games, can be the same for either activity; moreover, the one activity, betting, may evolve quickly into gambling. Thus, it is more nearly the setting which differentiates these activities than the objects, attitudes, or time associated with them.

The chapter on the blood sports (12) entitled "A Wit in the White House? or Grover Cleveland on Hunting and Fishing" is as odd as it sounds. However, Keating's attempt to articulate the ethic of the outdoor life raises some interesting questions and philosophical paths to follow. Animal rights, a recent topic in ethics, takes on added dimensions when approached from the viewpoint of hunting. Sportsmanlike behavior of the hunter is discussed in terms of how the animal is killed. The defenses of the kill and hunting in general in this chapter would have been markedly improved had Keating consulted Ortega's *Meditations on Hunting*.[17] Ortega's phenomenological study of hunting and the hunt brings a sympathetic account to the field which is still missing in philosophical discussions. But Keating turns from drama to humor. It is difficult not to laugh when one reads some of the things he writes. For instance;

> Non-fishermen are often startled by the tall tales with which fishermen regale one another. But why such incredulity? The presumption must be with the fishermen and for very good reasons. It is axiomatic that fish are constantly doing the most mysterious things, and thus, in recognition of this fact, any tale told by a fisherman is, to a fellow fisherman, indubitably true. (135)

I am startled that Keating would write such remarks as these.

Like Novak,[18] Keating discusses the black athlete and the nature of athletics (ch. 6). But Keating addresses himself to more social and moral issues than Novak has. Keating discusses the career of Bill Russell and its effects on other blacks in terms of career selection—whether or not athletics has deprived the black community of other

professions by the lure of money and fame. Also the question of equality in athletics is raised and Keating carefully reviews the answers.

Conclusion

One of the real pluses of the book is its revisionary program. Many of the books in philosophy of sport today which focus on the current state of sport dwell mainly on corruption and decline. These authors do not extend their enterprise to include explanations and remedies for the degradation of sport. Keating does. *Competition and Playful Activities* is principally a work in ethics.

The method employed by Keating throughout the book is essentialism or a modified version of it. Keating's procedures are anti-Wittgensteinian and similar to Bernard Suits.[19] Both conceive of philosophy traditionally, as seeking definitions of important ideas which comprise significant activities under analysis or discussion. But Keating's book is more popularly conceived and less philosophical at times than Suits' dialogue. I would place Keating's work somewhere in between Novak's concrete philosophy of culture (in *The Joy of Sports*) and Christopher Lasch's journalistic, "popular" philosophy.[20] So its audience is potentially broader and its ideas are more readily accessible.

The book's cosmetic drawbacks are the numerous printing errors (well over a dozen), the absence of an index, and the layout of some of the chapters. Chapter 7 should have followed chapter 4, and chapter 14 should have been after chapter 5, in terms of the order of ideas presented.

Notes

[1] John Underwood, *The Death of an American Game: The Crisis in Football* (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1980).

[2] Washington Bureau of The News, "Roger's Move Warms 'Skins," *The Dallas Morning News*, Wednesday, April 2, 1980, sec. B, Sports, p. 1.

[3] John Underwood, "Student-Athletes: The Sham, the Shame" (special report), *Sports Illustrated*, vol. 52, no. 21 (May 19, 1980), pp. 36–72.

[4] The French have admirably attempted this in the 1980 French Open by presenting the first place check for $43,000 later in private to Chris Evert Lloyd. The money is secondary to the prestige of the world's premier clay court title. (Barry Lorge of *The Washington Post*, "On to Wimbledon for Chris after win," *Sunday Fort Worth Star-Telegram*, June 8, 1980, section b, Sports, p. 1.) What prestige the WCT Finals in Dallas, Texas, has, lies squarely on the money the event has associated with it.

[5] Michael Novak, *The Joy of Sports* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1976), ch. 17, entitled "Some Burkean Reforms."

[6] *Op. cit., Sports Illustrated*, pp. 71–72.

[7] Peter Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1963), see the introduction for the distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics.

[8] G. B. Kerferd, "Aristotle," *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967), I, 157.

[9] Aristotle, *Poetics*, especially sections 4, 25, 26.

[10] Paul Weiss, *Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry* (Carbondale: Southern Illnois University Press, 1969), p. 57.

[11] *Op. cit.*, ch. 1.

[12] George Leonard first suggested this thesis in *The Ultimate Athlete: Revisioning Sports, Physical Education and the Body* (New York: The Viking Press, 1975), pp. 254–55.

[13] Katsuki Sekida, *Zen Training: Methods and Philosophy* (New York: John Weatherhill and Co., 1972), ch. 8.

[14] Jan Progan has rightfully listed this trait as one of the important characteristics of nature sports ("Man, Nature and Sport," in *Sport and the Body: A Philosophical Symposium*, Ellen Gerber, ed. [Philadelphia: Lea and Febiger, 1972], p. 200.)

[15] Harold VanderZwaag, *Toward a Philosophy of Sport* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1972), pp. 47f., 71f., 103f., 106f., 117f., 191f.

[16] See, for instance, Daniel A. Dombrowski, "Plato and Athletics," *Journal of the Philosophy of Sport*, vol. 6 (Fall 1979), pp. 29–38.

[17] José Ortega y Gasset, *Meditations on Hunting*, Howard B. Wescott, trans. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1972). Orignially written in Lisbon in 1942.

[18] *Op. cit.*, ch. 6.

[19] Bernard Suits, *The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978).

[20] Christopher Lasch, "The Corruption of Sports," *New York Review*, April 28, 1977, and reprinted in his *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in An Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1979), ch. 5.

Anthropology of Education: Methods and Applications

Alanson A. Van Fleet, Editor
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
A Special Topic Edition Of The
Journal of Thought, Vol. 15, No. 3, Fall 1980

By depicting the advantages and limitations of ethnographic research in education and educational evaluation, and by presenting illustrative cases in which anthropological perspectives and methods are used, this volume offers professionals and students an insight into the overlapping areas of anthropology and education. Articles include the following:

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Book Reviews

Social Justice and Preferential Treatment

W. T. Blackstone and Robert D. Heslep
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1977
217 pages. $11.59 cloth, $5.95 paper

Reviewed by:

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East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Some books lend themselves more readily to pedagogical uses than others. *Social Justice and Preferential Treatment* is such a book. The reason the book is so pedagogically useful is that it contains a number of essays by persons whose special experiences have afforded them unique insight into social problems. Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State and one of the contributors to this volume, formulates in the clearest and crispest terms the essence of the questions surrounding the reverse-discrimination-preferential-treatment debate. And the influence of his experience as Secretary and as a professor of law in international relations is obvious when he reduces the question of compensatory justice to one simple (or is it complex?) question: Who owes what, to whom, for what, under what conditions? The question sounds like the outline for a good lecture.

Take the first part of the question, Who owes? Does the white majority of this generation owe something special to the nonwhite minorities of this generation (for past discrimination against nonwhite minorities of past generations)? Who constitutes the white majority? Why does this generation have special obligations to rectify past injustices? These are all commonly asked questions—ones which have assumed a dreary familiarity in the debates over affirmative action. My chief point here is that Rusk's larger question provides a clear way of focusing systematically on all of the commonly asked questions surrounding notions of compensatory justice. Are Jews, Catholics, and Chinese included in the group with special obligations to minorities or are they a part of the minorities? What about redress for the discriminations they have suffered in America in the past?

What is owed? Justice surely. But what is required by justice? Equal treatment? Identical treatment? Preferential treatment? Reverse discrimination? Education and Educational Opportunity? Jobs? A quota of jobs? A quota of educational slots perhaps? Housing? Welfare rights? Health care? Day care for the children in families so that housewives (an oppressed class)

may be liberated? Head Start programs? Food and nutrition programs? Open admissions? A degree from colleges and universities without competencies to earn the degree?

To whom is justice owed? To Blacks? There may be, according to Bittker in *The Case for Black Reparations*, as many as 55 million American Blacks. Have all been harmed by discrimination? What about poor Appalachian whites—another 17 million persons? Jews—another 7 million? Chinese—another ½ million? Hispanics—another 11 million? Women? 110 million Americans are women. What about Roman Catholics—another 24 million? Mormons—another 5 million? Have all minorities or all members of minority groups been harmed by discrimination? Surely not. There are wealthy and well-off Blacks, Catholics, Jews, women, Hispanics, etc. To whom is justice owed?

Under what conditions is preferential treatment owed? How is redress for past injustices to be given? Through the supply-and-demand fluctuations of the job market? That seems like a haphazard way to distribute recompense for past wrongs. Should we try cash reparations? It has worked with stolen land in the case of wars. Why would cash reparation not be an appropriate way to compensate Blacks and other minorities for "stolen opportunities"? Is race one of the relevant conditions for determining what we owe to minorities? Why not harm? Those who have been harmed the most would have the strongest claim to compensatory treatment, that is, harm is more important than race in determining who gets compensated. Who owes what, to whom, under what conditions? A profound question. And the eleven contributors are about evenly divided on the question whether compensatory or preferential treatment can be justified.

This volume contains a number of significant essays and philosophical surprises. Richard Wasserstrom, UCLA professor of law and philosophy, questions the validity of employing merit as the basis for allocating jobs and opportunities in American society. Wasserstrom maintains that there is no "necessary connection between academic merit . . . and deserving to be a member of the academic community." This sounds like an outrageous statement. Wasserstrom employs a useful analogy to make his point:

> Suppose, for instance, that there is only one tennis court in the community. Is it clear that the two best tennis players ought to be the ones permitted to use it? Why not those who were there first? Or those who will enjoy playing the most? Or those who are the worst and therefore need the greatest opportunity to practice? Or those who have the chance to play least frequently?

Wasserstrom's questions cut to the core of our merit-based society and educational system. Unless one can prove that the opportunity to play tennis

is significantly different from other opportunities like education, the analogy has a point.

This book is important for the questions it raises *and* the way in which it raises these questions. It is perhaps one of the best books published on the problems associated with affirmative action.

W. T. Blackstone askes how we can redefine merit to take into account special handicaps suffered because of race or sex. Ruth Bader Ginsberg, professor of law at Columbia, asks how we can eliminate the "homework gap" that hampers women in the realization of equality of opportunity. Prince Wilson asks why greater progress toward equality of treatment—not preferential treatment—has not been achieved. William Banner of Howard University asks how we can begin to apply a meaningful test (like the Rawlsian concept of justice) to programs of affirmative action for minorities. Probably no summary will do this richly argued, broadly interdisciplinary book justice. It deserves preferential treatment on one's reading lists.

Journal of Thought

The Arrogance of Humanism

David Ehrenfeld
Oxford University Press,
1979
286 pp.

Reviewed by:

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The well-known environmental biologist David Ehrenfeld has written a sobering book that humanists will benefit from studying, even though they may not agree with all its arguments and conclusions. His thesis is that humanism is always homocentric, focusing on human needs and interests, and that this leads to a dichotomy between people and nature in which ecological factors are generally subordinated to the satisfaction of human wants. Furthermore, humanism's focus on man's interests leads to a second dichotomy, between reason and emotion. It is reason that humanists often cite as the differentia between man and other animals, and the means to satisfy human interests and needs is a form of rational problem-solving activity in which science, technology and socio-economic planning, the offspring of reason, are emphasized at the expense of human emotions and instincts.

Having characterized humanism as an ideology based on the assumptions that human interests are paramount and that all problems are resolvable by reason, Ehrenfeld devotes the major portion of his book to undercutting the assumptions. Generally, against both assumptions he argues by a reduction to unacceptable consequences that humanism is leading to global environmental degradation that will result in the impoverishment and collapse of the ecosystem. More specifically, against the homocentric assumption—which he claims entails that humanists will not generally favor saving any aspect of nature that is not clearly useful to man—he argues for an ecological worldview that emphasizes the interrelatedness, complexity, and intrinsic value of all aspects of the natural world. Existence, for Ehrenfeld, is the "only criterion of the value of parts of nature" (p. 208). Consequently, he argues that nothing in the natural realm should be endangered as a result of man's activities. Consistent with this ecological framework, he accepts the reason/emotion dichotomy, claims that emotion is the basis of sound judgment, and argues that its advantage over an emphasis on reason is that "the central core of all emotion is survival" (p. 224).

As in his earlier book, *Conserving Life on Earth* (Oxford, 1972), Ehrenfeld offers a detailed catalog of problems that emerge from man's drive to control the environment. Here he is at his best—even the most hardened technocrat will be brought to consider wider horizons if he reads this book. But it is doubtful that Ehrenfeld provides an acceptable prescription. In his

earlier book he stated that the only basis for optimism is a hope in "supra-rational factors which are, by definition, unknowable" (p. 335). At present he believes that our only hope lies in a global economic depression, resulting in the collapse of the world economic system and its technological infrastructure. Only then will it be possible for man to abjure power and find fulfillment in the natural context.

That Ehrenfeld is led to this rather desperate conclusion is an indication that his dichotomies pose false dilemmas. Humanism is certainly not necessarily committed to a dichotomy between people and nature. In fact, since it acknowledges no transcendental domain, *naturalistic* humanism places man squarely in the natural context. Furthermore, although humanists are concerned with man's interests, this does not entail indifference to the natural environment. Humanism is not egocentric; it is the long-term welfare of all humans, present and future, that it is concerned with, and it is clear to most humanists that a healthy environment is in fact necessary for the long-range satisfaction of human needs and interests. So the naturalistic humanist need not accept the first dichotomy; his commitment to naturalism does not entail an exclusive focus on human interests, and his commitment to the legitimate sphere of human interests does not entail indifference to nonhuman nature. Similarly, humanists need not accept the dichotomy between reason and emotion. Dewey, for example, stressed the integration of the human personality. And Harold Hadley has recently rejected both dichotomies in stating that humanism involves a "deep emotional relationship with one's world and is an appreciative response to the wholeness of that world" (Editorial, *Religious Humanism*, vol. XI, no. 3, Summer, 1977, p. 103).

With these caveats in mind, Ehrenfeld's book serves both as a forceful critique of positivistic forms of humanism which do stress the use of reason to exclusively secure human interests, and as a prod to religiously oriented naturalistic humanists to develop a more adequate and widely accepted philosophy.

The American Establishment

Leonard Silk and Mark Silk
New York: Basic Books, 1980
xi, 351 pp., $13.95

Reviewed by:

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The authors see "Establishment as a collective entity, as a 'third force' in the American Polity, the other two being Business and Government. The Establishment is not a force wholly independent of these other two." (p. 18) Then they deal with its historical roots, its major institutions and the intellectuals who have shaped them, its beliefs, and its future. In nine readable and anecdote-packed chapters, they describe the establishment in the institutions it inhabits: Harvard, the *New York Times*, the Ford Foundation, the Brookings Institution, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and the Committee for Economic Development. They detail for us how the Establishment changes form through the eyes—and the deeds—of both its friends and its foes, men like David Rockefeller and Richard Nixon, Edward Kennedy and Jimmy Carter, John Oakes and the Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, Henry Kissinger and McGeorge Bundy, and trace its origins through such figures as Andrew Carnegie, Felix Frankfurter, John D. Rockefeller, Charles Eliot, Henry L. Stimpson, and Walter Lippmann.

Basically they see the Establishment as an idea—an idea deeply rooted in the origins of the United States, an idea with ongoing importance to American political and social development.

That it is a good and quite readable book is evident. But that it is "the best book since de Tocqueville" (as a quote on the jacket claims) is highly debatable since, historically, we can point to such outstanding works as: Lord James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth* (New York: MacMillan, 1909), Kohn U. Nef, *The United States and Civilization* (Chicago University Press, 1942), Andrè Siegfried, *America Comes of Age* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1927), John W. Chase, ed., *Years of the Modern: An American Appraisal* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1949), Charles A. & Mary R. Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York: MacMillan, 1927); etc.

Furthermore, most historical sociologists will regret that the Silks do not relate their approach to the famous Pareto's "circulation of elites," since, after, their treatment of "Establishment" can hardly be dissociated from that theory: that every society is—whether covertly or overtly—governed by an oligarchy whose membership changes rather regularly (i.e. there is a "circulation of the elite") and because (1) elites seldom replace themselves

from their own "stock," hence must recruit talented members of subordinate groups to assume leadership positions, or (2) over the long run, members of "outside" groups will revolt—and thus, when successful, begin a new cycle in the power-circulation process. All of these points are rather cogently noted in the present work.

At any rate, on balance, the Silks' work is both insightful and rather incomplete—sociologically. Their conclusions are certain to stimulate a good part of current debate over the role of selected establishment in contemporary life. The generalist or the layman will appreciate it more than the sociologist, although all may profit from it.

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

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
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